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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the inconsistency between the plain language of states' accomplice
liability legislation and its respective interpretation in the state courts, many
states' accomplice laws present a confused picture in terms of the law's stance
on accomplice liability. No aspect of this law is more complex than that relating
to the mental state requirement for accomplice liability. Nevertheless, if one
engages in a cursory examination of the legal literature, case law, and state
legislation concerning the mental state requirement for accomplice liability,
essentially three approaches surface. These approaches differ in the degree to
which they hold an individual culpable for the conduct of another. First, there is
the perspective (which is particularly popular in the academic community) that
favors a very limited, narrow approach whereby accomplice liability is
dependent upon a finding that an accused's "purpose [was] to encourage or
assist another in the commission of a crime."' Meanwhile, a second perspective
(which the Model Penal Code follows to some extent2) tolerates a more
1. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(b), at 675 (4th ed. 2003).
2. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (1962) (providing that a defendant is guilty of
accomplice liability "if he acts with the kind of culpability ... that is sufficient for the commission
of the offense").
3
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expansive approach whereby an accomplice's liability turns on whether the
accomplice harbored the mental state required of the substantive crime allegedly
aided or abetted. Finally, the third and broadest approach holds an accomplice
liable for the "natural and probable" consequences of a principal's conduct that
the accomplice somehow assisted or encouraged,4  regardless of the
accomplice's mental state.
5
The first approach, which this Article will refer to as the Category I
approach, asserts that an individual should only be liable for the acts of a
principal if that individual acted with the specific intent to promote or assist the
principal's commission of the crime. 6 This theory holds that a mental state of
knowledge or recklessness on the part of an alleged accomplice is insufficient to
hold the alleged accomplice culpable. 7 Jurisdictions following this approach
will only hold an alleged accomplice liable for the crimes that the alleged
accomplice intended a perpetrator commit. Also, if the perpetrator commits a
secondary crime in pursuance of the intended crime, the accomplice is not liable
for the secondary crime unless the accomplice intended to promote or facilitate
8this offense as well. So long as the alleged accomplice intended to somehow
assist or encourage the principal's criminality, the accomplice is liable even if
the substantive crime only requires recklessness or negligence on the part of the
principal. 9 Thus, if A loans his gun to B knowing B intends to use it to shoot his
3. See, e.g., JOSHIUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.05[A] (4th ed.
2006) ("[1]t is more precisely correct to state that an accomplice must possess two states of mind:
(1) the intent to assist the primary party to engage in the conduct that forms the basis of the
offense; and (2) the mental state required for commission of the offense, as provided in the
definition of the substantive crime." (citing State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277, 283 (Conn. 1987))).
4. People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d 153, 159 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (citing People v. Campbell,
396 N.E.2d 607, 613 (11. App. Ct. 1979)).
5. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 13.3(b), at 688.
6. Id. § 13.2(c), at 676 (citing Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1997),
amended by 955 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1997)) ("Under the usual requirement that the accomplice must
intentionally assist or encourage, it is not sufficient that he intentionally engaged in acts which, as
it turned out, did give assistance or encouragement to the principal. Rather, the accomplice must
intend that his acts have the effect of assisting or encouraging another.").
7. See id. (citing People v. Beeman, 674 P.2d 1318, 1325 (Cal. 1984)) ("[E]ven if
knowledge of the actor's intent (as opposed to sharing that intent) is otherwise sufficient, the
accomplice must have intended to give the aid or encouragement.").
8. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) ("[An accomplice must] in some
sort associate himself with the venture,... participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring
about, [and] seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words used-even the most colorless,
'abet'-carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.").
9. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 347 (1985) ("The intention requirement, however, does not
preclude holding a person for complicity in a crime for which recklessness or negligence suffices
for liability, so long as the secondary actor intended to help or persuade the primary actor to do the
[VOL. 60:237
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
neighbor's barking dog, A would not be an accomplice to B's act unless he
himself intends that B's neighbor's dog be shot. Likewise, if X gives the keys of
her car to Y, who is intoxicated, knowing Y intends to drive the car, X would not
be criminally liable if Ys reckless driving kills or injures an innocent person.
Thus, this might simply be described as the "specific intent" approach.
The second approach, which this study refers to as the Category II model, is
what might be called the "statutorily prescribed mental state" approach.
According to this somewhat more expansive view, an individual may be liable
for a crime the individual did not specifically intend for the perpetrator to
commit. 10 Rather, liability attaches if the alleged accomplice acted "with the
mental culpability required for the commission" of the offense." Thus, states
following this approach will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another
if that individual possessed the mental state prescribed by the state's substantive
criminal statute, whether the requisite mental state for conviction is intent,
knowledge, recklessness, or criminal negligence.12  Returning to the
hypotheticals discussed above, where A loans his gun knowing of B's intent to
shoot the neighbor's barking dog, A would now be criminally liable for the
knowing, unauthorized infliction of injury or death on an animal, even though A
has no intent for the crime occur.' 3 Likewise, where X gives her car keys to the
intoxicated Y knowing Y will drive her car and Y recklessly kills Z, X would be
liable for reckless homicide along with Y if we agree X harbors a reckless state
of mind. 14 Both A and X would be liable because each acts with the mental
culpability required for the commission of their respective offenses.
reckless or negligent act. When a person does an act that recklessly causes the death of another, he
is liable for manslaughter as a principal offender. That he did not intend the death is irrelevant.").
10. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277, 282 (Conn. 1987) ("[Accomplice] liability does
not require that a defendant act with the conscious objective to cause the result described by a
statute.").
11. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 2004).
12. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that an
accomplice may be liable for "act[ing] purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with
respect to [a] result, as required for the commission of the offense").
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962) ("A person acts knowingly with respect to
a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause such a result.").
14. See id. § 2.02(2)(c) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.").
2008]
5
Decker: The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLTNA LAW REVTEW
Category II states can be divided into two subcategories: (1) states that
articulate the Category II approach statutorily, and (2) states whose courts have
judicially interpreted the Category II approach from statutes void of Category II
language. The states that statutorily follow the Category II approach can be
further divided into states that require the statutorily prescribed mental state
with regard to result-oriented crimes alone, and those that do not differentiate
between conduct- and result-oriented crimes.' 5 The Model Penal Code, codified
by a number of states,16 allows for liability if an accomplice possessed the
requisite mental state for conviction of a perpetrator when "causing a particular
result is an element" of the crime (e.g., the "death" in homicide; the "injury" in
battery).17 However, if the crime focuses on the conduct of the actor rather than
the result (e.g., the "unauthorized entry" in burglary; the "substantial step" in
criminal attempt), it is necessary that the accomplice have the specific intent
that the principal commit the crime.' 8 States that do not distinguish between
conduct- and result-oriented crimes will hold an individual liable for the
conduct of another as long as the individual possessed the statutorily prescribed
mental state for the substantive crime.'
9
The third approach, which this Article refers to as Category 1I1, is the most
expansive of the approaches. States following this approach will hold an actor
liable for all the natural and probable consequences of the intended crime.
2
0
21Although some jurisdictions may not use this exact language, these states
reject the necessity of proving the accomplice had either the specific intent
required by the Category I approach or the statutorily prescribed mental state
mandated by the Category II approach. Therefore, if the principal committed a
secondary crime in the course of carrying out the target crime even if the
accomplice had no way of knowing or anticipating that an incidental or
secondary crime would occur, a court will nonetheless convict the accomplice
of the incidental crime if the court determines it to be a natural and probable
consequence of the intended crime. Now the hypotheticals above become really
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 33 (citing Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the
Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 539, 539 (1988)).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4).
18. Id. § 2.06(3).
19. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005) (holding an accomplice liable for
any crime committed "in pursuance of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended crime").
21. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (holding an
accomplice liable for "any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably
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interesting. Assume after B shoots his neighbor's barking dog with A's gun, the
neighbor, C, becomes angry and engages B in a physical altercation during
which B shoots and injures C. If we agree the altercation and resultant injury
suffered by C are natural and probable consequences of A's arming B while
knowing of B's intentions, A would be liable as an accomplice for B's battery of
C. In the example where X gives her keys to the intoxicated Y (which itself is a
violation of the state's motor vehicle code), now assume Y not only recklessly
becomes involved in a fatal vehicle crash but also that Y collides with a gasoline
truck, which explodes and causes a nearby building to catch fire. If we agree
that when X gives the intoxicated Y the keys to her car she should be held
accountable for all natural and probable consequences, it is arguable that X is
liable not only for reckless homicide if Y is involved in a fatal collision while
driving X's car but also for criminal damage to property or perhaps arson. Or,
worse yet, if a firefighter or building occupant dies in the fire, it might even be
asserted that X is liable for manslaughter.
Members of the academic community, including Professors Wayne
22 23 2LaFave, Joshua Dressier, and Audrey Rogers, 4 have strongly criticized the
Category III approach because it holds an individual to the same culpability as a
principal for a crime the commission of which the accomplice had no
knowledge of or intent to assist in. Scholars have also asserted that "this
foreseeable-offense extension of the complicity doctrine is clearly a minority
,,25view. In any event, under this view one is held accountable for the incidental
crime as a result of choosing to enter into the criminal arena, an environment
22. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 13.3, at 683-84 ("Under the better view, one is not an
accomplice to a crime merely because that crime was committed in furtherance of a conspiracy of
which he is a member, or because that crime was a natural and probable consequence of another
offense as to which he is an accomplice."); id. § 13.3(b), at 688 ("The 'natural and probable
consequence' rule of accomplice liability, if viewed as a broad generalization, is inconsistent with
more fundamental principles of our system of criminal law.").
23. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 30.05[B][5], at 517-18 (citing Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868,
872 (Nev. 2002); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6, n.42; Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability
.br Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351,
1361 & n.33 (1998)) ("The natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine has been subjected to
substantial justifiable criticism.... Thus, the effect of the rule is to permit conviction of an
accomplice whose culpability as to the non-target offense is less than is required to prove the guilt
of the primary party. And yet, in view of the relative roles of the primary and secondary parties,
one would assume that an accomplice should not be convicted of an offense unless he has the same
or higher degree of culpability required to convict the perpetrator.").
24. Rogers, supra note 23, at 1379 ("Since the natural and probable consequence doctrine
flouts the most fundamental tenet of criminal law that punishment be based on blameworthiness,
courts should be especially mindful of it when assessing accomplice liability for unintentional
crimes.").
25. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1, at 333 (1997).
2008]
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where history has shown criminality has a tendency to spread like fast growing
cancer cells.
The goal of this Article is to examine the legislation and case law
concerning accomplice liability at the state level 26 in order to assess the extent
to which individual states follow one approach over another regarding the
required mental state for criminal accountability.2 7 Part IT focuses exclusively
on the various accomplice liability statutes that appear at the state level. It
points out language that commonly appears describing the actus rea and mens
rea requirements and terminology which may be unique to a particular state
jurisdiction. Part IT also explores related statutory provisions, such as whether a
state has a codified defense of withdrawal or an exception for the victim or
incidental party. Part 1I1 explores the case law in those states that follow, or
rather flirt with, the narrow Category I approach. Part IV examines those states
that follow, by statute or judicial interpretation, either one of the two
subcategories of the Category 11, or statutorily prescribed, approach. Part V
reviews those states that, by statute or judicial interpretation, accept the broadest
approach (Category 11) to accomplice liability and impose liability for the
natural and probable consequences of a principal's conduct without regard to
the mental state of an accomplice with respect to an incidental crime. Finally,
Part VI addresses states with confusing, novel, or unique approaches to mens
rea for accomplice liability. Some of these states have conflicting or inadequate
case law on the issue of accomplice liability, preventing a categorization. Other
states' mens rea requirements depend on the particular type of crime committed
and therefore do not fit neatly into any one particular approach.
1. A FACIAL REVIEW OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
This part of the Article focuses exclusively on the statutory language
describing individual states' mental state requirements for accomplice liability.
It analyzes, by engaging in a facial examination of the respective states'
legislation, which category a particular state belongs to with respect to its
26. For a review of accomplice liability and mental state law at the federal level, see Baruch
Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer
Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002).
27. In deciding which category a particular state falls in, the designation will depend on
whether the jurisdiction has case law following the natural and probable consequences approach or
some variant, in which case the state will be placed in the Category III grouping. If it does not, an
assessment will be made whether it favors a mental state requirement for accomplice liability that
is required of the substantive crime, in which case it will be placed in the Category II grouping. If
the jurisdiction insists an accomplice must intend that a particular crime be perpetrated by a
principal, then it will be placed in the Category I grouping. Finally, for states that cannot be placed
into any of the three categories, Part VI discusses the group of states having novel or unique
approaches to accomplice liability.
[VOL. 60:237
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accomplice liability statute. It does not reflect or refer to any judicial
interpretation of the specific statutory provisions. Parts III-VI discuss at length
the case law interpretations of the various states. Because of the inconsistencies
between the statutory language and its application in the state courts, later Parts
of this article reveal, for example, that a given state might pattern its legislation
after a Category I approach while exploration of its case law may show that the
state actually follows a Category 11 approach to the mental state requirement
for accomplice liability.
28
A. Category I Statutes: "Specific Intent"
At this juncture, it should be noted that section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal
Code states:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of
an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he
(i) solicits such other person to commit it, or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning
or committing it, or
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense,
fails to make proper effort to do so; or
(b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity.
29
Standing alone, this section appears to require nothing less than a specific intent
to promote or facilitate the criminality of another before an alleged accomplice
would be responsible for a perpetrator's conduct.:3
It appears as many as thirteen states pattern their mental state requirement
for their accomplice liability statutes after section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal
28. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2002) (imposing liability where
the alleged accomplice possesses "the intent to promote or facilitate" the perpetrator's commission
of an offense), with People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d 153, 159 (11. App. Ct. 1985) (citing People v.
Campbell, 396 N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)) (allowing liability where the crime was a
"natural and probable consequence" of the intended offense).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1962).
30. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 851 (3d ed. 1982) ("A
specific intent, when an element of the mens rea of a particular offense, is some intent other than to
do the actus reus thereof which is specifically required for guilt.").
2008]
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Code. 31 Focused solely on the statutory language in their accomplice liability
legislation, these thirteen states therefore follow the Category I, or specific
intent, approach to accomplice liability. Although these jurisdictions require
nothing less than an alleged accomplice's specific intent to aid a perpetrator,
legislatures express the mental state terminology in slightly different language
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Three of these states pattern their legislation
directly after the language used in section 2.06(3). These states' statutes contain
nearly identical language to the Model Penal Code's requirement that an
accomplice act with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the offense• • • 32
committed by the principal. For example, New Jersey asserts a person is an
accomplice of another if that person acts "[w]ith the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense."33 Montana uses nearly identical
language to describe its mental state requirement for an accomplice.3 Similarly,
Missouri demands that an individual act "with the purpose of promoting the
commission of an offense" before considering the individual criminally
responsible for the conduct of another.
Other states in this specific intent category, including Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, and South Dakota, deviate slightly from the Model
Penal Code's language and require that an accomplice act with the intent to
promote or assist another, rather than with the purpose to aid another, in the
commission of an offense. 36 These six states use virtually identical language to
describe an accomplice's required mental state. Colorado's statutory language,
for example, holds a person legally accountable for the actions of a principal if
the person acted "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the
31. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(2) (2006);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2) (2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2-20(b)(3)-(4) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2002); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 562.041.1(2) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-
6(c)(1) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2) (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).
32. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041.1(2) (West 1999) ("with the purpose of promoting
the commission of an offense"), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3) (2007) ("with the purpose
to promote or facilitate such commission"), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(c)(1) (West 2005)
("[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense"), with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) ("with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense").
33. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(c)(1) (West 2005).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3) (2007) ("with the purpose to promote or facilitate
such commission").
35. MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041(1)(2) (West 1999).
36. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(2) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (2008); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2002); OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.155(2) (2007); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006).
[VOL. 60:237
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offense." 37 Similarly, Delaware insists that if a person is "[i]ntending to
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense," that person is guilty of an
offense committed by another.
38
Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas phrase their intent requirement
for accomplice liability in a somewhat different manner.39 Although it does not
follow the exact wording of section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code, Alabama
requires that an alleged accomplice act "with the intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense. ' 4° Tennessee and Texas, in this same respect, state
in their respective statutes that a person is criminally liable for acting "with
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense."'41 Georgia, on the
other hand, simply requires that an alleged accomplice either "[i]ntentionally
aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or ... [i]ntentionally advises,S• 42
encourages, hires, counsels or procures" a principal. In any event, none of
these thirteen states have statutes reflecting Category II or Category III
language.
B. Category II Statutes: "Statutorily Prescribed Mental State"
Section 2.06(4) of the Model Penal Code provides an alternate route to
finding accomplice liability beyond that found in section 2.06(3). This
subsection reflects what might be called a statutorily prescribed mental state
approach. Specifically, it reads:
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the
commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense.43
It is important to remember that the thirteen states following the specific intent,
or Category I, scheme patterned after section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (2008).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2) (2007).
39. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 (LexisNexis 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-20(b)(3)-(4)
(2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2) (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon
2003).
40. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 (LexisNexis 2005).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2) (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2)
(Vernon 2003). It should be noted, however, that the Texas statute holds that if a person conspires
with another to commit a felony, that person is responsible for another felony committed by a
coconspirator notwithstanding the fact that the person had "no intent to commit it." § 7.02(b).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-20(b)(3)-(4) (2007).
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (1962).
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do not provide for accomplice liability similar to section 2.06(4). 44 Meanwhile,
six states-Arkansas, Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania-pattern their mental state requirement after section 2.06(4) of the
Model Penal Code and provide for criminal liability when causing a particular
result is an element of the offense and when an accused acted with the same
kind of culpable mental state or the same kind of culpability with respect to the
particular result that is required to convict a principal. 45 Each of these states
follows both sections 2.06(3) and 2.06(4) of the Model Penal Code. In other
words, these six states allow for liability if the accused either had the intention
of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense or had the kind of
culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense for a result-oriented crime.46
Beyond those jurisdictions which provide for liability based on a shared
mental state for result-oriented crimes, another five states-Connecticut, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah-extend criminal responsibility to an
accomplice who harbored the mental state necessary for the commission of the
crime, regardless of whether or not the crime committed contains a result
element.47 For instance, Connecticut and Utah hold an alleged accomplice liable
,,48who acts "with the mental state required for commission of an offense. New
York's statute states that so long as an accomplice had the "mental culpability
required for the commission" of the offense, the accomplice is criminally
responsible.49 Similarly, Ohio requires that an alleged accomplice act "with the
kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense," 50 while North
Dakota insists the accomplice act "with the kind of culpability required for the
offense." 51 As with the states allowing for a shared mental state with respect to
44. See statutes cited supra note 31.
45. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(B) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(b) (2006);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-223 (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(2)
(LexisNexis 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 306(d) (West 1998).
46. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301, -303 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(a)-(b)
(2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-222 to -223 (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 502.020(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(lI)(a), (TV) (LexisNexis
2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c)-(d) (West 1998). In this group, Arizona is the only state
which has not only "intent to promote or facilitate" language, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301,
and result-oriented language, id. § 13-303(B), but also a "natural and probable ... consequence"
provision. Id. § 13-303(A)(3).
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(a) (West 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00
(McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1)(a) (1997); OmO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.03(A) (LexisNexis 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(a) (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003).
49. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 2004).
50. OmO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A) (LexisNexis 2006).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1)(a) (1997).
[VOL. 60:237
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
result-oriented crimes, Connecticut, New York, North Dakota, and Utah also
allow for liability if an actor intentionally aids another in the commission of a
52crime. Thus, most of the states that follow the Category 1I, or statutorily
prescribed mental state, approach also contain a provision mirroring the
Category I, or specific intent, approach.
C. Category III Statutes: "Natural and Probable Consequences"
Six states do not limit liability merely to a person who possesses the
specific intent or the statutorily prescribed mental state required for the actual
commission of the crime in their respective accomplice liability legislation.
Rather, this grouping follows a very broad model of accomplice liability and
holds a person accountable not just for the crimes the person intended to aid and
abet but also for any offense that is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
criminal scheme. 53 Five of the Category 11 states have statutory provisions
stating that an accomplice must have the specific intent to assist a perpetrator in
the intended crime54 but also have a second provision allowing for liability for
any crimes done in furtherance of the intended crime. 55 For example, Kansas
52. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(a) (West 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00
(MCKINNEY 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1)(b) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202
(2003). Ohio's statute contains no specific intent provision. See OMO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.03(A) (LexisNexis 2006). On the other hand, Arizona also has a natural and probable
consequences provision. ARTz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008).
53. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West
2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (Supp.
2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005).
54. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301 (2008) ("with the intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of an offense") (emphasis added); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(1) (2007) ("A
person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person intentionally
aids ... the other .... ) (emphasis added); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (Supp.
2007) ("[w]ith the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime") (emphasis
added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) ("A person is criminally liable
for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids ... the other .... ) (emphasis
added); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(b) (West 2005) ("[i]ntentionally aids and abets the
commission") (emphasis added).
55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008) ("The person is an accomplice of
such other person in the commission of an offense including any offense that is a natural and
probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offense for which the person was an
accomplice."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (2007) ("A person liable under subsection (1)
hereof is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if
reasonably fbreseeable by such person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to
commit the crime intended.") (emphasis added); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (Supp.
2007) ("A person is an accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which
was a reasonably fbreseeable consequence of the person's conduct .... ) (emphasis added);
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and Minnesota both state that one is liable "for any other crime committed in
pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable.., as a probable
consequence," 56 while Arizona states that one is responsible for "any offense
that is a natural and probable or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
offense for which the person was an accomplice."
57
Wisconsin's statute differs in that it allows for liability for one who is a
"party to a conspiracy with another to commit [an offense] or advises, hires,
counsels or otherwise procures" the perpetrator. 58 Wisconsin, like the other
states following the Category III approach, expands an accomplice's criminal
liability to include "any other crime which is committed in pursuance of the
intended crime" if it "is a natural and probable consequence of the intended
crime.
59
While Iowa's criminal code does not have a specific intent provision, it
does use a similar approach regarding liability for crimes done in furtherance of
the original crime. Iowa is unique in that it expresses this provision in negative
nomenclature; namely, one is responsible for another's criminal acts "unless the
act was one which the person could not reasonably expect to be done in the
furtherance of the commission of the offense."
60
D. Statutes Requiring "Knowledge" Rather than "Intent"
Four states pattern their legislation similar to that of the Category I states
with one major exception. Rather than requiring intent on the part of an
accomplice, these states simply require that the accomplice knowingly assist a
perpetrator in the commission of the crime. 61 Wyoming holds individuals
accountable who "knowingly" aid or abet another's crime,62 while Indiana
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) ("A person liable under subdivision I is
also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably
fbreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the
crime intended.") (emphasis added); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005) ("Such a party
is also concerned in the commission of any other crime which is committed in pursuance of the
intended crime and which under the circumstances is a natural and probable consequence of the
intended crime.") (emphasis added).
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2008).
57. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008).
58. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005).
59. Id.
60. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West 2003).
61. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (LexisNexis 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.08.020(2)-(3)(a) (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-14e (LexisNexis 2005); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-201(a) (2007).
62. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-201(a) (2007).
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declares an individual responsible if that individual "knowingly or intentionally
aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense." 63 West Virginia
requires one to "knowingly" aid and abet a few crimes 64 but generally requires
no mental state for accomplice liability with respect to other crimes.65 Finally,
Washington holds one liable as an accomplice who acts "[w]ith knowledge that
[the assistance] will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime."
' 66
E. Statutes Lacking Any Mental State Requirement
Eighteen states do not pattern their mental state requirements after the
Category I, Category 1I, or Category 1I1 approach. Instead, these states do not
appear to require any mental state on the part of an accomplice to find
liability.67 For example, Michigan's law indicates, "Every person concerned in
the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting
the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission ... shall be
punished as if he had directly committed such offense. ' 68 Likewise, Nebraska's
statute states that "[a] person who aids, abets, procures, or causes another to
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender. ' 69 New Mexico imposes liability when an accomplice "procures,
counsels, aids or abets in [the crime's] commission." 70 South Carolina and
Vermont hold that courts are to treat "[a] person who aids in the commission of
a felony" the same as a "principal. ' 7 1 California provides that "[a]ll persons ...
[who] aid and abet" are responsible, 72 while Florida's law reads that
"[w]hoever... aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense
63. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (LexisNexis 2004).
64. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-14e (LexisNexis 2005) (listing kidnapping, holding hostage,
demanding ransom, concealment of a minor child, and several other crimes).
65. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-6 (LexisNexis 2005).
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(3)(a) (West 2000).
67. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-204 (2004 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:24 (2007);
MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-204 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2
(West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.39 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3 (2006);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-206 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.020 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-1-13 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 432 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3-4 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-11-6 (LexisNexis 2005).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.39 (West 2000).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-206 (1995).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-13 (LexisNexis 2004).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3 (1998).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1999).
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to be committed" is liable under accountability principles. 73 Rhode Island's
accomplice measure states that "[e]very person who shall aid, assist, abet,
counsel, hire, command, or procure another to commit any crime or offense" is
accountable to the same extent as "the principal offender."'74 Massachusetts
states that "[w]hoever aids in the commission of a felony ... by counseling,
hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed" is punishable in the
manner as provided for "the principal felon." 75 Similarly, Oklahoma's law
proscribes that any person "concerned in the commission of a felony," whether
that person is the actual perpetrator or one who "aid[s] or abet[s] in its
commission," is criminally accountable for such felony. 76 Mississippi's stricture
reads that "[e]very person who shall be an accessory to any felony" is as
criminally liable as "the principal. 77 North Carolina and Virginia's statutes
offer similar language.
78
Nevada explicitly denies the necessity of any mental state requirement for
an accomplice to be criminally responsible. 79 Nevada's statute indicates that
"[t]he fact that [a] person.., could not or did not entertain a criminal intent
shall not be a defense" if that person assisted a perpetrator's commission of an
offense.
80
Maryland's statute differs in that it not only lacks a mental state
requirement, but it also lacks any indication of who it considers an "accessory
before the fact.' , 81 The Maryland statute simply states, without further
explanation, that "the distinction between an accessory before the fact and a
principal is abrogated" and that "an accessory before the fact may be charged,
tried, convicted, and sentenced as a principal. 82
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West 2005).
74. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11- 1 -3 (2002).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 2000).
76. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 432 (West 2003).
77. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3 (2006).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004).
79. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.020 (LexisNexis 2006).
80. Id.
81. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-204 (LexisNexis 2008).
82. Id. § 4-204(b). It should be noted, however, that the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions
indicate that to prove a defendant was an accessory before the fact, the State must prove the
defendant acted "with the intent to make the crime succeed." MD. STATE BAR ASS'N STANDING
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JU RY INSTRUCTIONS
6:01 (10th ed. 2005).
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F. Statutes Allowing for a Defense for the Victim of a Crime
The Model Penal Code's accomplice liability statute protects one from
accomplice liability if one "is a victim of that offense." 83 For example, under
this provision, the minor victim of a statutory rape cannot be liable as an
accomplice to the adult rapist's conduct, even if the minor encouraged the adult
84perpetrator. Nine states have similar provisions in their accomplice liability
legislation. 85 For example, Pennsylvania will not hold an alleged accomplice
liable who "is a victim of that offense,"' 86 while Washington's statute will not
allow for the conviction of an alleged accomplice who "is a victim of that
crime.
87
G. Statutes with Incidental Party Provisions
Another defense the Model Penal Code provides protects an individual if
the crime "is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its
commission."88 This provision, for instance, would not allow a state to charge
the purchaser of illegal drugs as an accomplice to the sale of the drugs. 89 Six
states have codified similar incidental party provisions in their accomplice
liability statutes. 90 Missouri's statute indicates an alleged accomplice will not be
liable if the crime "is so defined that his conduct was necessarily incident to the
commission or attempt to commit the offense." 91 Maine's provision likewise
allows a defense for an alleged accomplice if "the crime is so defined that it
cannot be committed without the person's cooperation."
92
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(a) (1962).
84. Id. § 2.06 cmt. 9(a).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 273(1) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c)(1)
(West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(5)(A) (Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 562.041.2(1) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3)(a) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:8(VI)(a) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(e)(1) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(t)(1) (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(5)(a) (West 2000).
86. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(t)(1) (West 1998).
87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(5)(a) (West 2000).
88. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(b).
89. JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10, at 188 (4th ed. 2006) (citing 1
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 38, at 252-53 (15th ed. 1993)).
90. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c)(2) (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 57(5)(B) (Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041.2(2) (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:8(VI)(B) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(e)(2) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306(t)(2) (West 1998).
91. MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041.2(2) (West 1999).
92. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(5)(B) (Supp. 2007).
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H. Statutes with Withdrawal Provisions
The Model Penal Code allows for an alleged accomplice to avoid criminal
liability by withdrawing from the criminal complicity prior to a perpetrator's
commission of the crime. 93 Subsection (6)(c) of the Model Penal Code's
accomplice liability provision provides a defense for one who "terminates his
complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of
effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to
the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the
commission of the offense." 94 Twelve states have similar withdrawal provisions
in their respective accomplice liability statutes. 95 For example, Illinois's statute
states that an alleged accomplice is not criminally responsible if:
Before the commission of the offense, he terminates his effort to
promote or facilitate such commission, and [either] wholly deprives his
prior efforts of effectiveness in such commission, or gives timely
warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or otherwise makes
proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
96
Minnesota, on the other hand, only requires that an individual who acted
with the purpose of assisting the perpetrator "abandon[] that purpose and
make[] a reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the crime prior to its
commission."
' 97
I. Statutes with Liability for Persons Exempt from the Substantive Offense
Also contained within section 2.06 of the Model Penal Code is a legislative
exemption provision. This subsection holds an individual "who is legally
incapable of committing" the offense accountable as an accomplice if the
offense is "committed by the conduct of another person for which [the
individual] is legally accountable. ' '% This provision is designed to make a
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(c).
94. Id.
95. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 273(3) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c)(3)
(West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-10 (LexisNexis 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 57(5)(C) (Supp. 2007); MTNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 562.041.2(3) (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(VI)(c) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(e)(3) (West 2005); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(E) (LexisNexis 2006);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(t)(3) (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(5)(b)
(West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 2005).
96. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c)(3) (West 2002).
97. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(5).
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person an accomplice even though that person is personally exempt from the
reach of the substantive offense.99 The example cited in comments to the Model
Penal Code-albeit rather antiquated-is the husband who is exempt from the
reach of the common law rape proscription due to the marital exemption rule. 100
Perhaps a more appropriate example would be the adult who is free of the reach
of the local curfew law but who encourages or facilitates a minor's presence in a
public area after hours without adult accompaniment. 101
Six states have statutory provisions similar to section 2.06(5).' ° 2 Delaware's
statute provides that "it is no defense that ... [t]he offense in question, as
defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons," of which the
defendant is not a member,' ° 3 while New Jersey maintains that "[a] person who
is legally incapable of committing a particular offense" may be liable if that
person is "legally accountable" for the conduct of the perpetrator.'04
J. Statutes Containing an Innocent Agent Provision
The Model Penal Code' °5 and nineteen states' °6 have an innocent agent
provision in their accomplice accountability measures allowing for accomplice
99. See id. § 2.06 cmt. 8.
100. Id. (citing Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307, 315-16 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961)) (allowing a
husband to be tried as an accessory for the rape of his wife); cf id. § 213.1(1) ("A male who has
sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape .... ).
101. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY CITY, MO., MU NICIPAL CODE § 9.20.020 (2007) ("It is unlawful
for any minor under the age of seventeen (17) years to loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play in or upon
the public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds or other public grounds, public
places and public buildings, places of amusement and entertainment, vacant lots or other
unsupervised places, between the hours of eleven p.m. and six a.m. of the following day, official
city time, except on Fridays and Saturdays, when the hours shall be twelve midnight to six a.m.;
however, the provisions of this section shall not apply to a minor accompanied by his or her parent,
guardian or other adult person having the care and custody of the minor, or where the minor is
upon an emergency errand or legitimate business directed by his or her parent, guardian or other
adult person having the care and custody of the minor.").
102. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 272(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(4)
(Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(j) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(d)
(West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(e) (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.08.020(4) (West 2000).
103. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 272(3) (2007).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(d) (West 2005).
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a).
106. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(3) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(2)
(2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-402(3) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-602(1)(b) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(1) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-
20(b)(2) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-221(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(a) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.010(1) (LexisNexis 1999); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(2)(A) (Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(1) (2007);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(Il)(a) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(b)(1) (West
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liability if the alleged accomplice encouraged an innocent agent, such as a very
young child, to perpetrate the offense. The Model Penal Code states that "[a]
person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when ... acting
with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense,
he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct."',0 7 For
example, Alaska holds a person criminally accountable for another's conduct
where the person is "acting with the culpable mental state that is sufficient for
the commission of the offense, [and] the person causes an innocent person or a
person who lacks criminal responsibility to engage in the proscribed
conduct." 10
8
K. Statutes Containing a Legal Duty Provision
Six states 1° 9 and the Model Penal Code 11° base accomplice liability on
one's breach of a legal duty. The Model Penal Code language states that a
person is an accomplice of another if that person, "with the purpose of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense .... having a legal duty
to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to
do.'' 111 While most of the statutes in this small grouping parallel the Model
Penal Code's language,112 the Tennessee law in this regard reads that a person is
criminally accountable for another's crimes if:
Having a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent
commission of the offense and acting with intent to benefit in the
proceeds or results of the offense, or to promote or assist its
commission, the person fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent
commission of the offense. 
11 3
2005); OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 306(b)(1) (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(1) (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 7.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(2)(a) (West 2000).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a).
108. ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(3) (2006).
109. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(a)(3) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2)(c)
(2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-222(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 502.020(1)(c) (LexisNexis 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2)(c) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-11-402(3) (2006).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(iii).
111. Id.
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(a)(3) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2)(c)
(2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-222(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 502.020(1)(c) (LexisNexis 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2)(c) (2007).
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(3) (2006).
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L. Statutes Allowing for Liability of an Accomplice Without the
Conviction of the Perpetrator
At common law, "an accessory could not be convicted of a crime unless
and until the principal was convicted."' 14 Similarly, "an accessory could not be
convicted of a more serious offense, or a higher degree of an offense, than his
principal."' 15 However, the Model Penal Code makes it clear that:
An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of
the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to
have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has
been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an
immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted." 6
Twenty states have similar statutes designed to abrogate the common law rule
conditioning prosecution of an accomplice on the conviction of the principal.' 17
For instance, the Illinois criminal code provides,
A person who is legally accountable for the conduct of another which is
an element of an offense may be convicted upon proof that the offense
was committed and that he was so accountable, although the other
person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted
or convicted, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of
offense, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted. 18
Meanwhile, Iowa law provides, "The guilt of a person who aids and abets the
commission of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part
114. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 30.03 [B] [5], at 505.
115. Id. § 30.03 [B] [6], at 506.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7).
117. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 272(2) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-3 (West
2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.1 (West 2003);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(6) (Supp. 2007); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-204(c) (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 3
(West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
1-3 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.040 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:8(VII) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(t) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-1-13 (LexisNexis 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(2)(b) (1997); 0mo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.03(B) (LexisNexis 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(g) (West 1998); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(6) (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-6 (LexisNexis 2005);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-201(b)(ii) (2007).
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-3 (West 2002).
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the person had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's
guilt." 119
M. Statutes Only Pertaining to Felonies
Although the Model Penal Code' and the vast majority of states hold an
individual liable as an accomplice whether the offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor, five states explicitly state that their accomplice statute applies
only to felonies. 12 South Carolina's accomplice legislation only applies to "[a]
person who aids in the commission of a felony or is an accessory before the fact
in the commission of a felony."' 122 Similarly, Mississippi allows for criminal
liability for "[e]very person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the
fact."'
23
N. Statutes with Provisions Unique to Their Particular State
Three states-Connecticut, North Carolina, and Virginia-have accomplice
liability statutes with provisions unique to their particular state.124 Connecticut,
for instance, is the only state that has a firearm provision in its accomplice
liability legislation. Specifically, it reads:
A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm ... to another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or
under circumstances in which he should know that such other person
intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable
for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender.
125
119. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.1 (West 2003).
120. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1)-(2) (referring to "offenses").
121. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3
(2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 432 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003).
123. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3 (2006).
124. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(b) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004).
125. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(b) (West 2007).
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In other words, if an accomplice provides a firearm to the principal, the
accomplice must only possess the mental state of knowledge rather than the
requisite mental state necessary to convict the principal.1
2
1
North Carolina's statute is unique in that it contains a provision regarding
the evidence necessary to convict an accomplice of a capital felony. The North
Carolina law reads:
[I]f a person who heretofore would have been guilty and punishable as
an accessory before the fact is convicted of a capital felony, and the
jury finds that his conviction was based solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of one or more principals, coconspirators, or accessories to
the crime, he shall be guilty of a Class B2 felony.
127
A Class B2 felony falls outside the reach of North Carolina's death penalty• • 128
provision. Thus, if the offense is a capital felony, North Carolina will hold an
alleged accomplice to a lesser penalty than the principal felon if there is no
evidence against the accomplice besides the testimony of the other parties to the
crime.129
While several states explicitly provide that they will hold an accomplice to
an offense as liable as the actual perpetrator,' 30 Virginia's statute is distinctive
in that it specifies only certain types of capital murder in which Virginia will
treat an accessory before the fact as the actual perpetrator.' 3 ' Virginia's code
126. Connecticut is a Category II state with regard to all other offenses and therefore
requires that the accomplice have the shared mental state with regard to the crime that is necessary
to convict the perpetrator. See id.;supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007).
128. In North Carolina, a felon convicted of murder in the first degree is guilty of a Class A
felony and therefore may receive the death penalty. Id. § 14-17. However, a felon convicted of
murder in the second degree, which is a Class B2 felony, id., is not eligible for the death penalty.
Id. § 15A-1340.17.
129. Id. § 14-5.2.
130. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006) ("Any person who, with the intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, aids, abets, or advises another person in planning
or committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime.").
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004) ("In the case of every felony, every principal in the
second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished
in all respects as if a principal in the first degree; provided, however, that except in the case of a
killing for hire under the provisions of subdivision 2 of § 18.2-31 or a killing pursuant to the
direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise under the provisions of
subdivision 10 of § 18.2-31 or a killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in
the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism under the provisions of
subdivision 13 of § 18.2-31, an accessory before the fact or principal in the second degree to a
capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense were murder
in the first degree.").
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specifies that if an accessory before the fact aids in the offenses of murder for
hire, murder in connection with a criminal enterprise, or murder in connection
with terrorism, then the accessory before the fact is liable for murder in the first
degree, 132 which is a Class 2 felony. 133 However, principals who commit those
crimes are liable for capital murder, which is a Class 1 felony.' 34 For all other
crimes, however, accessories before the fact are treated in the same manner as
the perpetrator.'
3 5
0. Statutes that Make Reference to the Common Law Distinctions of
Principals and Accessories
Although the Model Penal Code' 36 and the majority of states 137 no longer
maintain the common law distinctions of accessories and principals in their
statutory language, six states continue to use these common law terms in their
legislation.' 3North Carolina's statute, for instance, asserts that "[e]very person
who heretofore would have been guilty as an accessory before the fact to any
felony shall be guilty and punishable as a principal." 3 9 Vermont has patterned
its legislation in a similar manner. Using the same common law terminology, it
states that "[a] person who is accessory before the fact" is equally as liable as
the "principal offender."' 40 Virginia's statute refers to both the "principal in the
second degree" and the "accessory before the fact."'
14 1
P. Statutes that Intertwine Criminal Facilitation or Conspiracy
Because the crimes of criminal facilitation and conspiracy have many of the
same elements as accomplice liability, 142 some states have intertwined their
132. Id.
133. Id. § 18.2-32.
134. Id. § 18.2-31 (Supp. 2008).
135. Id. § 18.2-18.
136. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(c)(2) (1962).
137. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 13.1(e), at 670.
138. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-204 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-6 (LexisNexis 2005).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007).
140. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4 (1998).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004).
142. Compare 16 AM. JIR. 2D Conspiracy §§ 10, 13-15 (1998) (listing the elements of
conspiracy as agreement, intent, knowledge, and overt act), and 35 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law.
Substantive Principles and Oft~nses §§ 344-46 (2008) (listing the elements of criminal facilitation
as scienter, commission of the facilitated crime, and actual assistance), with 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law §§ 173-76 (2008) (listing the elements of accomplice liability as acting with
another, common plan or design, knowledge, and intent).
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criminal facilitation and conspiracy statutes with their accomplice liability
legislation. 143 Ohio and Kentucky frame their respective complicity statutes to
include both accomplice liability and conspiracy. Under Ohio law, a person is
liable under the complicity statute who, possessing the requisite mental state for
conviction of the perpetrator, aids or abets the principal or "[c]onspire[s] with
another to commit the offense."' 145 Kentucky's statute, in the same respect,
includes the offense of "engag[ing] in a conspiracy with another person" within
its complicity statute. 1
46
Texas includes the crime of conspiracy within its accomplice legislation; 147
however, the mental state requirement necessary for a conviction of conspiracy
differs from that necessary for accomplice liability. The Texas law reads:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators
are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to
commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful
148purpose and was one that should have been anticipated ....
Other states have criminal facilitation prohibitions separate and apart from
their accomplice legislation. 149 Kentucky has codified the crime of criminal
facilitation, holding an individual liable when, "acting with knowledge that
another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he... knowingly
provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission of the
crime."' 150 Therefore, although Kentucky's accomplice liability statute allows
conviction if the alleged accomplice either had the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense or had the kind of culpability with
respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense for a
143. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(2)(a) (LexisNexis 1999); OmO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.03(A)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis 2006); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 2003).
144. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(2)(a) (LexisNexis 1999); OmO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.03(A)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
145. OHfO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
146. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(2)(a) (LexisNexis 1999).
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 2003).
148. Id. Thus, while this provision uses a Category III mental state approach with regard to
conspiracy, id., Texas uses a Category I mental state approach with regard to accomplice liability,
id. § 7.02(a).
149. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.080(1) (LexisNexis 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 115.00-115.15 (McKinney 2004).
150. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.080(1) (LexisNexis 1999).
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result-oriented crime,151 Kentucky may convict an individual of criminal
facilitation for possessing a mental state of mere knowledge. 52
1I. STATES WITH CASE LAW FOLLOWING THE CATEGORY I APPROACH:
SPECIFIC INTENT
When examining the respective states' case law, with most of these states
having accomplice statutes patterned after either the Category I model, 153 the
Category II model,' 54 or both,155 one finds only six states that interpret their
statutes in a fashion demanding proof of specific intent to promote or assist on
the part of the alleged accomplice. These states are Florida, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
A. Florida
Florida's criminal code imposes liability on anyone who "aids, abets,
counsels, hires, or otherwise procures" a criminal offense, regardless of that
person's actual or constructive presence at the commission of the offense.
156
Notwithstanding the statutory language, the case law does not track the statute
in that the case law also requires proof that a defendant intended to participate
in the crime. 157 For example, in Giniebra v. State, 15 where a trial court had
151. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
152. § 506.080(1).
153. See discussion supra Part H.A.
154. See discussion supra Part I.B.
155. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West 2005) ("Whoever commits any criminal offense
against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise
procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be
committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such,
whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such
offense.").
157. In Christie v. State, 652 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam), the court
explained that "[tlo convict defendant as an aider and abettor, the state had to show that defendant
(1) assisted the actual perpetrators by doing or saying something that caused, encouraged, assisted
or incited the perpetrators to actually commit the crime; and (2) intended to participate in the
crime." Id. at 934 (citing Howard v. State, 473 So. 2d 841, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
Therefore, in a cocaine transaction where the principals double-crossed cocaine suppliers, forcibly
took the cocaine at the site of the drug deal, kidnapped the suppliers, and killed them, and where
the defendant "was the boss of the drug deal, participated in its planning and supervised its
execution," id. at 933, the court held that the defendant was a "willing participant." Id. at 935.
In K.O. v. State, 673 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), the court held that where the
defendant intended to participate in a scheme of breaking the window of a vehicle at a car
dealership in order to steal a telephone, which his cohort apparently removed from the vehicle,
"there was evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction for burglary under an aiding and abetting
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convicted the defendant of second degree murder and kidnapping, the Florida159
District Court of Appeal affirmed only the kidnapping charge. In this case,
the defendant admitted after arrest to being present during the kidnapping of the
victim that was motivated by ransom. In addition to the defendant's
admission to being present, forensic evidence placed the defendant at the scene
where the kidnappers were holding and likely killed the victim.161 The victim's
murder followed the kidnapping and unsuccessful ransom demand, but the
defendant denied having participated in the murder. 62
The defendant appealed his convictions based on insufficiency of
evidence. 163 The Florida District Court of Appeal stated that "[t]o convict as a
principal, the State must show that [the defendant] intended the crime to be
committed and assisted the actual perpetrator in committing the crime."',64 The
court then stated that nothing in the record evinced that defendant intended or
participated in the victim's murder, and consequently, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction for second degree murder. 165 However, the court found
sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction for kidnapping. 66
Meanwhile, in R.M. v. State,167 the defendant "was one of three youths who
threw tiles at the victim ... ; however, the victim was only struck by one of the
theory." Id. at 48. The court explained that the defendant "could be convicted of burglary if the
evidence presented by the state at trial was sufficient to show that he (1) assisted the actual
perpetrators by doing or saying something that caused, encouraged, assisted, or incited the
perpetrators to actually commit the crime, and (2) intended to participate in the crime." Id. (citing
A.B.G. v. State, 586 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
Additionally, in Evans v. State, 643 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the court provided
that "[tlo secure a conviction on an aider and abettor theory, the state must establish ... that the
defendant intended to participate in the crime" and that "mere knowledge that an offense is being
committed is not the same as participation with the requisite criminal intent." Id. at 1205-06
(quoting C.P.P. v. State, 479 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, the court held that where that the defendant-passenger merely knew that other
occupants in a pickup truck intended to shoot the windows out of a store, the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of aiding and abetting. Id. at 1206.
Finally, in Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), the court upheld a jury
instruction that the defendant's knowledge of the principal's use of a firearm was not required in
order to convict the defendant. Id. at 1210-11. Notably, the court stated that "[tlo be found guilty
as a principal it is not necessary for the aider and abettor to know of every detail of the crime so
long as there exists evidence of the aider's intent to participate." Id. at 1211.
158. 787 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).








167. 664 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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tiles," and it was unclear as to which of the youths threw that particular tile.,
68
Because of the uncertainty as to who caused the injury to the victim, the State
prosecuted the defendant as an accomplice to battery.' 69 The Florida appellate
court stated that "[i]n order to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the evidence
must show that the defendant '(1) assisted the actual perpetrator by doing or
saying something that causes, encourages or assists or incites the perpetrator to
actually commit the crime; and (2) intended to participate in the crime.
''
170
Here, the evidence revealed that "the concerted throwing of the tiles
[demonstrated] that the crime had been planned in advance," and consequently,
"there was sufficient evidence to convict [the defendant] of battery." 171
B. Mississippi
It appears Mississippi is another one of the few states which falls into
Category I status. 172 In Malone v. State,173 the principal approached the victim
as she was trying to enter her house, struck her with a "slapjack," and took
money, diamonds, and jewelry from the victim.' 74 At trial, the principal's
testimony established that although the defendant was not present at the time of
the robbery, he made the initial call to the principal and asked her to come meet
his cohorts, who would assist her in stealing the diamonds.' 75 The principal also
stated that the defendant took the diamonds from the principal after the robbery
and gave her five $100 bills for bringing him the diamonds.
The defendant appealed his conviction of being an accessory before the fact
of armed robbery, claiming the trial court's jury instructions charged the jury on
a criminal conspiracy theory, failed to define "aiding and abetting," and failed
to call for a finding of specific intent.' 77 In regard to the issue of intent, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the conviction after finding that the jury
instructions, which required the jury to find that the defendant was "acting in
concert with others ... with the unlawful and felonious intent to steal" in order
168. Id.
169. Id. at 43.
170. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rouse v. State, 583 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991)).
171. Id. at42-43.
172. Interestingly, Mississippi law contains no mental state requirement. MiSS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-1-3 (2006) ("Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be
deemed and considered a principal .....
173. 486 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1986).
174. Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. at361-63.
176. Id. at 362.
177. Id. at 363-64.
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to reach a guilty verdict, were proper.178 The court concluded that "[a]ny alleged
deficiency in the instructions on the matter of advising the jury of the concepts
of aiding and abetting and specific intent were more than cured" by the
instructions given. 79
In White v. State,18° the State charged and obtained a conviction of the
defendant-accomplice for robbery. 181 In this case, the defendant and three
others baited the victims to an isolated location and robbed them at gunpoint. 82
The three other individuals pleaded guilty and testified against the defendant. 83
The trial court gave the jury two avenues to find the defendant guilty, either as a
direct participant or as an accomplice. 184 The jury found the defendant guilty of
robbery but did not specify whether they convicted him as a principal or as an
accessory. 85 The jury instruction regarding the theory that the defendant may
have been an aider and abettor read in part:
If another person is acting under the direction of the defendant or if
the defendant joins another person and performs acts with the intent to
commit a crime, then the law holds the defendant responsible for the
acts and conduct of such other persons just as though the defendant had
committed the acts or engaged in such conduct.
Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the
acts of others it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate
himself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent
to bring about the crime. 186
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction, finding "no
error in the submission of this instruction.
' 187
C. New Mexico
Notwithstanding its accessory statute which reflects no mental state
requirement, 188 New Mexico provides a strong example of a jurisdiction which
178. Id. at 364-65.
179. Id. at 364.
180. 919 So. 2d 1029 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
181. Id. at 1031, 1034.
182. Id. at 1031.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1032.
185. Id. at 1035.
186. Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 1034, 1036.
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judicially adheres to the Category I perspective. In State v. Carrasco, 1  two
principals went into a convenience store while the defendant waited in the
car.19 1 While in the store, one principal struck the clerk, knocked her down, and
kicked her as the other principal attempted to open the cash register. 192 When a
customer entered the store, the principals ran out of the store, jumped into the
car, and drove away with the defendant driving the vehicle.1 93 At the
defendant's trial, where he faced multiple charges as an accessory, the
defendant "testified that he was intoxicated [during the incident] and that he
either went to sleep or blacked-out in the car" while the principals were inside
of the store. 194 Therefore, although the defendant admitted to driving the two
principals away from the store, he also claimed to know "nothing of the acts"
the principals committed inside the store until after they informed him of their
attempted robbery while they were driving away.' 95 Nevertheless, a trial court
convicted the defendant of "conspiracy to commit robbery, accessory to assault
with intent to commit a violent felony (robbery), accessory to aggravated
battery, accessory to attempted robbery, and accessory to false
imprisonment."'
96
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in upholding the defendant's
convictions, "relied on the doctrine that an accessory may be held liable for all
crimes which are the natural and probable consequence of the attempted
criminal offense."' 197 However, the Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected this
188. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-13 (LexisNexis 2004) ("A person may be charged with and
convicted of the crime as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids or abets in its
commission .... ).
189. See State v. Bankert, 875 P.2d 370, 374 (N.M. 1994) (quoting N.M. RILES ANN.,
CRIM. U.J.I. § 14-2822) (adopting the elements of accomplice liability from the New Mexico
uniform jury instructions for criminal cases). In Bankert, the evidence established that the alleged
accomplice "badly wanted [an illegal drug] deal to take place"-so much so that he killed a
supplier in order to allow the principal to take possession of the drugs. Id. at 375-76. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico determined that the defendant-accomplice was guilty as an accomplice to
possession of drugs with intent to distribute, which served as the predicate offense necessary to
convict the defendant-accomplice of felony murder. Id. at 376. The Bankert court stated that the
Uniform Jury Instructions demand proof that "[t]he defendant intended that the crime be
committed;... [t]he crime was committed; [and t]he defendant helped, encouraged or caused the
crime to be committed." Id. at 374 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
N.M. RIULES ANN., CRIM. U.J.I. § 14-2822).
190. 946 P.2d 1075 (N.M. 1997).





196. Id. at 1078-79.
197. Id. at 1079.
[VOL. 60:237
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opinion insofar as it applied the "natural and probable consequence test."',
98
Instead, the court stated that in order to be held liable as an accessory, an
individual "must share the criminal intent of the principal." 99 The court noted
that the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions demand that "[t]he defendant
intended that the crime be committed" before accomplice liability attaches.200 In
other words:
[A] jury must find a community of purpose for each crime of the
principal. This principle means that a jury must find that a defendant
intended that the acts necessary for each crime be committed; a jury
cannot convict a defendant on accessory liability for a crime unless the




In explicitly rejecting the natural and probable consequences test, the court
commented that although other states have adopted this approach, scholars have
criticized it. z20 Additionally, the court justified its refusal to adhere to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine by noting that the doctrine does not
conform to the mental state required by section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal. .. . .203
Code or New Mexico's accomplice liability jurisprudence. 2 Finally, although
the court felt there was sufficient evidence to warrant convictions on each of the
charges under the correct mental state requirement, the court required a retrial
due to unrelated error.20
4
D. Oregon
Oregon's accomplice statutez2 5 and courts z2 6 require proof that the
defendant-accomplice acted with the "intent to promote or facilitate the
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. (citing State v. Ochoa, 72 P.2d 609, 615 (N.M. 1937)).
200. Id. (quoting N.M. RU LES ANN., CRIM. U.J.I. § 14-2822) (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id.; cf supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (citing scholarly criticism).
203. Corrasco, 946 P.2d at 1079.
204. Id. at 1086.
205. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155 (2007) ("A person is criminally liable for the conduct of
another person constituting a crime if: (1) [t]he person is made criminally liable by the statute
defining the crime; or (2) [w]ith the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the
person: (a) [s]olicits or commands such other person to commit the crime; or (b) [a]ids or abets or
agrees or attempts to aid or abet such person in planning or committing the crime; or (c) [h]aving a
legal duty to prevent the commission of the crime, fails to make an effort the person is legally
required to make.").
206. For example, in State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't ofI Multnomah County v. Holloway, 795
P.2d 589 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that although the juvenile defendant was in a pickup
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commission of the crime." For example, State ex rel. Juvenile Department of
Marion County v. Arevalo2 07 involved a juvenile defendant a lower court found
responsible for kidnapping as a principal and first degree sexual abuse as an
accomplice. 20 8 Here, the defendant, "other boys and the victim were together in
a physical education class when," during the teacher's absence, defendant and
the other boys dragged the victim into an adjacent room. 20 9 As one of the boys
sat on top of the victim, the defendant stood by the door while several of the
210other boys grabbed the victim's breasts. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld
the findings of the uvenile court, including that the defendant aided and abetted
the sexual abuse. The court pointed out that "[t]he state was required to prove
that [the] child aided or abetted the commission of the crime with the intent to
facilitate its commission. 212 Here, although the defendant had not touched the
victim's breasts, the defendant observed a codefendant's hands going uthe
victim's shirt and "could see that the assault had taken a sexual turn." The
defendant also invited other boys into the room and overheard one boy yell,
"Take her shirt off. ' ' 2 1 4 Thus, the court concluded the defendant had the
requisite "intent to promote or facilitate" the sexual abuse carried out by the
other boys.215
216Similarly, in State v. Branam, based on the finding of the defendant's
specific intent to aid and abet, the court found the defendant to be an
accomplice to her boyfriend's first degree criminal mistreatment of her three
217young boys. According to the evidence, the defendant's boyfriend spanked
218the boys to such an extent that they suffered bruises. The appellate court
noted that the accomplice statute imputes the conduct of another to an accused
truck that was involved in a gang-related drive-by-shooting, he had not aided and abetted an
attempted murder where the evidence did not support a conclusion that he had the "intent to
promote or facilitate" the shooting. Id. at 590-92 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2)(b)
(2007)). Also, in State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't q/ Multnomah County v. Greenwood, 813 P.2d 58
(Or. Ct. App. 1991), the court upheld a defendant's conviction where she assisted her sister in
forcibly stealing a purse from the victim because "under the accomplice statute, the state had only
to show that the defendant had the intent to promote or facilitate her sister's commission of
robbery in order to complete its proof of the elements of second-degree robbery." Id. at 59-60.
207. 844 P.2d 928 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).






214. Id. at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Id. at930.
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if the accused had the "intent to promote or facilitate" the perpetrator's
criminality and had a "legal duty to prevent the commission of the crime, [but]
,,219fail[ed] to make an effort the [accused was legally] required to make. Here,
the trial court properly found the defendant had the necessary intent to promote
or facilitate the criminal mistreatment.
220
221In State v. Moreno, the defendant appealed his conviction of possession
222of a precursor substance with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. In
this case, the defendant stole five packages of Sudafed cold medicine from a
223pharmacy. After his arrest, the defendant admitted that he stole the Sudafed
and "that he intended to sell it on the street for money."'2 24 The defendant also
acknowledged "that he knew that Sudafed contains pseudoephedrine and that
pseudoephedrine is a precursor substance used to manufacture
,,225methamphetamine. However, the defendant denied "that he intended
personally to manufacture methamphetamine or that he even knew how to
manufacture it.",
22 6
The Oregon drug measure under which the trial court convicted the
defendant required the jury to find that the defendant held the "'conscious
objective' to manufacture methamphetamine. 227 Because the facts of the case
did not suggest that the defendant intended that the Sudafed be used to
manufacture methamphetamine, the state argued for criminal liability on an
228aiding and abetting theory. Accordingly, the state argued that the defendant
possessed the requisite conscious objective because he intended to sell the
Sudafed to another knowing the other person would likely or certainly use it to
229manufacture methamphetamine.
However, the Court of Appeals of Oregon disagreed. Reversing the
conviction, the court stated that knowledge was "not enough to establish
liability on the state's alternative theory that defendant aided and abetted
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2)(c)
(2007)).
220. Id. at 608. There was also evidence the defendant spanked her children excessively. Id.
at 607. However, the primary focus of the court's discussion regarding the defendant's liability
was on the accomplice theory. See id. at 607-08.
221. 104 P.3d 628 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
222. Id. at 628.
223. Id. at 628-29.
224. Id. at 629.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 630 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(7) (2007)).
228. Id. at629-31.
229. Id. at 631.
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,230another in the commission of the crime. Ultimately, the court concluded
that:
The mental state required for criminal liability on an aid and abet
theory is essentially the same as for a principal's liability in this
circumstance. A person is guilty of a crime committed by another if
that person, "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission or
the crime," aids and abets the "other person in planning or committing
the crime."23'
Therefore, the jury had to find that the defendant actually possessed the
conscious objective, not merely the awareness, that another would use theS 232
Sudafed to manufacture methamphetamine. In other words, at best, the
defendant was interested in selling the Sudafed to make money, and as such, to
assume he intended to sell it to some hypothetical person with the conscious
objective that such person use it to manufacture methamphetamine was nothing
less than pure conjecture.
E. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania is a jurisdiction which reflects both Category I and Category
233
II language in its accomplice statute, but its case law follows a Category I
pattern.2 Although Pennsylvania opinions often refer to the need for shared
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2) (2007)).
232. Id.
233. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c)-(d) (West 1998) ("A person is an accomplice
of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees
or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly
declared by law to establish his complicity .... When causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of
that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is
sufficient for the commission of the offense.").
234. For example, the court in Commonwealth v. Potts, 566 A.2d 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),
determined that "there was sufficient evidence for the fact finder to reject the [defendant's]
contention that he merely intended to beat up the deceased, and to instead find that ... he intended
to facilitate the killing of [the victim]." Id. at 291. Therefore, the court upheld the defendant's
conviction as an accomplice because "an accomplice is equally criminally liable for the acts of
another if he acts 'with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense,' and
agrees or aids or attempts to aid such other person in either planning or committing the criminal
offense." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Driver, 493 A.2d 778, 779-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
[VOL. 60:237
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criminal intent, 235 a close examination of these decisions reveals the accomplice
must have the intent to commit the crime perpetrated by the principal. In
236Commonwealth v. Murphy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
defendant's conviction as a principal and as an accomplice of delivery of and
237conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. In this case, an undercover
Pennsylvania state trooper approached the defendant on the street and asked
,,238him if he knew where the undercover officer could buy some "dope. The
defendant asked the undercover officer if he was "a cop" and, when the officer
239replied that he was not, the defendant called the principal over. The defendant
told the principal that the officer was not a cop and assured the principal the
officer was "cool. '" 24 After determining how much the officer wished to buy,
the principal left the officer and the defendant on the corner for several
minutes. When he returned, the principal asked the officer to follow him
down the street, where the officer eventually purchased two bags of heroin with
two marked $20 bills. 242 When the officer returned to the corner with the drugs,
the defendant asked the officer for half of one of the bags, but the officer
declined. 243 Subsequently, officers arrested both the defendant and the principal,
and the trial court convicted the defendant. 244 Thereafter, the defendant
unsuccessfully appealed to the superior court. 245 Finally, the defendant appealed
the superior court's decision that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of
the delivery charges based on accomplice liability.
246
In determining the propriety of this judgment, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that an accomplice must have the requisite intent "'of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense,"' which must be shown by first,
"evidence that the defendant intended to aid or promote the underlying offense,"
and second, "evidence that the defendant actively participated in the crime by
235. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 296 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. 1972) ("[S]hared criminal
intent must be found to be present to justify a finding that an accused was an accomplice." (citing
Commonwealth v. Lowry, 98 A.2d 733, 736 (Pa. 1953); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 53 A.2d 112,
114 (Pa. 1947); Commonwealth v. Doris, 135 A. 313, 314 (Pa. 1926))); Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 447 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("To aid and abet in the commission of a
crime, one must possess a shared intent to commit it." (citing Commonwealth v. Leach, 317 A.2d
293, 295 (Pa. 1974); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 378 A.2d 393, 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977))).
236. 844 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2004).
237. Id. at 1232-33.
238. Id. at 1231.
239. Id.




244. Id. at 1231-32.
245. Id. at 1232-33.
246. Id. at 1233.
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soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal.,2 7 It upheld this conviction
because the defendant aided in the delivery of the contraband with the clear
intent to do so, as he "called out to [the principal] after the trooper approached
him, confirmed to [the principal] that the trooper was not a police officer, stayed
with the trooper while [the principal] got drugs, and requested compensation
from the trooper for his efforts."
248
In applying this approach to accomplice liability, the Pennsylvania courts
have also explicitly rejected other, more expansive perspectives. For instance, in
Murphy the court stated that a court could not convict the defendant where he
simply knew of the criminal activity or was merely present at the scene of the
crime: "There must be some additional evidence that the defendant intended to
aid in the commission of the underlying crime, and then did or attempted to do
so.',249 In this sense, Pennsylvania appears not to follow those jurisdictions
where the State can secure a conviction for accomplice liability with a lesser
mental state than specific intent.
25°
F. Texas
The Texas law entitled "Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of Another"
contains a subsection which insists on "intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense" for aiding and abetting. The Texas case law, • • • 252
appears to be true to the state's accomplice legislation.
247. Id. at 1234 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c)(1) (West 1998);
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 (Pa. 1998)).
248. Id. at 1237.
249. Id. at 1234.
250. See discussion supra Part i.D.
251. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003) ("A person is criminally
responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if: ... (2) acting with intent to
promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts
to aid the other person to commit the offense; or (3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of
the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a
reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.").
252. See, e.g., Horton v. State, 880 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App. 1993). In Horton, police officers
charged the victim with driving while intoxicated. Id. at 23. After his arrest, the officers took him
to the county jail, "booked [him] in, and then placed [him] in the detoxification tank." Id. Later, the
victim died of injuries inflicted upon him while in the jail facility. Id. at 23-24. The defendant, a
law enforcement officer, "was charged with the commission of murder as both a principal and/or
as a party." Id. at 24. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and concluded the
record was "devoid of any evidence which would justify a finding that [the defendant] was guilty
of the offense as a principal," noting that "any culpability of [the defendant] would be only as a
party ..... Id. The court stated that where the defendant was at best "responsible for the actions of
the primary actor, the State must prove conduct constituting an offense, plus an act by [the
defendant] done with the intent to promote or assist such conduct." Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added)
(citing Beier v. State, 687 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Here, the court concluded that the
36
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In Hill v. State,253 a Texas Court of Appeals ruling, the defendant was found
guilty "as a party to the first degree felony offense of injury to a child.' ,254 In
this case, a hospital admitted the nine year old son of the defendant "with severe
,,255and infected bruises and injuries. A registered nurse noticed the victim "had
,,256various bruises and injuries obviously inflicted at different times.
Subsequently, when police investigated the matter, the defendant's husband
confessed that several days before the child's hospitalization he had "spanked"
257the victim with a metal rod. Because the police believed the defendant to be
an accomplice, they charged her with aiding and abetting her husband's
beatings of the victim. 258 The appellate court stated that "for the appellant to be
criminally responsible for the offense committed [by her husband], the evidence
must show that 'acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense, [she] solicit[ed], encourage[d], direct[ed], aid[ed], or attempt[ed] to aid•• , ,,259
the other person to commit the offense. The court found,
From the evidence, the jury could discern a pattern, existing during
a number of years, that on the occasions when [her husband] arrived
home from work and [the defendant] told him one of the children had
been bad, [her husband] would take the child into his bedroom and
"spank" the child with a metal rod or a stick. There was evidence that
these "spankings" had resulted in physical injuries to the children,
including knots on the heads.., and the fracture of eight of [the
victim's] ribs. On some of these occasions [the defendant] would be
present; at other times she would leave the house at [her husband's]
direction.26 °
The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the
defendant, "albeit not present during the 'spanking,' acted to promote or assist
in the 'spanking"' of the victim, and as such, the court affirmed her
261
conviction.
State failed to rebut the "reasonable hypothesis ... that the fatal blows could have been inflicted
[by others] either in the detox[ification] tank or in the hallway before [the defendant] was present."
Id. at 25.
253. 883 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App. 1994).
254. Id. at 766-67.
255. Id. at 767.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 767-68.
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In an another opinion from a Texas Court of Appeals, Wooden v. State,262 a
witness observed the defendant and three other men get out of a car and
surround a parked truck, from which they evidently intended to steal some
* 263items. Upon noticing the witness observing the men, the defendant and the
other men returned to the car and drove to the witness's vantage point.2 64 One of
the men, seated in the rear seat behind the defendant, reached down, picked up a
265gun, and pointed it at the witness's car. When the witness picked up his
266phone to call 911, the men drove away. The trial court convicted the
defendant as an accomplice to aggravated robbery based on the attempted theft
and his companion's pointing the gun at the witness in an attempt to prevent the
267witness from interfering. On appeal, the court stated that in order for a court
to find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, the evidence must show he
intended to promote both the theft and the pointing of the gun at the witness that
268created the basis for an aggravated robbery charge. The defendant claimed
that he did not know his companion had a gun and, as such, could not have
intended to promote or assist an aggravated robbery. 2 69 The court agreed and
270therefore reversed the aggravated robbery conviction. The court reasoned:
While [defendant's] statement, "I did not throw out the gun," is some
evidence that appellant knew a gun was thrown out of the car, it does
not indicate that appellant knew the gun was in the car when the men
were talking to [the witness] or that appellant encouraged his
271companion to threaten [the witness] with the gun.
The court concluded that the State was required to prove the defendant
"intended to promote or assist" the robbery but that it had not.
272
262. 101 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App. 2003).
263. Id. at 543-44.
264. Id. at 544.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 545.
268. Id. at 547-48.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 546-49.
271. Id. at548.
272. Id. at 547-48.
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IV. STATES WITH CASE LAW FOLLOWING THE CATEGORY 11 APPROACH:
STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED MENTAL STATE
The fourteen states that follow the Category IT approach fit into one of two
general subcategories: (1) states in which Category II language is codified and
strictly applied by the courts and (2) states in which Category 11 language is not
codified but judicially construed by the courts. Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky,
New Hampshire, New York, and Utah are the only six states in this first
category. Of these states, Hawaii, Kentucky, and New Hampshire essentially
274codify Model Penal Code section 2.06(4), while Connecticut, New York, and
Utah require a shared mental state for any offense, not just for result-oriented
crimes. In Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wyoming, the state courts have created a Category 11
276approach where Category 11 language is absent from the accomplice statutes.
Finally, although it might be argued that several other states, most notably
Alaska and Washington, follow the Category 11 approach, Part VI explores
these states' novel or unique approaches to accomplice liability.
A. "Codified" Category II Approach
While courts in Connecticut, New York, and Utah apply the Category 11
277approach from statutes containing only Category IT language, courts in
Hawaii, Kentucky, and New Hampshire follow the Category IT approach from
statutes that provide for accomplice liability under both a Category I and• 278
Category IT perspective.
1. Connecticut
In Connecticut, the courts strictly apply an accomplice statute under which
an accomplice is liable for a crime committed by a principal if the accomplice
aids and abets the principal and acts "with the mental state required for
273. See discussion infr a Part W.A.
274. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
276. See discussion infr a Part IV.B.
277. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(a) (West 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00
(McKinney 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003).
278. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-222 to -223 (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT.




Decker: The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVTEW
,,279 280commission of an offense. In State v. Foster, a jury convicted the
defendant, inter alia, of criminally negligent homicide based on an accomplice
281theory. In this case, the defendant and the principal confronted the victim,
282whom they suspected had raped the defendant's girlfriend. The defendant
beat the victim and then left the principal with a knife to guard the victim while
the defendant retrieved his girlfriend to identify the victim as the rapist.
283
While the defendant was away, the victim charged at the principal, who then
fatally stabbed the victim.
284
On appeal, the defendant contended and the Supreme Court of Connecticut
acknowledged that courts previously understood Connecticut accomplice law to
require "proof of a dual intent, i.e., 'that the accessory have the intent to aid the
principal and that in so aiding he intend to commit the offense with which he is
charged. ' ' , 285 The defendant then argued that because (1) accomplice liability in
Connecticut required that the accomplice intend to commit the charged offense,
and (2) "criminally negligent homicide requires that an unintended death
occur," accomplice liability for criminally negligent homicide was a "logical
impossibility in that it would require a defendant, in aiding another, to intend to
,,286commit a crime in which an unintended result occurs.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut disagreed with the defendant, however,
stating that the defendant's reliance on the concept of dual intent was
"misplaced' ' 287 and concluding:
[The accomplice liability statute] is not limited to cases where the
substantive crime requires the specific intent to bring about a result. [It]
merely requires that a defendant have the mental state required for the
commission of a crime while intentionally aiding another....
Accordingly, an accessory may be liable in aiding another if he acts
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence toward
the result, depending on the mental state required by the substantive
279. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8(a) (West 2007) ("A person, acting with the mental
state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender."). Importantly, this statute reflects no Category I language.
280. 522 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1987).
281. Id. at 278 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1987) (current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 2007)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-58 (West 2007)).
282. Id. at 279.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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crime. When a crime requires that a person act with criminal
negligence, an accessory is liable if he acts "with respect to a result or
to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he
fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will
occur or that such circumstance exists.
' 288
Here, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant intentionally
aided the principal by giving him the knife and negligently "failed to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would occur by handing [the
principal] the knife to prevent [the victim] from escaping. ' 289 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the defendant's conviction for
criminally negligent homicide 29 based on a Category II approach to accomplice
liability.
In State v. Crosswell,291 the defendant and the two principals agreed to steal
$15,000 that the principals believed was hidden in an apartment. 292 The
defendant and the principals broke into the apartment, ransacked it, and
restrained its occupants; one of the principals also beat an occupant in order to
293silence her. After one of the principals found the money, the defendant and
the principals left and then divided the $15,000 among themselves.294 A jury
convicted the defendant, inter alia, as an accessory to first degree burglary.
Here, the jury instructions stated that "reference to the mental state required
means that the alleged accessory must have the same intent to commit the crime
that is required of the actual perpetrators of the crime. 296
On appeal, the defendant claimed "that the [S]tate failed to prove that he
intended to commit a crime" in the premises, which is an element of first degree
burglary. 97 In addition, the defendant argued that being an accessory to first
degree burglary requires proof of the same mental state necessary to commit
298first degree burglary. The State, by contrast, argued that case law stated that
an "accessory was not required to 'possess the intent to commit the specific
288. Id. at 283 (footnote call numbers omitted) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
3(14) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008)).
289. Id. at 286.
290. Id. at 288.
291. 612 A.2d 1174 (Conn. 1992).
292. Id. at 1177.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1177-78.
295. Id. at 1176.
296. Id. at 1184 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id. at 1181-82 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101(a) (West 1992) (current
version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101(a) (West Supp. 2008))).
298. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1992) (current version at CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 2007))).
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degree' of the crime charged.' ,2 99 The Supreme Court of Connecticut responded
that "[t]aking a literal view of the plain language of the accessory statute," it
effectively agreed with the position "that 'the mental state required of an
accomplice who is charged with a crime [cannot be] less than that which must
be proved against a principal."' ° The court held that to be liable as an
accomplice, the defendant must possess the mental state necessary to convict
him of the substantive crime.:3 1 After examining the evidence, namely, that the
defendant knew that the principals entered the house to commit a robbery and
that infliction of injury was a possibility, the court concluded that the defendant• •. 302
had the mental state to commit first degree burglary: Consequently, the court
upheld the defendant's conviction for that offense.
2. New York
Under New York's accomplice statute, to be guilty as an accomplice, one
must act with the same "mental culpability" required of the principal. 3 4 New
York's statute, like Connecticut's, has no Category I provision: 5 When
analyzing earlier accomplice liability law, however, New York courts stated that
when a defendant aided and abetted a "common purpose," he was "presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his act. ' 3° 6 For example, in People v.
Lieberman, the New York Court of Appeals examined a case where a group of
four young men decided to assault tramps and vagrants. 30 7 Upon finding a man
sitting on the front steps of an abandoned home, members of the group
308proceeded to punch the man until he fell to the ground. At this point, the
victim ran to aid the man lying on the sidewalk, whereupon an altercation
erupted between the victim and the group: 9 One of the defendant's
confederates subsequently struck the victim, who fell to the sidewalk and struck
the back of his head on the edge of the sidewalk, which rendered him
299. Id. (quoting State v. McCalpine, 463 A.2d 545, 551 (Conn. 1983)).





304. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 2004) ("When one person engages in conduct
which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting
with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands,
importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.").
305. See id.; supra note 279 and accompanying text.
306. People v. Lieberman, 148 N.E.2d 293, 295 (N.Y. 1958) (citations omitted).
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unconscious. 310 The defendant and his three companions then left the scene, and
the victim subsequently died without regaining consciousness. 311 The State
prosecuted the defendant and his codefendants for manslaughter, but the trial
court granted a motion to dismiss.
3 12
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reinstated the charge.313 The
court held that the evidence proved the existence of a plan to "beat up 'tramps
and vagrants' which, when set in motion," led to the victim's death. The court
reasoned that a jury could properly conclude that the defendant was "a willing
and active participant from start to finish. ' '315 Although the victim's death may
not have been what the group intended, the court noted that "both here and in
sister States ... a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
act., 316 Because the victim's death was a "natural and probable consequence" of
the group's plan, the court concluded that a jury could find the defendant liable
even though the victim's resulting death "was unexpected and formed no part of
the original scheme." 
3 17
Notwithstanding Lieberman and similar early cases, later New York
opinions track the requirements of the New York accomplice statute, which
mandates shared intent. In People v. Torres,3 18 the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, reversed the murder conviction of a defendant who had
argued with the victim and armed himself with a knife with which to murder the
victim.319 Another man the defendant knew shot the victim.320 In this case, the
appellate court held that the People failed to prove the defendant was "acting in
concert with the person who shot the deceased. ' , 32 1 The court stated that "even if
the defendant was aware of the weapon possessed by the shooter, the People
failed to prove that the defendant shared or was aware of the shooter's intent to
kill" the victim.3 22 The court added that "[n]otwithstanding the defendant's
admitted but uneffectuated intent to stab [the victim]," the People had not






314. Id. at 294.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
317. Id.
318. 545 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).




323. Id. (citing People v. LaCoot, 500 N.Y.S.2d 12, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)).
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Because the state failed to prove "that the defendant shared the shooter's intent
to kill," the court felt obliged to reverse the defendant's conviction.
3
2
In People v. Rossey,3 25 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
had previously reversed the defendant's murder conviction because it was not
convinced the defendant "shared the intent to kill" the victim.3 26 Later, the New
York Court of Appeals reinstated the conviction of the defendant, who had
driven the codefendant to an area, looked for and conversed with the victim, and
327drove the codefendant from the area afterward. The court found that: (1) the
defendant had been present during the commission of the crime, and (2) a
rational trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was "acting in concert
with the shooter," thus satisfying the requirements for conviction under an
accomplice liability theory.3 28 The court further stated that although it was
circumstantial evidence that established that the "defendant shared [the
principal's] intention to kill," such evidence could support a conviction under
New York accomplice law. 3 29 In conclusion, Rossey and Torres demonstrate
that New York follows a shared intent approach.
3. Utah
Utah's criminal code requires a shared mental state for aiding and
abetting.330 Its case law is true to its accomplice legislation. 3 3 1 In State v.
Cayer, a group of men beat the victim while the defendant remained inside a
324. Id.
325. 678 N.E.2d 473 (N.Y. 1997).
326. Id. at 473 (citing People v. Rossey, 635 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)).
327. Id. at 474.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 473-74 (citing People v. Cabey, 649 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (N.Y. 1995)).
330. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003) ("Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.").
331. See State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000) (holding that in order to convict a
defendant of aggravated battery as an accomplice, the State "had to show that [the defendant],
acting 'with the mental state required for the commission of' aggravated burglary," aided the
principal in the commission of the offense (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003))); see
also State v. Chancy, 989 P.2d 1091, 1101, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "criminal
liability attaches to one who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
and does so with the mental state required for commission of the offense" and rejecting the
argument that specific intent is required for accomplice liability); State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d
30, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that where the defendant claimed that he did not act "with the
mental state required to commit the offense" of aggravated sexual assault as an accomplice, the
jury properly concluded that the "defendant intentionally aided [the principal] in the sexual
assault").
332. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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trailer and prevented the victim's friend from going to the victim's aid.333 A jury
convicted the defendant of second degree murder under the Utah accomplice
liability statute and he appealed on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Court of Appeals of Utah
disagreed, stating that the "[d]efendant prevented [the victim's friend] from
going outside to help [the victim] by hitting [the friend] every time he attempted
to get up. A jury could reasonably conclude this conduct by defendant aided his
friends in the beating death of [the victim]." 335 Moreover, "a reasonable jury
could infer that defendant had the requisite mental state for the offense" because
"[h]e made no attempt to aid the victim either by seeking help.., or by
intervening on the victim's behalf.
336
4. Hawaii
Under Hawaii's "complicity" liability statute, a person is an accomplice if
that person aids with the intent to promote or facilitate the underlying
offense.337 Meanwhile, under Hawaii's "complicity with respect to the result"
statute, where a "particular result is an element of an offense," a person is an
accomplice to the conduct that produced the result if the person acted with the
mens rea required for the offense. 338 Consequently, because one need not
invariably harbor specific intent as to a criminal result to be an accomplice in
Hawaii, this state is also a Category Iljurisdiction.
In State v. Hernandez,339 the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a conviction
relying on the complicity statute. 34 In that case, where the defendant was
present when the perpetrator began his attack upon the victim, prevented the
beaten and bloodied victim from escaping, and returned her to the perpetrator
333. Id. at 607.
334. Id. at 608, 612 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1990) (current version at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2008)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2003)).
335. Id. at612.
336. Id.
337. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-222 (LexisNexis 2007) ("A person is an accomplice of
another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) [w]ith the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, the person: (a) [s]olicits the other person to commit it;
or (b) [a]ids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or (c)
[h]aving a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make reasonable effort so to
do .... ").
338. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-223 (LexisNexis 2007) ("When causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing the result is an accomplice
in the commission of that offense, if the accomplice acts, with respect to that result, with the state
of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.").
339. 605 P.2d 75 (Haw. 1980) (per curiam).
340. Id. at 79.
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who then sexually abused her by inserting a beer bottle in her vagina, the
defendant was liable as an accomplice for the sexual abuse because he had
aided the perpetrator "with the intention of facilitating the commission of the
offense."
' 341
In State v. Kaiama,342 the Hawaii Supreme Court applied the complicity
with respect to the result statute. 34 3 After the defendant and the principal met the
victim in a bar, the three went to a beach sometime after midnight, whereupon
the victim offered to perform oral sex on the defendant and principal.
Infuriated by the suggestion, the defendant and principal attacked the victim,
who escaped by jumping in the ocean.345 The two then threw rocks at the victim
to discourage him from coming out of the water.346 The defendant claimed the
principal went into the ocean, where he struggled with the victim.34 7 Afterward,
the principal told the defendant he had "drowned" the victim. 34 Later, the
victim was found dead from drowning. 34 9 At the defendant's trial, where a jury
convicted the defendant of second degree murder, the jury had been instructed
that they could find the defendant liable as an accomplice for the homicide "as
long as he acted with the required state of mind with respect to the actual
result," to wit, the victim's death. 3 5 Although the defendant claimed that this
instruction was inadequate, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that it was an
accurate reflection of Hawaii's complicity with respect to the result law and
affirmed the defendant's conviction.
3 5 1
5. New Hampshire
The New Hampshire Supreme Court previously held that an accomplice
must have specific intent that the principal commit the substantive offense that
was charged, even though the language of the criminal code appeared to tolerate
341. Id. at 76-79 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-222 (LexisNexis 2007)). However,
the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of a second count of sexual abuse arising
from the State's claim that the perpetrator had also inserted the beer bottle into the victim's anus.
Id. at 79.
342. 911 P.2d 735 (Haw. 1996).
343. Id. at 747 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-223 (LexisNexis 2007)).




348. Id. at 739.
349. Id. at 737.
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a lesser mental state for result-based crimes.352 Then, in 2001, the legislature
amended its accomplice legislation in a deliberate attempt to narrow the test for
accomplice liability, making it clear that New Hampshire is a Category II
state.
In Etzweiler, a 1984 New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion, a grand jury
indicted the defendant charging him with two counts of negligent homicide and
with being an accomplice to two counts of negligent homicide, but the supreme
court later dismissed all the charges against the defendant. In this case, the
defendant and principal arrived in the defendant's car at the plant where they
both worked .35The defendant then loaned his car to the allegedly intoxicated
principal, whom the defendant allegedly knew was intoxicated, and the
principal drove and collided with another car, killing two of its passengers.356
The trial court transferred five questions of law to the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, but the supreme court recognized only the question of
"whether the legislature ... intended to impose criminal liability upon a person
who lends his automobile to an intoxicated driver but does not accompany the
driver, when the driver's operation of the borrowed automobile causes
death. 357 The court held that whether the defendant's conduct could
conceivably "fall within the statutory language defining negligent homicide"
352. Compare State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870, 874 (N.H. 1984) ("[U]nder our statute, the
accomplice must aid the primary actor in the substantive offense with the purpose of facilitating
the substantive offense .... ), superseded by statute, Act of July 11, 2001, 2001 N.H. Laws 446
(codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007)), as recognized in
State v. Anthony, 861 A.2d 773, 775 (N.H. 2004), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(1I)
(LexisNexis 1974) ("A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense
if: (a) [w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he ... aids or
agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it .... ), and id. § 626:8
(IV) ("[W]hen causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct
causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of
culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.")
(current version at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007)).
353. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007) ("Notwithstanding the
requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph 111(a), when causing a particular result is an
element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the
commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result
that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability
under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or
facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a
prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and
the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as
required for the commission of the offense.").
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was a matter "for legislative concern" and, as such, chose only to address
whether the defendant could be guilty as an accomplice.
358
Discussing section 626:8 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire explained that subsection 1II "sets forth the
elements which must be present above, beyond, and regardless of the
substantive offense" for accomplice liability and subsection IV "sets forth the
elements of the substantive offense that the State has the burden of establishing
against the accomplice. 3 The supreme court continued:
The State has alleged that, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, [the defendant]
aided [the principal] in the commission of that offense. However, under
[New Hampshire's] statute, the accomplice must aid the primary actor
in the substantive offense with the purpose of facilitating the
substantive offense-in this case, negligent homicide ....
... [The defendant], as a matter of law, could not be an accomplice
to negligent homicide. To satisfy the requirements of [the accomplice
statute], the State must establish that [the defendant]'s acts were
designed to aid [the principal] in committing negligent homicide. Yet
under the negligent homicide statute, [the principal] must be unaware
of the risk of death that his conduct created .... We cannot see how
[the defendant] could intentionally aid [the principal] in a crime that
[the principal] was unaware that he was committing. Thus, we hold, as
a matter of law, that, in the present context of the Criminal Code, an
individual may not be an accomplice to negligent homicide.
The supreme court thereafter dismissed the charges against the defendant.
361
Then, in 2004, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected the Etzweiler
holding after considering the 2001 legislative amendment to New Hampshire's
accomplice liability statute. 362 In State v. Anthony, the defendant helped her
358. Id. at 873. Here, the court felt it was beyond its judicial prerogative to rule that the
defendant would be guilty as a principal under the terms of the negligent homicide statute when he
was not even present in the vehicle when the deadly driving occurred. See id. at 872-73.
359. Id. at 873-74 (discussing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(1)-(IV) (LexisNexis 1984)
(current version at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(111)-(IV) (LexisNexis 2007))).
360. Id. at 874-75 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:3 (LexisNexis 1984) (current version at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:3
(LexisNexis 2007))).
361. Id. at 875.
362. See State v. Anthony, 861 A.2d 773, 775 (N.H. 2004) (discussing N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007); State v. Locke, 761 A.2d 376, 379 (1999), superseded by
statute, Act of July 1, 2001, 2001 N.H. Laws 446 (codified as amended at § 626:8(W)); Etzweiler,
480 A.2d at 874).
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husband tie a horse's legs together, which caused the horse to suffer pain and
injury. At trial, the State charged the defendant with being an accomplice to
intentional cruelty to animals, but the jury found the defendant guilty of "the
lesser included offense of accomplice to negligent cruelty to animals."
364
On appeal, the defendant cited Etzweiler, contending that the Etzweiler
interpretation of New Hampshire's accomplice liability statute would require an
accomplice's purposeful intent to injure, and therefore being an accomplice to
negligent cruelty to animals could not be a crime. 365 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire affirmed the conviction, however, concluding:
[C]onsistent[] with the majority of courts interpreting accomplice
liability statutes derived from the Model Penal Code .... accomplice
liability under [section] 626:8, ITT and IV requires proof "(1) that the
accomplice intended to promote or facilitate another's unlawful or
dangerous conduct, and (2) that the accomplice acted with the culpable
mental state specified in the underlying statute with respect to the
result[] ,366
The court explained that the legislature did not intend its use of the phrase "with
a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense" to require, even under the
original version of the New Hampshire accomplice law, both intent to aid and
intent for the commission of the underlying offense; it further suggested that
Etzweiler was simply wrongly decided. Thereafter, the court upheld the
defendant's conviction for negligent cruelty to animals under an accomplice
theory because the defendant (1) "intentionally aided her husband in confining a
horse" and (2) failed to become aware of the resulting "substantial and
unjustifiable risk" to the horse. 368 Here, the defendant had both (1) the intent to
aid the principal's conduct and (2) the negligence required of the substantive
crime.369
363. Anthony, 861 A.2d at 774.
364. Id.
365. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8 (LexisNexis 1984) (current version at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8 (LexisNexis 2007)); Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874).
366. Id. at 776 (quoting Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204, 215 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)).
367. See id. (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(V) (LexisNexis 2007)) ("We conclude
that the 2001 amendment to [section] 626:8, TV was not enacted to alter the original intent of the
statute, but rather to clarify it in response to Etzweiler.").
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6. Kentucky
Kentucky's complicity statute follows sections 2.06(3)-(4) of the Model
Penal Code, effectively making Kentucky a Category II state. 37 In Tharp v.
Commonwealth,37' the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction of
the defendant for "wanton murder by complicity and ... criminal abuse in the
second degree. 72 The defendant's child had died from abuse by the
373defendant's husband. At trial, the defendant "testified that she had never
witnessed her husband abusing [their child]," although she had previously stated
to the police that she had in fact seen her husband abusing their child on two
separate occasions, one of which led to the death of their child. A jury
convicted the defendant on a theory of complicity; the defendant appealed,
contending that the jury received improper instructions on guilt by complicity
because the instructions did not require a determination of the husband's mental
state at the time he killed the victim.
375
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained:
[Kentucky's accomplice liability statute] describes two separate
and distinct theories under which a person can be found guilty by
complicity, i.e., "complicity to the act" under subsection (1) of the
statute, which applies when the principal actor's conduct constitutes the
criminal offense, and "complicity to the result" under subsection (2) of
the statute, which applies when the result of the principal's conduct
constitutes the criminal offense ....
The primary distinction between these two statutory theories of
accomplice liability is that a person can be guilty of "complicity to the
act" under [subsection (1)] only if he/she possesses the intent that the
principal actor commit the criminal act. However, a person can be
guilty of "complicity to the result" under [subsection (2)] without the
intent that the principal's act cause the criminal result, but with a state
of mind which equates with "the kind of culpability with respect to the
370. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020
(LexisNexis 1999) ("A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he... [a]ids ... such person
in planning or committing the offense .... When causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient
for the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense when he ... [a]ids ... another person in
planning, or engaging in the conduct causing such result ....
371. 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000).
372. Id. at 359-60, 369.
373. Id. at 359.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 359-60, 365.
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result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense," whether
intent, recklessness, wantonness, or aggravated wantonness.
376
The Supreme Court of Kentucky also cited the Model Penal Code:
"[Section 2.06(4)] makes it clear that complicity in conduct causing a
particular criminal result entails accountability for that result so long as
the accomplice is personally culpable with respect to the result to the
extent demanded by the definition of the crime .... It has been
asserted that the purpose of Section 2.06(4) is to ameliorate the harshest
aspects of the so-called "natural and probable consequence" doctrine,
under which an accomplice is held criminally liable for a crime which
he/she did not intend to aid or assist so long as the resultant crime was a
natural and probable consequence of the crime he/she did intend to aid
or assist.
377
Holding that the degree of liability of the husband was "immaterial" with regard
to the defendant's culpability for a result-based crime, the court concluded that
the defendant possessed the requisite level of "aggravated wantonness" for a
conviction of wanton murder by complicity.
378
In Wilson v. Commonwealth,379 the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed
and remanded a circuit court's conviction of the defendant because the jury
instructions on complicity were erroneous. 38 The circuit court had convicted
the defendant of one count of complicity to first degree rape and two counts of
complicity to second degree rape in the rape of her children by several men.381
The defendant challenged paragraph D of the jury instruction, which read:
You will find the Defendant... Guilty of Complicity to Second
Degree Rape under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A.... [the
principal] engaged in sexual intercourse with [the victim]; B. That at
the time of such intercourse, [the principal] was eighteen (18) years of
age or older and [the victim] was less than fourteen (14) years of age.
376. Id. at 360 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 1999); id. § 502
official commentary; ROBERT G. LAWSON & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE §§ 3-3(b)(3), at 106, (c)(2), at 114 (1998)).
377. Id. at 365-66 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 7 (1962)) (citing Rogers,
supra note 23, at 1360, 1362).
378. Id. at 366.
379. No. 2002-SC-370-MR, 2004 WL 2624155 (Ky. Nov. 18, 2004).
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C. That the Defendant... was the mother of [the victim]; AND D. That
the Defendant ... aided or assisted [the principal] in having sexual
intercourse with [the victim] or, knowing that sexual intercourse may
occur, failed to make a proper effort to prevent the act.:
3 2
The court acknowledged that it had approved an instruction containing
language similar to paragraph D in its earlier opinion of Tharp v.
Commonwealth, a homicide case. 383 However, the court in Wilson noted that
homicide "is a 'result offense' ... in which the crime is the result of the
conduct"; in other words, the crime is the death itself, not the conduct that
384causes death. Thus, "if the accomplice intended the principal's conduct to
result in the victim's death, then such intent is a required element of the offense
and the conviction is of complicity to murder or complicity to manslaughter in
the first degree."'3 85 In contrast, "[i]f the accomplice did not intend the
principal's conduct to cause the victim's death, then the classification of the
homicide depends upon the degree of the defendant's culpability with respect to
,,386the result, i.e., the victim's death. The court pointed out, "In Tharp, there
was no evidence that the victim's mother intended for her husband to kill her
child.' , 387 Consequently,
[T]he instructions in Tharp permitted the jury to convict the mother of
reckless homicide if her failure to make a proper effort to prevent her
child's death constituted recklessness, or of manslaughter in the second
degree if her failure constituted wantonness, or of wanton murder if her
failure constituted aggravated wantonness.
3
8
Turning to the case at hand, the Wilson court then distinguished homicide
from rape, which "is not a result offense."' 3 9 The court pointed out that in
"'statutory rape,' it is the conduct of sexual intercourse ... that constitutes the
crime." 390 Thus, "conviction of complicity to rape ... requires proof of intent
382. Id. at *2.
383. Id. (citing Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356,364 (Ky. 2000)).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020(1) (LexisNexis 1999); Harper v.
Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 261, 266-67 (Ky. 2001)).
387. Id.
388. Id. (citing Tharp, 40 S.W.3d at 364-66).
389. Id. at *3.
390. Id. (emphasis added).
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that the [rape] be committed., 391 Here, "[m]ere knowledge, as required by the
instruction in this case, proves only criminal facilitation."
392
The court concluded that "[t]here was ample evidence in this case from
which a jury could have concluded that [the defendant] intended for [the
principal] to engage in sexual intercourse with [the defendant's child]," but
because "the instruction only required the jury to conclude that [the defendant]
knew 'that sexual intercourse may occur,"' the deficiency warranted a
reversal. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that "other complicity
instructions were similarly deficient," and as such, a new trial was warranted.394
B. "Judicially Construed" Category II Approach
Though the accomplice statutes in the eight remaining Category II states-
Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wyoming-are devoid of any Category II language, the courts nevertheless
construe their accomplice laws consistent with the Category II approach.
1. Georgia
Georgia's criminal code does not contain language reflecting either the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or the shared intent approach.
Nevertheless, one Georgia appellate case has applied the natural and probable
consequence doctrine where there was a common design. In Guzman v. State,39
the defendant provided alcohol to minors, consumed it with them, and then gave
his car keys to one of the minors, a fourteen year old, who drove off with two of
the other minors and crashed into a tree, killing both passengers. 397 A jury
convicted the defendant "as a party to the crime" of two counts of vehicular
391. Id. (emphasis added).
392. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.080(1) (LexisNexis 1999)) ("A person is guilty
of criminal facilitation when, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends
to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or




395. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-20(a), (b)(3)-(4) (2007) ("Every person concerned in the
commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of
the crime .... A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he: ... [i]ntentionally
aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or ... [i]ntentionally advises, encourages, hires,
counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.").
396. 586 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
397. Id. at 61.
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homicide in the first degree and five counts of furnishing alcohol to a minor.
398
As part of its analysis, the Georgia Court of Appeals raised the issue of whether
there was a "common design [between the defendant and the minor driver] to
act together for the accomplishment of driving under the influence in a less safe
manner." 399 The court concluded that "[t]he jury could have reasonably
concluded that [defendant and the minor] had a common design to allow [the
minor] to drive after drinking alcohol" because, contrary to law, defendant
provided the minor with alcohol and his car keys and did nothing to stop the
minor, who had little experience in either driving or consuming alcohol, from
leaving with the car.40 The court reasoned that even though defendant's mere
"presence" at the scene would not be enough to establish that defendant was a
party to vehicular homicide, 40 1 "[e]very person is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his conduct, particularly if that conduct
be unlawful and dangerous to the safety or lives of others."
40 2
However, a 2007 Georgia Supreme Court opinion follows the shared intent403
approach. In Hill v. State,0 the defendant and codefendant had armed
themselves and assaulted the victims in an attempt to rob a restaurant.40 4 An
alarm sounded and the first victim fled, but the codefendant chased him down in
the belief that the victim had the restaurant's money.40 5 The defendant allowed
the second victim to run free and then joined the codefendant and first victim in
a nearby alley. 40 6 The defendant, upon being asked by the codefendant whether
the codefendant should kill the victim, first replied "no, don't" but then said "I
don't know, man, it's up to you." 40 7 The codefendant then fatally shot the victim
and both the defendants fled.40 A jury convicted the defendant on charges of
felony murder and kidnapping with bodily injury. 40 9 On appeal, the defendant
argued, among other things, that the evidence adduced at trial supported the
crimes in the restaurant but was insufficient for his conviction on charges
arising from the codefendant's actions in the alley.410 The Georgia Supreme
398. Id.
399. Id. at 62.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. State, 373 S.E.2d 97, 98
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988)).
402. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Helton v. State, 455 S.E.2d 848,
849 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)).
403. 642 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. 2007).
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Court affirmed the lower court's verdict, citing a previous discussion of Georgia
statutory law by the court: "Proof that the defendant share[d] a common
criminal intent with the actual perpetrators is necessary, and may be inferred
from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime., The court
412concluded that the State had produced sufficient evidence at trial. I Based on
the evidence that the defendant was "willingly present when [the victim] was
killed"; that defendant "fled the crime scene with [codefendant]; and that he
afterwards bragged about his participation in the crimes," the court concluded
that a reasonable jury could have inferred the defendant "shared the criminal
intent of the actual perpetrator. 4 1 3 Inasmuch as the Georgia Supreme Court has
explicitly followed the shared intent approach in Hill and its previous
decisions,41 4 the author believes Georgia is a member of the Category II
jurisdictions.
2. Idaho
In a single statutory provision, Idaho proscribes one's direct involvement in
the crime and also covers one who "aid[s] and abet[s] in its commission, or, not
,4415being present, [one who may] have advised and encouraged its commission.
Its accomplice case law, meanwhile, holds that one must have the same mental
state required for commission of the offense.41 In State v. Gonzalez, a trial
court acquitted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter on a theory of aiding
and abetting.41 7 In this case, the defendant and a confederate armed themselves
after the defendant became jealous of suspected relations between his wife and
411. Id. at 66 (quoting Eckman v. State, 548 S.E.2d 310, 313 (Ga. 2001)).
412. Id.
413. Id. (quoting Eckman, 548 S.E.2d at 310).
414. See, e.g., Eckman, 548 S.E.2d at 313 ("Proof that the defendant shares a common
criminal intent with the actual perpetrators is necessary." (citing Jones v. State, 295 S.E.2d 71 (Ga.
1982))); Grace v. State, 425 S.E.2d 865, 869 (Ga. 1993) (inquiring if the defendant "shares in the
criminal intent" (citing Sands v. State, 418 S.E.2d 55, 57 (Ga. 1992))); Jones, 295 S.E.2d at 73
(Ga. 1982) ("The elements of proof that one is a party to a crime or an accomplice requires proof
of a common criminal intent." (citing Lamar v. State, 224 S.E.2d 69, 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)));
Thornton v. State, 46 S.E. 640, 642 (Ga. 1903) ("For one to be guilty as principal in the second
degree, it is essential that he share in the criminal intent of the principal in the first degree. The
same criminal intent must exist in the minds of both."); Springer v. State, 30 S.E. 971, 971 (Ga.
1897) ("Participation in the commission of the same criminal act, and in the execution of a
common criminal intent, is therefore necessary, to render one criminal, in a legal sense, an
accomplice of another."), abrogated on other grounds by Selvidge v. State, 313 S.E.2d 84 (Ga.
1984).
415. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-204 (2004 & Supp. 2008).
416. State v. Gonzalez, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Hickman,
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the victim. 4 18 The defendant and his confederate then waited in the
confederate's trailer, where the victim also lived.419 When the victim returned,
he attacked the defendant before the defendant could react.4 2° The defendant
contended that while being attacked by the victim, he begged for his
confederate to intervene, whereupon his confederate shot and killed the
victim. 4 2 1 However, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant
may have in fact attacked the victim first, failed in his attempt, and encouraged
his confederate to shoot the victim after the victim began to defend himself.
Although the jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter, the
defendant "filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that
there was no evidence that [the defendant] knew [his confederate] was going to
shoot and kill the victim when the victim was beating [the defendant] and [the
defendant] asked [the confederate] for assistance. 423 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion and explained that "no evidence supported the jury's
conclusion that [the defendant] aided and abetted [the confederate's] shooting
and killing the victim. ' '424 The Court of Appeals of Idaho disagreed. 425 The
court explained, first, "[v]oluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 426
Second,
[T]he aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and acted in some
manner to bring about the intended result. The definition of aiding and
abetting may encompass the activity of one who intentionally assists or
encourages or knowingly participates by any of such means in bringing
about the commission of a crime. Thus, in order to prove [the
defendant] guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the state had to show that
he had the requisite intent to bring about the death of [the victim] and
acted in furtherance of that intent by encouraging or soliciting [his
confederate] to shoot [the victim] under the circumstances which [the
427defendant] himself had helped to create.




422. Id. at 384.
423. Id. at 383-84.
424. Id. at 384.
425. Id.
426. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006(1) (2004 & Supp. 2008); State v. Grube, 883
P.2d 1069, 1073 (Idaho 1994)).
427. Id. at 384-85 (citation omitted).
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The court concluded that a reasonable mind could infer from the facts of this
428case that the defendant had the requisite intent for voluntary manslaughter.
The jury could reasonably have found that the defendant "attempted to shoot
[the victim] in accord with his previously expressed threat to kill him; that his
attempt failed; that a struggle ensued in which [the defendant] encouraged [his
confederate] to shoot and kill [the victim]; and that they thereafter agreed upon
a story of self-defense. 429
In State v. Romero-Garcia,430 police officers met with a confidential
informant who had arranged for a cocaine purchase through the defendant. 43 1
Officers followed the informant's vehicle while the informant picked up the
432defendant at his home. The informant and the defendant subsequently drove
to an apartment parking lot.433 While under surveillance, the defendant "exited
the vehicle, walked to an apartment, and returned to the vehicle" with a drug
dealer.434 The dealer "agreed to sell [the informant] an ounce of cocaine, and
walked back to the apartment to obtain the drugs. 435 Upon returning to the
vehicle, the dealer gave the ounce of cocaine to the informant in exchange for
$800.436 The defendant received $200 "[tior his part in the transaction," and was
taken home.437 After police arrested the defendant, the trial court convicted the
defendant of aiding and abetting trafficking in cocaine and aiding and abetting
438the failure to affix drug tax stamps.
On appeal, the defendant contended that there was not sufficient evidence
to support his conviction on the charge of aiding and abetting the failure to affix
illegal drug tax stamps.439 The Court of Appeals of Idaho stated that (1)
"[u]nder the Idaho Illegal Drug Tax Act, illegal drug tax stamps were required
to be permanently affixed to the cocaine sold"; (2) "[b]ecause no stamps were
attached, the drug dealer was charged with and found guilty of failure to affix
the required tax stamps"; and (3) the defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting
the dealer's failure to affix the required tax stamps.440
According to the court, the main issue regarding whether the defendant was
an accomplice to the tax stamp violation centered on the required mental state,
428. Id. at 386.
429. Id.
430. 75 P.3d 1209 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003).
431. Id. at1211.
432. Id. at 1211-12.







440. Id. at 1214.
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which is "generally the same as that required for the underlying offense-the
aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the princi al and there must
be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking." After examining
the tax stamp statute and the Idaho aiding and abetting law, the court explained
that for a charge of aiding and abetting the failure to affix tax stamps "the
mental state necessary to that charge required only that [the defendant]
knowingly participated in or assisted the drug dealer in the possession orS,,442
distribution of cocaine. Since the State presented sufficient evidence




In the state of Massachusetts, in order to establish guilt as an accessory
before the fact,444 the accomplice must "intentionally assist[] the principal in the
commission of the crime and ... shar[e] with the principal the [same] mental
state" that is required to convict the principal of that crime. 445 In
Commonwealth v. Richards, a jury had convicted the defendant-accomplice of
armed robbery and assault with intent to murder.446 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the nature of the
defendant-accomplice's aid in the commission of the armed robbery was
evidence that he intended the assault with intent to murder that occurred.
447
Here, the defendant gave guns to the principal and a co-accomplice, drove them
to a store, developed a plan for the robbery, and drove them away from the
441. Id. (citing State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Idaho 1985)).
442. Id. at 1215.
443. Id. at 1216.
444. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 2000) ("Whoever aids in the
commission of a felony, or is accessory thereto before the fact by counselling, hiring or otherwise
procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished in the manner provided for the
punishment of the principal felon.").
445. Commonwealth v. Richards, 293 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Mass. 1973) (citing State v.
Hickam, 8 S.W. 252, 258 (Mo. 1888); State v. Taylor, 39 A. 447, 451 (Vt. 1898)); see also
Commonwealth v. Raposo, 595 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Mass. 1992) ("[I]t is clear that what is required
to be convicted as an accessory before the fact is not only knowledge of the crime and a shared
intent to bring it about, but also some sort of act that contributes to its happening.") (emphasis
added); Commonwealth v. Pope, 491 N.E.2d 240, 245 (Mass. 1986) ("The Commonwealth had to
show, first, that [the principal] killed [the victim] with deliberately premeditated malice
aforethought and, second, that the defendant assisted [the principal] in the commission of [the]
crime while sharing with the principal the mental state required for murder in the first degree, or,
in the absence of deliberate premeditation, murder in the second degree.") (emphasis added).
446. Richards, 293 N.E.2d at 856.
447. Id. at 860.
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robbery. 448 During the robbery, a police sergeant responded and the principal
shot him while the defendant was outside the store. 449 The court laid out a
procedure for convicting the defendant-accomplice: first, the State must show
that the principal is guilty of the offense;450 and second, the State must show
that the accomplice "intentionally assisted the principal" and did so while
"sharing with the principal the mental state required for that crime."451 The
court held that an accomplice meets the required mental state if the "purpose to
murder in the mind of the [accomplice] was a conditional or contingent one, a
willingness to see the shooting take place should it become necessary to
,,452effectuate the robbery or make good an escape. In this case, the defendant
was the "ringleader," he planned the robbery's commission and the escape, and
he furnished loaded weapons.453 The court held that these facts showed the
defendant acted with a contingent plan in his mind that the principal would use
the gun on anyone who obstructed the robbery.454
4. New Jersey
The New Jersey "complicity" statute contains no Category II language and
on its face insists on proof of a defendant's "purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense. ' ' 5 Upon closer scrutiny, however,
the case law from New Jersey, including the oft-cited State v. Weeks,456 reveals
it is in fact a Category II state insisting on "shared intent. ' '457 In State v.
448. Id. at 856-57.
449. Id. at 857.
450. Id. at 860.
451. Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Hickam, 8 S.W. 252, 258 (Mo. 1888); State v.
Taylor, 39 A. 447, 451 (Vt. 1898)).
452. Id. (citing Taylor, 39 A. at 451).
453. Id.
454. Id. (comparing these facts with the similar facts and guilty verdict in People v. Poplar,
173 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)).
455. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6C (West 2005) ("A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if: (1) [w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense; he (a) [s]olicits such other person to commit it; (b) [a]ids or agrees or
attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) [h]aving a legal duty to
prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do .....
456. 526 A.2d 1077 (N.J. 1987).
457. Much of the apparent confusion about New Jersey's stance on the mental state for
accomplice liability appears to stem from Weeks, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated
"the [Model Penal Code] now specifically requires that the accomplice have the 'purpose of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense' of which the principal was convicted." Id.
at 1080 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (1985)). The court noted the New Jersey
statutory "language in [section] 2C:2-6C(l) is identical." Id. Further, it pointed out that New
Jersey law deliberately "limits the scope of liability to crimes which the accomplice had the
purpose of promoting or facilitating. It is intended not to include those which he merely knowingly
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Bielkiewicz,458 two tow truck drivers, including the victim, first got into an
argument and then a physical confrontation with the second defendant,
whereupon the first defendant and another individual came to assist the second
defendant.459 When the two tow truck drivers attempted to leave the scene in
their respective vehicles, the second tow truck driver stated that he saw the
second defendant fire several shots into the victim's truck. 460 There was
conflicting testimony about the first defendant's role at this point; at least one
witness suggested that there were two shooters, one of whom was the
defendant.46 1 The prosecution proceeded on the theory that the gunfire which
killed the victim was probably that of the second defendant and that the first
462defendant was an accomplice. Ajury convicted both defendants of purposeful
463and knowing murder. Both defendants appealed, claiming the trial court's
accomplice instructions were flawed for failing to consider the possibility of
lesser included offense liability.
464
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division reversed both
defendants' convictions because the trial court's accomplice instructions were
incomplete and because it was unclear which defendant the jury believed to be
465the shooter. The court first noted, "By definition an accomplice must be a
person who acts with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the substantive offense for which he is charged as an accomplice.,
466
Consequently, the trial court should instruct a jury that in order to find a
defendant guilty as an accomplice it must find that the defendant "shared in the
intent which is the crime's basic element, and at least indirectly participated in
facilitated substantially. We agree with the [Model Penal Code] in this regard." Id. at 1081
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 N.J. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
COMM'N, THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE 58 (1971)). In Weeks, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ruled that a court could not convict a defendant as an accomplice to an armed robbery where the
trial court's "instruction did not clearly require the jury to find that defendant had shared the
purpose to commit a robbery with a weapon." Id. at 1082 (first emphasis added). This language
seemingly would prevent a New Jersey defendant from being an accomplice where, for example,
the defendant recklessly facilitated a criminal result. However, subsequent judicial interpretation
reveals otherwise. See inrfra notes 458-72 and accompanying text.
458. 632 A.2d 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
459. Id. at 279-80.
460. Id. at 280.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 278.
464. Id. at 278-79.
465. Id. at 285-86.
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the commission of the criminal act. ' ,46 7 This presented the superior court with a
question-assuming the first defendant did not intend the second defendant kill
the tow truck driver but rather recklessly contributed to the victim's demise,
how could the first defendant have intended a lesser crime, such as
manslaughter, which required recklessness?4 6 8 In answering this question, the
court relied on its previous decision in State v. Bridges,469 which stated:
Weeks holds that in order to convict a defendant as an accomplice to a
crime, the jury must "find that the defendant had the purpose to
participate in the crime [as] defined in the Code .... [Weeks demands
h]e must have had the "conscious object or design of facilitating" that
crime....
What then of vicarious liability for a crime whose culpability
requirement is not knowing or purposeful action but rather reckless
action? If vicarious liability requires the purpose that the crime be
committed, but if the crime does not have a purposeful element, can
there be vicarious liability at all? The apparent conundrum is how one
can intend a reckless act. We are, however, satisfied that that
conundrum is semantical rather than substantive....
... [I]mposition of vicarious liability for a crime whose culpability
requirement is recklessness requires an initial focus on the actor's
conduct rather than on the crime itself. As a first condition, the
accomplice.., must have intended that the actor's conduct take place,
i.e., that the accomplice.., had the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of that conduct by the actor and took some step or
steps ... in order actually to promote or facilitate that conduct....
If the actor is liable for a "reckless" crime, vicarious liability for
that crime or a lesser-included "reckless" crime may attach to an
accomplice•.. who purposely promoted or facilitated the actor's
conduct; who was aware when he did so, considering the circumstances
then known to him, that the criminal result was a substantial and
[un]justifiable risk of that conduct; and who nevertheless promoted that
conduct in conscious disregard of that risk. If the actor is liable for an
"intent" crime, vicarious liability for that crime may only attach to an
accomplice•.. who shared the intent that that crime be committed.
467. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Fair, 211 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J.
1965)).
468. Id. at281-82.
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Vicarious liability for a "reckless" crime may also, however, attach
when the actor commits an "intent" crime and the accomplice ... did
not intend that that crime be committed but nevertheless intended that
the actor take a specific action or actions which resulted in the crime.
If criminal liability for the criminal result of that conduct can be
predicated on a reckless state of mind, an accomplice ... can be
vicariously liable for that "reckless" crime under the same principles
which apply where the actor's culpability is also based on recklessness.
This is so even if the actor himself is guilty of an "intent" crime. The
point.., is that each participant in a common plan may participate
therein with a different state of mind. The liability of each participant
for any ensuing crime is dependent on his own state of mind, not on
anyone else s.
Thus, in Bielkiewicz, the court observed:
[W]hile the [trial] court properly instructed the jury that a defendant
must have "the purpose to promote or facilitate the crime of purposeful
or knowing murder" to be found guilty of murder as an accomplice, it
did not inform the jury that a defendant could be found guilty as an
accomplice of aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter or assault. In
fact, the court did not even mention accomplice liability in instructing
the jury with respect to these lesser included offenses. The court also
did not inform the jury that it could find one defendant guilty of murder
as a principal and the other defendant guilty of aggravated
manslaughter, manslaughter or assault as an accomplice. Indeed, the
court implied the contrary when it told the jury that "one cannot be held
as an accomplice unless you find as a fact that he shared the same
purpose required to be proven against the person who actually
committed the act.",
4 7 1
Here, then, the trial court could have informed the jury that although "the
principal had committed purposeful or knowing murder, the accomplice could
be found guilty of a lesser offense involving recklessness if he intended that an
assault be committed upon [the victim] but did not share the principal's intent
that that assault cause death or serious bodily injury."4 72 Consequently, if this
was the case, it would have been proper "to convict the accomplice of
470. Id. at 143-45 (third emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote call numbers
omitted).
471. Bielkiewicz, 632 A.2d at 283.
472. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added) (citing Bridges, 604 A.2d at 145).
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aggravated manslaughter if there was a probability of death resulting from the
assault he intended to commit or manslaughter if there was a [mere] possibility
of death. 473
To conclude, although the Bielkiewicz court's discussion became slightly
confusing where it referred to New Jersey's oft-quoted "shared in the intent"
requirement,4 74 the court was in fact following a classic Category II analysis. If,
indeed, the accomplice (1) intended to promote or facilitate the conduct-
assaulting the victim-and (2) only harbored the mental state required for the
lesser substantive crime-recklessly endangering the life of the victim without
intent that he be killed-then the accomplice might be liable for some form of
manslaughter but not purposeful and knowing murder. Here, the trial court'sfailre o cariy ths . .. .... 475
failure to clarify this point in its instructions required the reversal.
State v. Cook47 6 involved a defendant the State indicted for purposeful and
knowing murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, and attempted theft
charges.477 In this case, the victim, a fifty-two year old homeless man, was
murdered during an attempted robbery. The defendant participated in the
robbery but was not the actual perpetrator in the murder. After the police
found the victim's body, the defendant "first denied involvement but then
admitted that he had watched [the principal] beat the victim and had himself hit




A jury found the defendant guilty of "purposeful and/or knowing murder"
481and the other charges after considering the evidence at trial. On appeal, the
defendant contended the trial court did not abide by the principles laid out in
Bielkiewicz when it failed to "adequately explain to the jury that it could find
him guilty as an accomplice to the lesser included offenses of aggravated
manslaughter or manslaughter even if it believed that [the principal] had
473. Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Bowens, 532 A.2d 215, 223 (N.J. 1987);
State v. Curtis, 479 A.2d 425,431-32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)).
474. See supra note 467 and accompanying text.
475. Bielkiewicz, 632 A.2d at 286; see also State v. Jackmon, 702 A.2d 489, 492-93, 495,
500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding that where the trial court convicted a defendant of
first degree murder on an accomplice theory in circumstances where he admitted an intent to
participate in an armed robbery but claimed he was angered when the principal began shooting
people, the defendant's mental state may have evinced only recklessness, and thus finding
reversible error in the trial court's erroneous instruction that first degree murder could be
predicated on less than a purposeful state of mind).
476. 693 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
477. Id. at 484.
478. Id. at 485.
479. Id. at 486.
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committed purposeful and/or knowing murder. ' ,48 2 The New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division found error in the instruction, stating:
To gain a conviction based on accomplice liability, it is "essential that
[the accomplice and principal] shared in the intent which is the crime's
basic element....
When an accomplice has been charged with an offense of a
different degree than the principal or when the jury may find him/her
guilty of a lesser included offense, the judge's instructions must
"carefully impart[] to the jury the distinctions between the specific
intent required for the grades of the offense. ...
These principles are particularly important where multiple
participants engage in a violent attack with the potential for differing
states of mind. In such cases, "[t]he liability of each participant for any
ensuing crime is dependent on his own state of mind, not on anyone[]
else' S.,,483
The court went on to explain,
[T]he [New Jersey] Supreme Court [has] stated: ["]If both parties enter
into the commission of a crime with the same intent and purpose each
is guilty to the same degree; but each may participate in the criminal act
with a different intent. Each defendant may thus be guilty of a higher or
lower degree of crime than the other, the degree of guilt depending
entirely upon his own actions, intent and state of mind.[]
484
The court concluded that, considering that even the State had theorized the
murder resulted from a robbery gone awry, the facts of the case required the
trial court to instruct the jury on the various degrees of culpability and the
possibility of conviction for lesser homicidal offenses based on the degree of the
defendant's mental culpability. 485 After considering the evidence presented in
the trial court, the court noted two plausible options. The jury could find that
neither defendant initially planned a murder, but after the victim attacked the
principal, the principal became enraged and formulated the intent to kill the
victim, 4 86 or that the defendant planned to tie the victim without expecting that
482. Id. at 488.
483. Id. (last alteration added) (citations omitted).
484. Id. (quoting State v. Fair, 211 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J. 1965)).
485. Id. at 488-89.
486. Id. at 489.
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the principal would take advantage and kill the victim. 4 87 Here, it is important to
note that when the Cook court discussed the need to show that the defendant and
the principal "shared in the intent which is the [substantive] crime's basic
element, ' ,4 88 it was evidently using the term "intent" generically, referring to
any mental state.
5. Oklahoma
Oklahoma also appears to follow the Category II model with respect to
treating accomplices as principals, its courts generally using language stating
that a defendant is an accomplice if the State could convict the defendant as a
principal. Oklahoma law simply states: "[A]ll persons concerned in the
commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, must be
prosecuted, tried and punished as principals.,,
48 9 In Conover v. State,490
witnesses observed the defendant and a confederate attack the victim, with the
defendant "holding him and punching him and [the confederate] stabbing
him."'491 When a passerby approached to see what was happening, the defendant
ran to the passerby's car, banged on his windows while yelling profanities, and
told him "that [the incident] was none of his business.,,4 92 Meanwhile, the
confederate, who stayed with the victim, found a bottle, broke it, and slashed
and stabbed the victim with it.493 After the victim died, an autopsy revealed the
victim had bled to death as the result of stab wounds.494 The State charged the
defendant with first degree murder on the alternative theories that he was the
principal or the accomplice.495
Following his conviction, the defendant argued he was neither a principal
nor an accomplice to murder.496 He claimed the aiding and abetting instructions
were flawed because they did not require that he personally have the specific
intent to kill as a condition for being convicted of first degree murder. The
487. Id.
488. Id. at 488 (quoting State v. White, 484 A.2d 691, 695 (N.J. 1984)).
489. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 432 (West 2003); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 172 (West 2003) ("[A]1 persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in
its commission, though not present, are principals.").
490. 933 P.2d 904 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
491. Id. at 908.
492. Id. at 908-09.




497. Id. at 914.
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Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma pointed out that there was evidence
498that supported the defendant's conviction as a principal or as an accomplice.
As to the accomplice issue, the court noted that the trial court instructions
correctly provided that the defendant could be accountable if he "aided and
abetted [the principal's] acts knowing of [the principal's] intent to take [the
victim's] life., 4 99 The court stated:
To adopt [defendant's] argument that he could only be convicted if he
personally had the specific intent to kill would be to void the law of
principals as it relates to aider and abettor. Under [the defendant's]
argument, an accused could not be convicted of a crime unless he was
in fact a perpetrator. As the law allows both a perpetrator and an aider
and abettor to be found guilty as a principal to a crime, we find [the
defendant's] argument is without merit .... 500
In Cannon v. State,50 1 the defendant and the principal had ransacked the
eighty-four year old victim's house and driven off with her; they then beat her
502for a second time, poured gasoline on her, and burned her to death. On
appealing his conviction for first degree murder, among other crimes, the
defendant argued that the jury instructions on "aiding and abetting negated the
element of specific intent to kill" required for "malice murder," which allowed
the jury to convict him of murder even if he had only "general criminal intent"
to commit a crime. 503 In other words, he asserted the jury could convict him of
murder "if they found he had the intent to commit any crime."' 504 The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma disagreed:
The aiding and abetting instructions cannot be read in a vacuum; they
explicitly refer to the underlying charged crime and indicate that the
elements of the charged offense must be proved. Read as a whole, the
instructions clearly required the jury to find that [the defendant's]
conduct caused [the victim's] death and that he intended to take her
life, or that he aided and abetted [the principal's] acts knowing of and
sharing in [the principal's] intent to take [the victim's] life. 50 5
498. Id. at 911.
499. Id. at 915-16 (emphasis added).
500. Id. at 916.
501. 904 P.2d 89 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
502. Id. at 94.
503. Id. at 99.
504. Id.
505. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the trial court had properly required the defendant to share the principal's
mental state-in this case, the intent to kill necessary for malice murder-in
order to be liable as an aider and abettor. 506 As evidenced by these cases,
Oklahoma follows a Category II perspective.
6. Rhode Island
The law of accomplice or accessory before the fact liability in Rhode Island
contains no mental state requirement. 507 The case law, however, requires a
508mental state of shared criminal intent with the principal. For example, in State
v. Gazerro,50 9 the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a conviction for
murder obtained under an accomplice theory because there was insufficient
evidence of shared criminal intent. 510 In this case, the victim was present in
defendant's automobile with the codefendant and two other individuals when
the codefendant shot the victim in the head.511 Ajury convicted the defendant in
the trial court of murder as an aider and abettor, and the defendant appealed.
In laying out Rhode Island's accomplice liability law, the supreme court relied
on language from a federal appellate case, stating that,
Beyond mere presence, the circumstances must establish that a
defendant "shared in the criminal intent of the principal and there must
be a community of unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed.
As the term 'aiding and abetting' implies, it assumes some participation
in the criminal act in furtherance of the common design, either before
or at the time the criminal act is committed. It implies some conduct of
506. Id.
507. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (2002) ("Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel,
hire, command, or procure another to commit any crime or offense, shall be proceeded against as a
principal or as an accessory before the fact, according to the nature of the offense committed, and
upon conviction shall suffer the like punishment as the principal offender is subject to by this
title.").
508. State v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam) ("In order to find
defendant guilty under the theory of aiding and abetting, the facts must establish that the defendant
shared in the principal's criminal intent and that there was a community of unlawful purpose at the
time the act is committed." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d
1195, 1202 (R.I. 1995))).
509. 420 A.2d 816 (R.I. 1980).
510. Id. at 829-30.
511. Id. at 821 n.6.
512. Id. at 827.
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an affirmative nature and mere negative acquiescence is not
sufficient." 
513
In analyzing the facts, the court first reasoned that the fact that the
defendant was seen with the principals shortly before the shooting offered
"nothing other than the mere fact of association." 514 Also, the fact that the
defendant was the driver of the car did not itself indicate that he was part of any
prearranged plan. 515 Finally, the victim's statements given before he died gave
no hint of defendant's "state of mind or his knowledge of impending criminal
activity." 51 6 Since there was no other evidence that defendant aided and abetted
the commission of the murder, the court found the trial court's inferences of
guilt drawn from the evidence was too speculative and thus reversed the
defendant's conviction.
51 7
In contrast, in State v. Diaz,518 the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed
convictions for two counts of murder under an accomplice theory where there
was evidence of shared criminal intent.519 Here, the defendant, who was
possibly involved romantically with one of the victims, reported her firearm
missing to the police before the principal's shooting of the victims.
520
Moreover, the defendant accompanied the principal, her boyfriend, to the scene
of the shooting but fled before she could witness the shooting. 521 Later, the
defendant lied to the police to cover for her boyfriend, who in the interim had
committed suicide in New York.522 Although the evidence presented before the
trial court was almost all circumstantial, the jury convicted the defendant of
murder as an accomplice. 523 Before affirming the convictions, the court
discussed the standard by which it was to measure accomplice liability:
In order to find that a defendant aided and abetted the commission
of a crime, the facts must establish that the defendant shared in the
principal's criminal intent and that there was "a community of
unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed." The accused must
be shown to have participated in the criminal act in furtherance of the
513. Id. at 828 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1952)).
514. Id. at 829.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 829-30. However the court affirmed the codefendant shooter's conviction. Id. at
830.
518. 654 A.2d 1195 (R.I. 1995).
519. Id. at 1202-04.
520. Id. at 1197.
521. Id. at 1198.
522. Id. at 1199.
523. Id. at 1196-1200.
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common design, either before or at the time the criminal act was
committed. Conduct of an affirmative nature is required; mere negative
acquiescence is insufficient to connote guilt. These standards do not
require, however, that the accused must foresee the consequences of
such unlawful acts, nor do they require that every act of the accused
must coincide with those of the principal. 524
The court then summarized what it would require before it could find
accomplice liability in the case at hand: "in order to affirm the judgment of
conviction, we must be able.., to conclude that sufficient circumstantial
evidence proved that [the] defendant, either alone or sharing in [the principal's]
criminal intent, murdered the decedents deliberately with premeditation of
longer than momentary duration."
525
In affirming the conviction, the court considered the following facts: the
principal used a gun owned by the defendant to kill the victims; defendant had
falsely reported to police that her gun had been stolen; defendant accompanied
the principal to the victims' home immediately before the shooting; defendant
had a prior relationship with one of the victims; defendant saw the principal
brandishing the weapon immediately before the shootings in such a manner as
to suggest that a crime was about to occur; the principal carried out the murders
in a manner defendant herself described as "execution-style"; and the defendant
did not notify the authorities of the murders after feeling the scene.
52 6
7. Vermont
Operating under perhaps the most oblique accomplice liability statute of the
Category II states, 52 7 Vermont's courts changed their interpretation of the
accomplice statute from Category 1I1 to Category 11 in State v. Bacon.5 28 In that
case, the defendant and the codefendant, both inmates, escaped together from a
correctional work crew and "broke into unoccupied seasonal camps over the
next few days and found food and lodging. ' 529 In a subsequent recorded
statement to police, the defendant stated that he and the codefendant found a
neighborhood watch directory indicating that the victim lived alone in the area
year-round. 530 They then planned to steal the victim's car.53 1 The plan was for
524. Id. at 1202 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
525. Id.
526. Id. at 1203.
527. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3 (1998) ("A person who aids in the commission of a felony
shall be punished as a principal.").
528. 658 A.2d 54 (Vt. 1995).




Decker: The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Published by Scholar Commons,
306 SOUTH CAROLTNA LAW REvTEw [VOL. 60:237
the defendant to enter the house and intimidate the victim with a metal bar.
53 2
The defendant and codefendant then went to the victim's house carrying a metal
bar and a knife, respectively. 533 When they arrived at the house the defendant
became skittish, and the codefendant "reacted by exchanging the knife for the
metal bar [the] defendant was carrying." 534 The codefendant entered the house
and shut the front door.535 When the defendant subsequently went into the
house, he saw the codefendant hit the victim on the head with the bar.536 The
codefendant then placed the bar over the victim's throat and stood on it.
537
Following the codefendant's instructions, the defendant closed off the victim's
dogs in another room. 538 The codefendant then urged the defendant to stab the
victim.539 When the defendant refused, the codefendant grabbed the knife from
defendant's hands and stabbed the victim to death. 54° Then, the defendant and
codefendant stole money from the victim's purse, cleaned the blood stains, and
"stole an ATV from a nearby camp to transport the body into the woods ....
After disposing of the body, they returned to [the victim's] house and took her
car.' 541 Police later arrested them in Vermont. 5 42 The Vermont trial court
convicted the defendant of being an accessory to felony murder committed
during a burglary of the victim's residence and multiple other crimes associated
with the murder.
543
On appeal, the defendant (1) claimed that he had no "murderous intent" and
(2) challenged an accomplice liability instruction by the trial court.5" The
instruction had included the following language:
The prosecution must prove that the illegal common purpose existed
and that one of the participants in the illegal plan committed the
murder... during the alleged attempt or perpetration of the illegal plan
to burglarize [the victim's] dwelling. The defendant is liable for the
acts of his accomplice.., even if [the jury] find[s] that [the










540. Id. at 58-59.
541. Id. at 59.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 58.
544. Id. at 59.
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made so long as [the accomplice]'s acts were incidental to the
execution of or as a natural and probable consequence of their original
plan, and in firtherance of their alleged common purpose.545
The Vermont Supreme Court held that these instructions improperly
permitted the jury "to convict defendant of being an accomplice to felony
murder even if he neither intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to [the
victim] nor acted with extreme indifference to human life"; the instructions
allowed the jury to "impute defendant's mental state with respect to the murder
based solely on its determination that [the codefendant] harbored the requisite
intent" to kill while the defendant may have only had the intent to burglarize the
victim's dwelling. 546 The court disagreed with the accomplice liability principle
from State v. Orlandi,547 which it acknowledged to be Vermont's "leading case"
on the required mental state for accomplice liability. 548 The court explained that
in this leading case, the Orlandi court had held,
Where several persons combine under a common understanding and
with a common purpose to do an illegal act, every one is criminally
responsible for the acts of each and all who participate with him in the
execution of the unlawful design....
... So, when the evidence is sufficient to enable the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that several persons have formed a common
design ... and are present for that purpose at the place agreed upon for
the commission of the offense, each one is criminally responsible for
the acts of the others in the prosecution of the design, and for
everything done by any one of them which follows incidentally in the
execution of the design as one of its natural consequences, even though
it was not intended as a part of the original plan.
549
The Vermont Supreme Court stated in Bacon that the principle set forth by
the Orlandi court "violates one of the most basic principles of criminal law by
allowing the jury to convict a person for causing a bad result without
determining that the person had some culpable mental state with respect to that
result." 550 The court implied the Orlandi statement was actually dictum because
545. Id. at 60.
546. Id. at 60-61.
547. 170 A. 908 (Vt. 1934).
548. Bacon, 658 A.2d at 61-62 (citing State v. Davignon, 565 A.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Vt.
1989); State v. Doucette, 470 A.2d 676, 681 (Vt. 1983); Orlandi, 170 A. at 910-11).
549. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Orlandi, 170
A. at 910-11).
550. Id. at 62 (citing Doucette, 470 A.2d at 681).
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in Orlandi "the charged conduct.., was within the scope of the defendants'
intended plan." 551 In any event, the court declared that a court can convict a
defendant as an accomplice "'only if he acted with the same intent as that
required for' the principal perpetrator of the crime." 552 The court then
concluded:
The purpose of the accomplice-liability rule is not to permit the
conviction of participants to a crime who never intended a co-felon to
commit the acts in fact committed. Rather, the rule is intended to allow
the conviction of defendants who intended to, and did in fact, aid in the
commission of the charged offense, but who were not the primary
perpetrators of the crime or did not participate in every aspect of the
planned illegal act.
553
The court then turned to felony murder and held that "to convict a
defendant as an accomplice to felony murder, the prosecutor must prove that the
defendant possessed both the intent to commit the underlying felony as well as
one of the three mental states required to convict the principal perpetrator of
felony murder. '554 The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the felony murder
conviction "because the [trial] court's charge permitted the element of intent as
to [the victim's] murder to be found in either the defendant or his
accomplice." 555 Thus, the shared intent requirement used by the Bacon court
significantly narrowed the scope of Vermont's accomplice law.
State v. Pitts,556 another Vermont Supreme Court opinion, involved a
defendant whom the police charged with aggravated assault as a result of an
altercation that left a laceration on the victim's face requiring multiple stitches
and leaving permanent scars. 557 In this case, the victim and the father of the
defendant's child were engaged. 558 Prior to the incident, the victim and her
friends went to a pizzeria. 559 When the victim and her friends started to leave to
go home, they walked past the defendant and the principal. 560 The defendant
551. Id. at 61 (citing Orlandi, 170 A. at 910-11).
552. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Davignon, 565 A.2d at 1304-05).
553. Id. at 62.
554. Id. at 63. The court listed the three mental states required as follows: "an intent to kill,
an intent to do great bodily harm, or a wanton disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily
harm would result." Id. (citing Doucette, 470 A.2d at 682).
555. Id. at 64.
556. 800 A.2d 481 (Vt. 2002).
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followed the victim and pushed her.561 An altercation then occurred and the
principal joined the fight. 562 The defendant and the principal alternated fighting
the victim until the victim "felt a sudden burn on her che[e]k. 563 She later
realized she had suffered an injury to her face but did not know who cut her.
564
After being taken into custody, the police found on the defendant a box cutter
and a handwritten rap song that implicated the defendant and principal in the
assault.565 The police charged the defendant with aggravated assault.
At trial, the State proceeded under two alternative theories: the defendant
was the principal in the assault or the defendant aided and abetted the
principal's assault.567 The jury "acquitted defendant as the principal but
convicted her of accessory to aggravated assault. ' 568 On appeal, the defendant
argued the jury instruction was error.569 Specifically, she contended she "could
be convicted of accomplice liability only if she intended to 'purposely cause
serious bodily injury to [the victim] by cutting her."' 570 The court disagreed and
stated that in Bacon, "we held that a defendant can be convicted as an
accomplice only where he acted with the same intent that is required to convict
the principal. ' 571 Here, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant
shared the principal's intent to cut the victim's face. In the handwritten rap
song, the defendant had "written in the first person of 'Shortie Assassin,'
identified in trial testimony to be [the] defendant, and foretold that 'Ox,'
identified in trial testimony to be [the principal], would hurt the women from
King Street [(where the victim lived)]. Specifically, the song lyrics predicted
the injury to the victim's face: "my girl Ox ... [s]licin bitches where there [sic]
eyelids meet." 573 Further, the evidence "supported the State's theory that the
defendant intended for herself or [the principal] to cause serious bodily injury to
[the victim]." 574 Finally, the defendant claimed that "an accomplice must share
not only the principal's intent to commit the elements of the crime, but also










570. Id. at 483 (first emphasis added).
571. Id. (citing State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 61 (Vt. 1995)).
572. Id.
573. Id. at 483-84 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
574. Id. at 484.
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crime." 575 The court responded that a defendant "need not share with the
principal the intent to use the exact means of the crime, so long as she shares the
intent to commit all the elements of the crime."
576
8. Wyoming
In Wyoming, the "accessory" provision of the state's code requires the
"accessory before the fact" to have a mental state of knowledge, 577 but the
Wyoming courts' construction of the statute appears to follow a Category II
approach, requiring a court to convict a defendant as an accessory if it could
578also convict him as a principal. Jahnke v. State involved a defendant whose
father psychologically and physically abused her and her brother, who
developed an elaborate plan to confront their father. 57 9 Prior to the execution of
her brother's plan, the defendant watched her brother prepare and lie in wait for
their father, advised him about how to prepare for the crime, and saw herself as
a "backup." 58° When the father returned home, her brother fired at their father,
killing him almost instantly.581 The defendant was prosecuted for first degree
murder but convicted of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter. 582 The
Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the conviction for aiding and abetting the
voluntary manslaughter of the victim.583 The court reasoned that in order to
convict a criminal defendant on an aiding and abetting charge, "[t]he
prosecution must demonstrate that a defendant shared the criminal intent of the
principal if he is to be found guilty as an aider and abettor. ' 584 The court
concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant had the
requisite mental state required for conviction of voluntary manslaughter-she
"was acting 'upon a sudden heat of passion' aroused by the earlier incidents
which continued through her participation in the planning and accomplishment
of what she characterized as the father's execution." 585 Based on the court's
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-201(a) (2007) ("A person who knowingly aids or abets in the
commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be
committed, is an accessory before the fact.").





583. Id. at 914.
584. Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
585. Id. at 922 (referring to the Wyoming voluntary manslaughter law, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-105 (2007), which provides that whoever "unlawfully kills any human being without
malice ... [v]oluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion" is guilty of voluntary manslaughter).
[VOL. 60:237
74
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
conclusion, it is obvious the court used the term "intent" to refer to any criminal
mental state.
In Fales v. State,586 pursuant to a plan to burglarize a junior high school, the
defendant had waited outside the school while the principals vandalized it inside
and then received various stolen goods handed to her out of the school's
windows by the principals. 587 The defendant challenged her conviction as an
accessory before the fact to burglary, arguing that the evidence could not
establish that she knowingly served as a lookout while the principals
burglarized the school or that she knew what they were doing when in the
building. 588 The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, stating that an "aider and
abettor must share the principal's criminal intent" in order for conviction.
589
Because the principals told the defendant of their intention to commit larceny in
the school, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant knew of their intent,
especially since she remained outside and received stolen goods out the
window, thus allowing the court to uphold the conviction.
590
In Black v. State,59' the defendant had planned and executed a robbery in
the victim's apartment, and although the defendant was unarmed, the two
principals threatened the occupants with a gun and a knife.592 One of the
principals struck the victim with the gun before removing money from his
jacket.593 A jury convicted the defendant of "aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit
aggravated robbery." 594 On appeal, the defendant argued the jury wrongly
convicted him of the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon due to
insufficient evidence that he had a deadly weapon or "knowingly or recklessly
inflicted bodily injury on another person." 595 The Wyoming Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, restating its past holdings that "no distinction is made
between an aider and abettor and principal. Hence, an aider and abettor is guilty
of the principal crime. Proof of participation in either capacity is sufficient to
586. 908 P.2d 404 (Wyo. 1995).
587. Id. at 407.
588. Id. at 407-08.
589. Id. at 408 (citing Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 921).
590. Id. (referring to the Wyoming burglary law, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-301(a) (2007),
which states that "[a] person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a
building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein").
591. 46 P.3d 298 (Wyo. 2002).
592. Id. at 301-02.
593. Id. at 302.
594. Id. at 299.
595. Id. at 300-01.
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,,596convict a defendant as a principal. As to the fact that the defendant had no
weapon, the court responded that "it is not necessary to prove that each
defendant did that which was necessary to establish each element of an offense
but that it is sufficient to show that they were associated together in doing that
which comprises each element of the offense."
597
V. STATES WITH CASE LAW FOLLOWING THE CATEGORY 1l APPROACH:
NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES.
There appear to be twenty states that have case law following the Category
I model holding accomplices liable not just for crimes they intended to
facilitate but also for incidental offenses that were "natural and foreseeable" or
"natural and probable consequences" of the intended crime. These states fall
into two subcategories: (1) states that codify the Category III approach and (2)
states which do not codify Category III language but whose courts judicially
construe it from accomplice statutes that on their face more resemble a Category
I or Category II model.
A. "Codified" Category III Approach
Six states hold an accomplice liable for the natural and foreseeable
consequences of the target crime pursuant to their respective accomplice




Prior to 2008, Arizona had both legislation and case law supporting a
Category II approach but not Category 11 liability.599 For example, in State v.
596. Id. at 303 (citing Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 1981); Neilson v. State,
599 P.2d 1326, 1335 (Wyo. 1979)).
597. Id. at 301 (citing Edge v. State, 647 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1982)).
598. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West
2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (2006
& Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.05 (West 2005).
599. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301 (2008) ("[A]ccomplice' means a person ... who
with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense: [(1) s]olicits or commands
another person to commit the offense; or [(2) a]ids, counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid
another person in planning or committing an offense[, or (3) p]rovides means or opportunity to
another person to commit the offense."); id. § 13-303 ("A person is criminally accountable for the
conduct of another if... [t]he person is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of
an offense including any offense that is a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable
[VOL. 60:237
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Garnica,60 the Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the defendant's
convictions for accomplice liability for second degree murder, aggravated
assault, and endangerment. 60 1 In this case, the defendant was drinking and
partying with friends when another group that "had been drinking and partying
at a different location ... drove into the area and exited their vehicles."
60 2
According to the defendant's subsequent confession, members of each group
began trading insults and eventually threw bottles at each other; the defendant's
brother then started shooting at the other group as the defendant provided him
ammunition. 60 3 Ultimately, the defendant's brother not only shot a member of




The Court of Appeals of Arizona first noted that the state had a statute
patterned after Model Penal Code section 2.06(4), allowing for liability so long
as the defendant "acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that
is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ' 6°5 The court concluded that by
providing ammunition, the defendant not only intended to facilitate the
shooter's conduct but also held the requisite mental state of recklessness
required for each resulting crime of which the jury had convicted the
defendant. 6°6 Thus, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions using the
Category II approach, explaining that the defendant both intended to facilitate
his brother's conduct 60 7  and recklessly created the result, to wit:
endangerment, 608 second degree murder,
60
9 and assault. 610
consequence of the offense for which the person was an accomplice .... If causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the
result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense if: [(I) t]he person
solicits or commands another person to engage in the conduct causing such result; or [(2) t]he
person aids, counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or engaging in the
conduct causing such result.").
600. 98 P.3d 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
601. Id. at 214.
602. Id. at 208.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4)
(1962)) (quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(B) (2001) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-303(B) (2008))).
606. Id. at212-13.
607. Id. at 212. C(.' ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303 (2008) (which is satisfied by proof of
facilitating conduct).
608. Id. at 213 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1201(A) (2001) (which is satisfied by
proof of recklessly creating a substantial risk of imminent death)).
609. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1104(A)(3) (2001) (which is satisfied by proof
of recklessly creating a grave risk of death) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1104(A)(3) (Supp. 2007)).
610. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203(A)(1) (2001) (which is satisfied by proof
of recklessly causing any physical injury to another)).
2008]
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Likewise, in State v. Nelson,611 the Court of Appeals of Arizona relied on
similar reasoning after the defendant appealed his conviction for negligent
homicide. 6 12 In this case, the victim, whom the defendant punched in the head
many times and whom the principal continued to punch, died later at a
hospital.613 The State then tried and a jury convicted the defendant for negligent
homicide on a theory of accomplice liability because of "the uncertainty about
whether [the defendant] or [the principal] landed the punch or punches that
caused [the victim]'s death. 6 14
On appeal, the defendant contended that it was legally impossible to be
convicted as an accomplice to negligent homicide because Arizona's statutory
definition of accomplice required that an accomplice act intentionally.
6 15
However, the Court of Appeals of Arizona looked to the provisions regarding
result-based crimes that Garnica had relied on and expanded accomplice
liability beyond crimes requiring recklessness to crimes involving negligent616
mens rea. The court held that the "intent" language in the accomplice statute
refers only to aiding the conduct itself, not to the mental state required for
conviction of the substantive crime. 6 17 Therefore, although the defendant may
have only intended to beat the victim and not kill him, his negligent conduct
facilitated the deadly result.
6 1
8
However, in 2008, the Arizona legislature amended its accomplice statute
by adding a provision which provides that an accomplice is criminally liable for
"any offense that is a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the offense for which the person was an accomplice."
' 619
Consequently, if a court were to review Garnica under the new Arizona law, it
would be proper to rule that when the defendant recklessly endangered the life
of the homicide victim by providing ammunition to his brother who was bent on
harming the victim, the victim's death was a natural and probable consequence
of the endangerment. Likewise, in a case such as Nelson, a court could hold
under the new statute that the victim's death was a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant and codefendant's assault on the victim.
611. 150 P.3d 769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
612. Id. at 769.
613. Id. at 770.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 771-72 (discussing State v. Garnica, 98 P.3d 207, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004))
(citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-301, -303 (2001) (current versions at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-301,-303 (2008))).
617. Id. at 772 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(B) (2001) (current version at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(B) (2008))).
618. Id.
619. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(3) (2008).
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The Iowa legislature has codified the Category II approach in a "joint
criminal conduct" provision which holds an alleged accomplice liable for
another's criminal acts "unless the act was one which the person could not
reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the commission of the
offense. ' 62° In State v. Jefferson,62 1 the Supreme Court of Iowa set out the
elements necessary for conviction under its "joint criminal liability" statute: (1)
the "[d]efendant must be acting in concert with another"; (2) the "[d]efendant
must knowingly be participating in a public offense"; (3) a "'different crime'
must be committed by another participant in furtherance of [the] defendant's
offense"; and (4) "[t]he commission of the different crime must be reasonably
foreseen. ' 622 The Jefferson court applied these criteria to a case involving a
robbery planned by the principal and accomplice; during the course of the
623robbery, the principal shot a convenience store clerk. The court opined that a
reasonable jury could conclude the result was one the accomplice "did not plan
and in which he did not personally participate, but which could reasonably be
expected" and, as such, he was an accomplice not only to first degree robbery
but also to the assault of the store clerk.62
625In State v. Hustead, the Court of Appeals of Iowa upheld the defendant's
conviction for second degree burglary and first degree theft where the defendant
was party to an arrangement to purchase property he knew to be stolen by the
626principal. In this case, the principal acted in concert with two other
individuals to regularly burglarize businesses and farm sheds and then sell the
stolen property to other individuals, including the defendant. 6 27 The defendant
was aware of the theft and burglary scheme and had purchased stolen property
from the principal on numerous previous occasions. At trial, a jury convicted
the defendant of aiding and abetting theft and burglary.
629
620. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West 2003) ("When two or more persons, acting in concert,
knowingly participate in a public offense, each is responsible for the acts of the other done in
furtherance of the commission of the offense or escape therefrom, and each person's guilt will be
the same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the person could not
reasonably expect to be done in furtherance of the commission of the offense.").
621. 574 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1997).
622. Id. at 277 (quoting State v. Hohle, 510 N.W.2d 847, 848 (Iowa 1994)).
623. Id. at 278.
624. Id.
625. 538 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
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On appeal, the defendant argued that the court could not hold him
responsible for the crimes of theft and burglary because the State lacked
sufficient evidence to show he "planned or participated" in the specific
instances of theft and burglary "or had any knowledge of the specific crimes
prior to the time they were committed. ,630 In determining the defendant's
liability, the appellate court concluded that one need not have knowledge of the
"particular crime committed by the perpetrator" to be criminally responsible as
an aider or abettor. 631 Rather, in accord with the Category 1II approach, the
Court of Appeals stated that a court may convict an alleged accomplice of "any
criminal act which in the ordinary course of events was the natural and probable
consequence of the criminal act [the accomplice] encouraged. ' , 632 Therefore,
because the defendant had knowledge that the principal engaged in burglary and
theft and, furthermore, facilitated the crimes the principal committed by
purchasing the stolen goods, the court held that the trial court properly
convicted defendant of first degree theft and second degree burglary.
633
In State v. Bahmer,634 the Court of Appeals of Iowa used the "natural and
probable consequences" language of Hustead to uphold a conviction for theft
where the defendant agreed to accept stolen property as payment for a narcotics
debt the principal owed to her. 635 In this case, the principal stole a skid loader
from a construction site to repay the defendant for the drug debt. 636 The
defendant had told the principal prior to the theft that she would accept a skid
loader as payment, and she accepted the stolen skid loader in exchange for two
ounces of crack cocaine and a two thousand dollar reduction of the principal's
drug debt.637 A jury convicted the defendant of theft by taking.638
The defendant asserted on appeal that the court could not hold her
criminally responsible for theft by taking as an aider and abettor because she
was not physically with the principal when the theft took place and because the
State lacked sufficient evidence to prove that she "took possession of the
[property] with the intent to deprive the owner of the property."' 639 The court
upheld the defendant's conviction because, although she was not present at the
time of the crime and may not have intended this specific owner be deprived of
this specific skid loader, she was aware of the principal's plan to steal and
630. Id. at 869.
631. Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
632. Id. (citation omitted).
633. Id.
634. No. 03-1696, 2004 WL 2804819 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004).
635. Id. at *2 (citing Hustead, 538 N.W.2d at 870).






South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
encouraged the principal's criminal conduct. 64 0 Therefore, the court concluded
that this particular crime of theft by taking was a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant's encouragement.
6 4
1
642In State v. Satern, the Supreme Court of Iowa pointed out that "sections
703.1 and 703.2 articulate the particulars of accomplice liability" in Iowa.
643
Specifically, section 703.1 provides that aiders and abettors are liable for the
crime which they have "knowingly aided the principal in committing," either by
participation or encouragement before or during its commission. 6" The joint
criminal conduct provision, section 703.2, "contemplates two acts-the crime
the joint actor has knowingly participated in, and a second or resulting crime
that is unplanned but could reasonably be expected to occur in furtherance of
the first one." 645 The court also stated that "[d]epending on the case, it may be
appropriate for the court to instruct on both doctrines." 646 In Satern, where it
was unclear whether the defendant or his companion was the intoxicated driver
who collided with another vehicle, killing the other driver, the trial court
instructed the jury on both theories and the jury found the defendant guilty of
vehicular homicide. 64 7 Assuming the defendant was not the driver, he was still
guilty because he allowed his intoxicated companion to drive his vehicle, which




Kansas's accomplice liability provision follows a Category 1II model in
holding an alleged accomplice liable for any crime "committed in pursuance of
the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by him as a probable consequence"649 650
of the intended crime. In State v. Edwards, the defendant and three cohorts
entered the victim's house to rob him.65 1 During the course of the robbery, one
of the robbers stabbed the victim while the defendant was in another room of
640. See id. (citing State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107, 109 (Iowa 1977); Hustead, 538
N.W.2d at 870).
641. Id.
642. 516 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1994).
643. Id. at 845 (discussing IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.1-.2 (West 2003)).
644. Id. at 843 (quoting Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107).
645. Id. (citing State v. Irvin, 334 N.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983)).
646. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 397 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 1986)).
647. Id. at 842-43.
648. Id. at 843.
649. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (2007).
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the house. 652 The State charged the defendant with aggravated battery as well as
robbery. 653 Following his conviction on the battery charge, the defendant argued
it was not foreseeable that his cohort would stab the victim.654 The Kansas
Supreme Court disagreed:
There can be little doubt from the evidence that both the robbery
and the battery occurred. There was direct evidence that defendant
transported [the codefendant responsible for the stabbing] to the scene
of these crimes. The statement of the defendant, as he viewed [the
victim's] furniture, that they could make a killing ... can only be
interpreted as indicating some action was contemplated by him and his
companions. Robbery is a crime of violence committed by threat or
force. There was evidence that defendant participated in the aggravated
robbery by taking a radio from the premises. From the facts it may
readily be inferred that violence, if necessary, was contemplated when
the four entered the house .... Under these circumstances the defendant
can hardly be considered an innocent bystander in the whole affair.
655
Thus, the court concluded that a plan to commit a crime of violence such as
robbery carried with it a serious potential to expand into even more serious
violent behavior. 656 In other words, the aggravated battery could be seen as a
natural outgrowth of the robbery. Here, the circumstances as a whole "clearly
support an inference that defendant aided and abetted in the aggravated battery
of the victim with the requisite criminal intent.
',657
In State v. Davis,658 a trial court in Kansas convicted the defendant of
aggravated battery and attempted misdemeanor theft.65 9 A dispatcher had
informed a security guard of a call by a resident of an apartment building who
had reported hearing sounds as if someone was breaking into vending machines
in the building. 66 Entering the building with his handgun drawn, the guard saw
the defendant standing in front of the door to the laundry room and heard prying






657. Id. at 53. It is important to note the "intentionally aid" language in subsection (1) of the
Kansas statute incorporates the "reasonably foreseeable" language found in subsection (2). See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(1)-(2) (2007).
658. 604 P.2d 68 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
659. Id. at 70.
660. Id. at 69.
661. Id.
82
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hands against the wall, at which time he noticed the defendant only had one
arm.662 The defendant claimed he had recently left an apartment, then inquired
to the guard about what was going on, and finally complied with the guard's
orders on the third or fourth command.663 A confederate then came out of the
664laundry room and placed his hands against the wall. The guard noticed that a
vending machine was pried open. 66 5 As the guard looked away from the men,
"they both moved away from the wall at the same time and [the confederate]...
ran into the laundry room."' 66 6 Meanwhile, "[t]he defendant remained standing
667in the hallway, facing [the guard]," but did not try to attack the guard. Very
shortly "after [the confederate] ran into the laundry room, a hand holding a
handgun appeared from the laundry room" and fired four or five shots, striking
the guard in his right arm. 66 Although the guard did not see the shooter, "he did
see the hand holding the handgun and did testify the gun was fired by a man of
,,669the same race as [the confederate]. Unable to defend himself, the guard "ran
out the back door and when he looked back inside he saw [the defendant] and
[the confederate] running down the hall in the opposite direction. ' 67° The
defendant and confederate were subsequently taken into custody and at trial
were positively identified.67 1
The Kansas Court of Appeals held that because the jury "obviously"
properly convicted the defendant of aiding and abetting the theft, the major
issue was whether the defendant was liable for the aggravated battery.
67 2
Because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant
intentionally aided the aggravated battery, the court analyzed whether it was
"reasonably foreseeable by the defendant that an aggravated battery would
occur as a probable consequence of committing misdemeanor theft or
attempting to commit misdemeanor theft." 673 The court first determined whether
the intended crime was "inherently or foreseeably dangerous" to human life by
"testing both the crime itself and the manner in which it was committed for
dangerous characteristics."' 674 Concluding that misdemeanor theft was not an
662. Id.









672. Id. at70-7 1.
673. Id. at71.
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inherently dangerous crime, like the robbery in Edwards,675 the court then
examined the particular circumstances of the case:
In the case at bar the intended crime, misdemeanor theft, was to
take place in the early morning hours in a laundry room that the
defendant knew to be unoccupied when the theft occurred. A lookout
was posted to insure that no one walked into the room while the theft
was in progress .... The record on appeal does not even hint that the
defendant knew or had any reason to suspect [the confederate] had a
weapon....
There is no evidence that the defendant and [the confederate] had
any plan for escape or had discussed what they would do if discovered.
There was no showing that either the defendant or [the confederate] had
a propensity for violence or that they normally carried a weapon of any
kind. Misdemeanor theft in itself is not a crime of violence, especially
when conducted outside the presence of others.
... In our opinion, it is mere speculation to say that a person who
with another is planning to commit a misdemeanor theft in an
unoccupied room can reasonably foresee in the absence of other facts
that the coconspirator will shoot someone in an effort to avoid
apprehension.
... [In addition,] [t]he fact that defendant did not drop to the floor
or run sheds no light on foreseeability. The security guard did not drop
to the floor and he was being shot at. 
76
It is clear from the Kansas statute and opinions discussed above that Kansas
courts are willing to apply the Category 11 model in appropriate circumstances.
4. Maine
Maine's criminal code states that "[a] person is an accomplice•.. to any
crime the commission of which was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
his conduct." 677 Aside from this explicit language, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine's interpretation of the statute's legislative history further supports the
doctrine of natural and foreseeable consequences. The court has explained that
"the legislature ... intended to impose liability upon accomplices for those
crimes that were the reasonably foreseeable consequence of their criminal
enterprise," even if there exists "an absence on their part of the same culpability
675. State v. Edwards, 498 P.2d 48, 51 (Kan. 1972).
676. Davis, 604 P.2d at 72-73.
677. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2007).
[VOL. 60:237
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required for conviction as a principal to the crime.' 678 Therefore, in Maine,
"[s]o long as the accomplice intended to promote the primary crime, and the
commission of the secondary crime was a foreseeable consequence of the
accomplice's participation in the primary crime, no firther evidence of the
accomplice's subjective state of mind as to the secondary crime is required.,
679
In State v. Williams, 68 the defendant and the principal had entered a
supermarket where the principal attempted to steal beer. 681 When the manager
confronted the principal, the principal dropped the beer, punched the manager in
the face, and began to exit the store. 682 Before he left the store, the principal
pulled out a knife, swung it at the manager, and then stabbed another employee
who had attempted to intervene. 683 Once outside the store, the principal and the
defendant exchanged celebratory "high-fives." 68a Another employee who
witnessed the attack then approached the principal and the defendant and
pointed his finger at them.685 The principal and the defendant then attacked this
employee outside the store. As two other store employees tried to approach to
,,687help, the defendant screamed, "He's got a knife, he's got a knife. The
employee who the principal and the defendant attacked outside the store later
died from his stab wounds. The defendant was indicted for murder, but the
trial court convicted him of manslaughter.
689
Upon review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the trial court
properly found the defendant guilty of manslaughter as an accomplice. 690 In
applying the natural and foreseeable consequences reasoning, the court looked
to the trial court's finding of fact that the defendant (1) had participated in the
attack on the victim when the principal used the knife to stab the victim, and (2)
confirmed his knowledge that the principal was wielding a weapon when he
678. State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 278 (Me. 1979) (emphasis added) (upholding
defendant's manslaughter conviction on an accomplice basis where the defendant intended his
cohort assault the victim, who died, because the victim's death was a "reasonably foreseeable
consequence" of the cohort's attack on the victim).
679. State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1987) (emphasis added). In this case, the
court held the defendant accountable for murder based on the accountability theory even though
the trial court found that the defendant did not intend to kill and "probably would not have
participated in the robbery had he believed that [the victim] would be killed." Id. at 1068.
680. 653 A.2d 902 (Me. 1995).
681. Id. at 904.
682. Id.
683. Id.






690. Id. at 904.
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shouted, "He's got a knife."'691 Here, the lower court properly concluded that
"[t]he average reasonable person with knowledge that [the principal] was
wielding a knife would have reasonably foreseen that the joint attack on [the
victim] could result in [the victim's] death. 692
5. Minnesota
Minnesota courts rely on the plain language of their state's accomplice
liability statute in holding an alleged accomplice responsible for crimes
"committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the
[accomplice] as a probable consequence" of the intended crime. 693 In State v.
Filippi, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction for
two assaults committed during a burglary in which the defendant was the
accomplice. 695 In this case, the defendant and the principal attempted to rob a
drugstore, 696 and the principal shot at police officers who responded to the
robbery. 69 After the police apprehended the two suspects, the principal testified
at trial for the defendant, asserting "that the gun was his [own], that defendant
had never seen him with the gun before, and that he did not tell defendant that
he was carrying the gun with him during the burglary. ' 698 The defendant
conceded to his involvement in the burglary but contended that the court should
699not hold him liable for the assaults committed by the principal.
Referring to Minnesota's accomplice liability statute, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's assault convictions.700 The court
interpreted Minnesota law as requiring a two-part test to determine liability:
"(1) whether the assaults were committed in furtherance of the intended crime
and (2) whether the assaults were reasonably foreseeable by defendant as a
probable consequence of the commission of the burglary. ' 'v 1 In the instant case,
691. Id. at 905.
692. Id. at 905-06.
693. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(1)-(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) ("A person is
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.... A person
liable under subdivision I is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended
crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or
attempting to commit the crime intended.").
694. 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1983).
695. Id. at 739.
696. Id. at 741.
697. Id.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 742.
700. Id. at 742-43.
701. Id. at 742.
[VOL. 60:237
86
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
the court stated that since there was no issue regarding whether the assaults
were committed in "furtherance" of the burglary, the real issue was whether the
defendant could have "reasonably foreseen" that these assaults would occur.702
The court reasoned that it is "reasonably foreseeable" that during the course of a
burglary, police are likely to arrive on the scene. 70 3 The court further stated that
a crime such as burglary "carries with it the possibility of violence" and that the
defendant, simply through his participation in the crime, "knew or could foresee
that the burglary might result in violence." 70 4 Therefore, the court found
defendant liable for the assaults under a Category I analysis.
6. Wisconsin
The state of Wisconsin is another Category III state that follows the plain
language of its accountability statute, which provides that a person can be an
accomplice to the commission of a crime if that person "intentionally aids and
abets" the offense or is acting in "pursuance of the intended crime and which
under the circumstances is a natural and probable consequence of the intended
crime.' 7° 5 In addition, Wisconsin case law explicitly provides that the State is
not required to prove intent in order to hold accomplices liable for the natural
and probable consequences of their acts. 7 06 In State v. Asfoor, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated that "the aider and abettor in a proper case is not only
guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are
contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or




705. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2) (West 2005). Because the "intentionally aids" language
is in one subsection of Wisconsin's "Parties to Crime" provision, id. § 939.05(2)(b), and the
"natural and probable consequence" language is in another, id. § 939.05(2)(c), at least one
defendant has argued that "only a conspirator or a solicitor-not an aider and abettor-can be held
liable for a crime other than the intended crime." State v. Asfoor, 249 N.W.2d 529, 537 (Wis.
1977). In Asfbor, the court rejected this claim and held that a court can hold an aider or abettor
liable under the statute for natural and probable consequences of the intended crimes. Id. at 537-
38.
706. See State v. Ivy, 350 N.W.2d 622, 627-28 (Wis. 1984) (noting that the natural and
probable consequence doctrine could support an accomplice's conviction for armed robbery
although the accomplice did not have knowledge the principal was armed with a dangerous
weapon); State v. Cydzik, 211 N.W.2d 421, 429, 431 (Wis. 1973) (relying on the natural and
probable consequence doctrine to uphold an accomplice's conviction for murder carried out by the
principal during their armed robbery of a supper club even though the accomplice had no intent
that a killing occur).
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Asfoor, the court upheld the defendant's conviction as an aider and abettor for
the crime of negligent injury by use of a weapon even though the defendant had
no intention of participating in that crime.70 The court determined that although
one cannot intend to negligently cause injury to another, "there are often many
intentional acts which lead to an injury caused by negligence." 70 9 Here, the
defendant knew that the principal and other perpetrators intended to commit a
battery or the like against the victim, assisted them by driving them to the
victim's location, and lent them his gun. 710 The court determined these were all
overt acts in furtherance of the intended crime, which led to the unintended but
natural and probable consequence of a gunshot injury to the victim caused by
defendant's companion's negligent use of the gun.
Similarly, in State v. Hecht,712 the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on
natural and probable consequence reasoning and upheld the defendant's
conviction as an aider and abettor to the crime of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. 713 In this case, the defendant helped arrange a
substantial cocaine sale between a supplier and an undercover law enforcement
agent.714 The arrangement included the defendant setting up a meeting between
a cocaine supplier and two agents and ensuring that the parties continue their
contact for the final exchange. 715 The court found that the defendant's in-depth
orchestration from start to finish to ensure the exchange of the cocaine was
sufficient to find him liable as an aider and abettor, thus rejecting defendant's
contention that he was merely involved in directing the agents to the potential
cocaine supplier. The court concluded:
In this case, the jury could reasonably find that the defendant put into
motion the wheels of a mechanism that would ultimately lead to a sale
of cocaine to the agents. By his acts of keeping [the supplier] and the
agents in close contact, he kept those wheels turning in a fluid motion.
Under these circumstances, the jury could also reasonably find that the
natural and probable consequence of this chain of events was the sale
of cocaine and that the defendant is, therefore, liable for the possession
708. See id. at 536-37, 543.
709. Id. at 536.
710. Id.
711. Id. at 538.
712. 342 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. 1984).
713. Id. at731,733.
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of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, under the theory of
aiding and abetting the commission of the crime.
716
B. "Judicially Construed" Category III Approach
In addition to those states that codify the Category III approach, there are
fourteen states that do not use Category II language in their criminal code but
whose courts have judicially construed their state's respective accomplice
statues to proscribe liability in a manner that resembles a Category III approach.
These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia.
1. Alabama
Although Alabama's criminal code requires specific intent to hold an
individual accountable for the criminal behavior of another, 717 case law
indicates that Alabama courts will consider holding accomplices liable for
crimes that are "the proximate, natural, and logical consequences" of the target
crime. 71 For example, in Howell v. State three individuals, including the
defendant and the principal, conspired to rob a gas station. 719 When an officer
arrived at the station suspecting something was amiss, the principal shot the
officer. The defendant was convicted of assault with an intent to murder. 720 On
appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether there was
sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant "aided and abetted" the
principal's shooting of the officer. 72 1 The court stated, "[t]he accomplice ... is
criminally responsible for acts which are the direct, proximate, natural result of
the conspiracy formed. He is not responsible for any special act[] not within the
scope of the common purpose, but [which] grows out of the individual malice of
the perpetrator."'722 Here, an evaluation of the evidence revealed that the
716. Id. at 731-32.
717. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 (LexisNexis 2005) ("A person is legally accountable for
the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense: (1) [h]e procures, induces or causes such other person to commit the
offense; or (2) [h]e aids or abets such other person in committing the offense; or (3) [h]aving a
legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, he fails to make an effort he is legally required
to make.").
718. Howell v. State, 339 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Tanner v. State, 9 So. 613, 615 (Ala. 1890)).
719. Id. at 139.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tanner, 9 So. at 615).
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"[a]ssault with intent to murder would be a foreseeable consequence of the joint
enterprise in which [the defendant and the two others] were engaged.,
723
In Hollingsworth v. State,72 the defendant claimed that assaulting an officer
was beyond the scope of his and the principal's original plan, and the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. 7 25 The defendant acquired a pistol at the
principal's request, and he and the principal drove around drinking and smoking
pot, allegedly looking for a party, at which time the principal noted that they
were nearing the home of the victim, a deputy sheriff.7 26 The principal then
pulled out a gun and emptied the magazine into the officer's house.
72 7
Defendant claimed he was unaware that the principal intended to shoot into the
officer's house until immediately prior to the crime.
728
The court addressed prior accomplice liability cases, indicating that those
cases held that "an accomplice is criminally responsible for the 'proximate,
natural, and logical consequences' of the criminal activity of the conspirators,"
but cautioned against "an extension of what was said in the cited cases beyond
the 'particular facts' thereof., 729 The court noted that in each of these earlier
accomplice liability cases, the underlying crime was homicide. 730 The court
continued:
That the principle set forth of criminal responsibility of an aider or
abettor for the "proximate, natural, and logical consequences" of their
common criminal undertaking would have applied under the
circumstances of the instant case if [the victim], or anyone else in his
dwelling, or thereabout, were in any way personally injured, by a bullet
from the pistol fired by [the principal], constitutes no reason for
holding [defendant] criminally responsible for any intentional crime of
[the principal] directed at the person of [the victim], in the absence of
any knowledge by [defendant], or reasonable notice to him, that [the
principal] intended to injure [the victim].
731
723. Id.
724. 366 So. 2d 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
725. Id. at 330-33.
726. Id. at 328.
727. Id. at 328-29.
728. Id. at 328.
729. Id. at 332 (discussing Stokley v. State, 49 So. 2d 284, 291 (Ala. 1950); Morris v. State,
41 So. 274, 280 (Ala. 1906); Tanner v. State, 9 So. 613, 615 (Ala. 1890)).
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The court concluded that the defendant was guilty of criminal conduct but that
there was "no substantial evidence that he was guilty of the crime of assault.
732
In D.L. v. State,733 a group of juveniles, including the defendant, had
engaged in a series of burglaries and thefts. 734 One burglary involved theft of
weapons from a home by the defendant, the principal, and other members of the
group.735 However, because the principal did not get one of the firearms stolen
in the burglary, he became angry and started a fire in the residence. 736 After
considering Alabama's accomplice law, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals observed that, although the group had "burglarized a number of
residence[s] during their 'crime spree,' there [was] no evidence that arson was a
part of their scheme or their method of operation." 737 Thus, there was "no
evidence that the arson was the proximate, natural, and logical result of the






Arkansas law reflects pieces of each of the three categories. Arkansas's
statute reflects both the specific intent approach, like section 2.06(3) of the
Model Penal Code, as well as a shared mental state provision similar to section
2.06(4) of the Model Penal Code. 739 Nevertheless, it appears that the Arkansas
courts abide by the natural and foreseeable consequences doctrine. 740 In Bosnick
732. Id.
733. 625 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
734. Id. at 1202.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 1204.
738. Id.
739. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(a)-(b) (2006) ("A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of an offense, the person: (1) Solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person
to commit the offense; (2) Aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or
committing the offense; or (3) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails
to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.... When causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission
of that offense if, acting with respect to that particular result with the kind of culpable mental state
sufficient for the commission of the offense, the person: (1) Solicits, advises, encourages, or
coerces the other person to engage in the conduct causing the particular result; (2) Aids, agrees to
aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or engaging in the conduct causing the
particular result; or (3) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the particular result,
fails to make a proper effort to prevent the conduct causing the particular result.").
740. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Ark. 1972) (citing Bosnick v. State,
454 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ark. 1970)) ("Each conspirator or participant is responsible for everything
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v. State,74' the defendant drove three armed men to a convenience store.742
Upon arriving, the defendant stayed in the car while his cohorts entered the
store. 743 A police officer arrived and knocked on the door and one of the
codefendants fired, killing him.7 " Immediately afterward, the defendant yelled
"[c]ome on, lets go" and drove the defendants away. 745 A jury later convicted
the defendant of premeditated murder.746 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas stated that an accomplice can be held liable for "every thing done
which followed directly and immediately in the execution of the common
purpose as one of its probable and natural consequences." 747 The court reversed
the conviction, however, because it determined that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of felony murder.
74 8
In Pettit v. State,74 9 the State charged the defendants with assault with intent
to kill arising out of a robbery. 750 Here, the two defendants and the principal had
planned to rob the victim, who reportedly had a lot of money in his house.
75 1
The victim later testified that before the robbery he heard someone at his door
saying, "[W]e know you're in there. If you don't come out we are coming in to,,752
get you. When the victim opened the door, he fired and wounded his
assailant, who returned fire and shot the victim in the chest.753 The trio, deciding
not to rob the victim, hurriedly left in a truck.754 The trial court provided the
jury an "aider and abettor" instruction.755
The thrust of the defendants' appeal was that in order "to be convicted
of... assault with intent to kill, the person.., must have a specific intent to
take the life of the victim." 756 They contended that although they may have
"plotted burglary and theft or perhaps robbery, there [was] no evidence that
done which followed directly and immediately in the execution of the common purpose as one of
its probable and natural consequences.").






747. Id. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clark v. State, 276 S.W. 849,
853 (Ark. 1925)).
748. Id. at315.
749. No. CR 76-103, 1976 WL 139 (Ark. Oct. 11, 1976).





755. Id. at *2.
756. Id. at *1.
[VOL. 60:237
92
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
they, themselves, intended any harm or violence to [the victim]." 757 The
Arkansas Supreme Court responded by saying, "As to the complicity of those
acting in concert ... : '[e]ach conspirator or participant is responsible for
everything done which followed directly and immediately in the execution of
the common purpose as one of its probable and natural consequences. '- 758 In




Although California's accomplice provision is silent as to a mental state,
76 0
California courts follow the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
repeat this language in case after case. 761If the accused ultimately commits
some different or additional crime other than the one the accused meant to aid
and abet, "the natural and probable consequences doctrine is triggered.,
762
Under this doctrine, a court can convict the defendant of the charged crime if
the defendant:
(1) [H]ad knowledge of a confederate's unlawful purpose; (2) intended
to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of any target
crime; ... (3) aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the target
crime .... his confederate (4) committed the charged crime; and (5)
the charged crime was a natural and probable consequence of the target
crime.
Moreover, the jury need not agree on which offense was the target crime, and
even "a misdemeanor can support a 'natural and probable consequences' aiding
and abetting murder conviction."
764
757. Id. at *2.
758. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Ark. 1972)).
759. Id.
760. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 27(a)(3) (West 1999) ("The following persons are liable to
punishment under the laws of this state: ... All who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise
or encourage, another person to commit a crime within this state .... ); id. § 31 (West Supp.
2008) ("All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be a felony or a
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in
its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission ... are
principals in any crime so committed.").
761. See, e.g., People v. Culuko, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
762. Id.
763. Donaghe v. Galaza, 4 Fed. App'x 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Solis v. Garcia, 219
F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2000)).
764. Id. at 341 (citing Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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In People v. Culuko,765 where the defendant's child's death was a
consequence of criminal child abuse inflicted by either the defendant or her
boyfriend, the court upheld the defendant's conviction for second degree
murder, among other crimes, based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. 766 The California Court of Appeals commented:
[T]he test of natural and probable consequences is an objective one....
[T]he issue does not turn on the defendant's subjective state of mind,
but depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should
have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant.
767
The defendant claimed the State was obliged to identify each particular "act" of
768child abuse the perpetrator inflicted. The court responded that the "aider and
abettor may intend or expect the perpetrator to commit the crime in the form of
a single, well-defined criminal 'act,"' or "the aider and abettor may have only
the vaguest idea of the precise 'act' by which the perpetrator will commit the
crime.' 769 Thus, it was sufficient that the accused was an accomplice to child
abuse of some form.770 Finally, the court pointed out that "[t]he natural and
probable consequences doctrine operates independently of the second degree
felony-murder rule. It allows an aider and abettor to be convicted of murder,
without malice, even where the target offense is not an inherently dangerous
felony."
771
772In People v. Hammond, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the
superior court's conviction of the defendant for murder, attempted murder, and
robbery, again using a Category 11 analysis. 773 In this case, the defendant drove
the getaway car after the principal robbed a jewelry store and shot the store's
owner and an employee, killing the owner.774 Defendant contested the charge of
attempted murder, claiming he did not have the requisite intent to kill, supported
by the fact the prosecutor conceded at trial that there was no evidence of such
765. Culuko, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789.
766. Id. at 801-03.
767. Id. at 802 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v.
Smith, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 604, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
768. Id.
769. Id. at 803.
770. Id.
771. Id. at 799.
772. 226 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
773. Id. at 477-78.
774. Id. at 476.
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intent on the defendant's part.775 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that
defendant's act of driving the getaway car was evidence of his intent to assist or
facilitate the principal in perpetrating the robbery, and that as an aider and
abettor, the defendant was then liable not only for the robbery which he
intended to assist but also for any resulting "natural and probable
consequences," including the attempted murder.
776
People v. Laster777 involved two defendants the State had charged with four
counts of attempted murder, allegedly the natural and probable consequences of
their target crimes of discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a
motor vehicle. 77 In this case, the defendant-driver set out with the defendant-
passenger in a car to avenge a gang beating of the defendant-passenger's
cousin. 77 9 Defendants then claimed they picked up two more men, one being the
principal. 780 At a stop sign in the gang's neighborhood, they claimed the
principal drew a gun and shot into a group playing basketball, presumed to
include the gang members that beat the defendant-passenger's cousin.
781
Defendants claimed they knew the principal had a gun but did not know that the
principal intended to shoot into the group of basketball players.
78
2
The appellate court acknowledged that the prosecution (1) "selected target
offenses with the fewest possible elements, so that they would be the easiest to
prove,"-discharging or permitting the discharge of weapons from a motor
vehicle-(2) claimed that the defendants had "knowingly and intentionally
aided and abetted ... these target offenses," (3) argued that "it was reasonably
foreseeable that, as a consequence, the [principal] would commit attempted
murder," and (4) concluded "that defendants were therefore guilty of attempted
murder. ' 783 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the prosecution's theory of
the case, reflected in the jury instructions, was an appropriate use of the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. 784 The defendants also argued that the
attempted murder and the discharge of the firearm were the same act so that one
could not be the consequence of the other, but the court disagreed because it
could not see "why the fact that the target offense and the offense ultimately
committed... consisted of the same act lessened defendants' culpability."
' 78 5
775. Id. at 477.
776. Id. at 477-78.
777. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
778. Id. at 682-83.
779. Id. at 685-86.
780. Id. at 685.
781. Id. at686.
782. Id. at 685-86.
783. Id. at 687-88 (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE § 12034(b), (d) (West 1999))
(criminalizing discharging and permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle).
784. Id. at 689.
785. Id. at 688.
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Thus, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's convictions
of both defendants for the four counts.
786
4. Delaware
787Delaware is another state whose statute follows the Category I model.
788Nevertheless, its case law appears to follow a broad Category III approach. In
Claudio v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction as an accomplice to
robbery, murder, and attempted murder.789 In this case, the defendant and the
principal robbed two victims at knifepoint. 790 The defendant stabbed one victim,
wounding him, and the principal stabbed the other, killing him. 791 The trial
court convicted the defendant of the murder on an accomplice liability theory.
792
On appeal, the defendant argued that he did not have the requisite specific intent
to be liable for the murder.793 However, the Supreme Court of Delaware
disagreed with the defendant's contentions, stating:
The inquiry under [the Delaware accomplice statute] is not whether
each accomplice had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether
he intended to promote or facilitate the principal's conduct constituting
the offense. The defendant[] did not have to specifically intend that the
result, a killing, should occur. As long as the result was a foreseeable
consequence of the underlying felonious conduct their intent as
accomplices includes the intent to facilitate the happening of this result.
786. Id. at 694.
787. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2) (2007) ("A person is guilty of an offense
committed by another person when: ... Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the
offense the person: ... Solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the
other person to commit it; or ... Aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in
planning or committing it; or ... Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense,
fails to make a proper effort to do so.").
788. In Collins v. State, 1995 WL 120655 (Del. Mar. 10, 1995), the trial court instructed the
jury to find "the defendant guilty if it found that the result of the ancillary crime (assault) was a
'foreseeable consequence' and in furtherance of the primary crime (robbery) for which [defendant]
intended to be an accomplice." Id. at *2. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the instruction
was "well within the constricts of the law of complicity in Delaware." Id. (citing Claudio v. State,
585 A.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Del. 1991); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197 (Del. 1980)). Here, the
court found evidence which established that "it was foreseeable that during the armed robbery of a
bar/package store, an onlooking patron of the bar might be seen as a threat to the success of the
robbery and might be assaulted by one of the robbers." Id. at *3.
789. Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1279.
790. Id. at 1280.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 1282.
793. Id. at 1281-82.
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Thus, Delaware law requires the jury to unanimously find that a
principal-accomplice relationship existed between the participants with
respect to a particular charge, e.g., in this case, robbery at knife point.
However, the jury is not required thereafter to find that the defendants
specifically intended the result of a consequential crime which occurs,
e.g., in this case, murder and attempted murder.
794
Here, the evidence revealed that the defendant agreed to rob the victims at
knifepoint and was responsible for the principal's murder.795 The court pointed
out that, in Delaware,
all persons who join together with a common intent and purpose to
commit an unlawful act which, in itself, makes it not improbable that a
crime not specifically agreed upon in advance might be committed, are
responsible equally as principals for the commission of such an
incidental or consequential crime, whenever the second crime is one in
furtherance of or in aid to the originally contemplated unlawful act.
796
In Chance v. State,797 the defendant appealed his conviction for second
degree murder, but the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the conviction on an
accomplice liability theory. In this case, the defendant taunted the victim at a
party and eventually instigated a general fight among the guests. 799 When the
victim attempted to leave, the defendant and three other party guests began to
beat him. 8°° The victim died as a result of the beating. 80 1 The trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant could be responsible as an accomplice for
second degree murder or any of four lesser included offenses, stating:
It is the law that all persons who join together with a common
intent and purpose to commit an unlawful act which, in itself, makes it
foreseeable that a crime not specifically agreed upon in advance might
be committed, are responsible equally as principals for the commission
of such an incidental or consequential crime, whenever the second
794. Id. at 1282 (quoting Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197 (Del. 1980)) (citing Probst v.
State A.2d 114, 123 (Del. 1998)).
795. Id.
796. Id. at 1281-82 (emphasis added).
797. 685 A.2d 351 (Del. 1996).
798. Id. at 352.
799. Id. at 352-53.
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crime is one in furtherance of or in aid to the originally contemplated
unlawful act.
80 2
The jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder based on a theory
of accomplice liability.80 3 On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the
"instruction with regard to accomplice liability for an offense that is
consequential to the originally contemplated unlawful act should only be given
in a felony-murder situation.' 8°4 The court disagreed and stated that if the jury
found that a "principal-accomplice relationship existed" between the defendant
and the others regarding the assault of the victim, "then each of them could be
held responsible for the consequential death of [the victim] without the jury
having to find that [the defendant] specifically intended the result of the
consequential offense, i.e., homicide.
' 8° 5
5. Illinois
The Illinois accomplice statute requires specific intent to promote or
facilitate the commission of a crime.80 6 However, the Illinois case law reflects
what its courts commonly refer to as the "common design rule,"'80 7 which they
have interpreted as holding a person accountable not only for intended crimes
but also for any natural and probable consequence of the common purpose.808
This rule holds that "when two or more people engage in a common criminal
design, any acts in furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered
the acts of all parties, ' 8°9 and applies even if the intended crime is a
misdemeanor. 8 1 For instance, where the defendant may have intended only that
he and his cohorts commit an aggravated assault against the victim, and his
cohort later shoots and kills, the defendant is responsible for murder.
8 1
1
802. Id. at 353-54.
803. Id. at 352.
804. Id. at 357-58.
805. Id. at 358.
806. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2002) ("A person is legally
accountable for the conduct of another when: ... [e]ither before or during the commission of an
offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees
or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.").
807. People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 32 (111. 1974).
808. See People v. Morgan, 364 N.E.2d 56, 60 (I1. 1977) (quoting People v. Morgan, 350
N.E.2d 27, 34 (111. App. Ct. 1976)).
809. People v. Hicks, 676 N.E.2d 725, 728-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing
People v. Martin, 648 N.E.2d 992, 998 (111. App. Ct. 1995)), rev'd on other grounds, 639 N.E.2d
373 (111. 1998).
810. See People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d 746, 749-50 (111. 984).
811. People v. McCoy, 786 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
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Similarly, even if the defendant's original intent is the commission of
misdemeanor battery, but the principal kills the victim, the defendant is
responsible for the killing. 812 Thus, where the principal "told [a] group, which
included defendant, that they should 'kick [the victim's] ass"' while a
codefendant "displayed a gun," the fact that the defendant was part of a
common design to hurt the victim also made him responsible for the principal's
shooting of the victim and resulted in his murder conviction.
8 13
In People v. Morgan,8 14 the defendant was part of a group planning a
robbery of an individual, and one of his cohorts struck the victim with a two-by-
four while another hit him with a hammer. 8 15 The court held the defendant
accountable for murder because it was a natural and probable consequence of
the group's common design to commit armed robbery, notwithstanding the




In People v. Green,8 17 the defendant, on the pretext of purchasing drugs,
convinced an eventual murder victim to open the burglar gates leading into his
apartment in order to allow two codefendants to rush in and demand money
from the victim.8 18 The codefendants murdered the victim and three others in
the apartment, and the court of appeals held the defendant responsible for four
counts of murder as well as burglary, home invasion, and armed robbery
because the murders were a natural and probable consequence of the common
purpose to commit robbery.
81 9
In People v. Kessler, 82 the defendant and two cohorts embarked on a plan
to burglarize an unoccupied tavern. 82 As the defendant waited outside the
tavern in a vehicle, his two unarmed cohorts entered the tavern. 822 While inside,
823the tavern owner arrived, at which point, one of the defendant's cohorts shot
the tavern owner with a gun he had found in the tavern during the course of the
burglary. 824 The defendant's cohorts exited the tavern, entered the defendant's
vehicle, and sped off, but the defendant lost control of the vehicle. 825 As the
defendant's cohorts fled on foot, one of them shot at a pursuing officer, but the
812. Terry, 460 N.E.2d at 749-50 (111. 1984).
813. People v. Duncan, 698 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (11. App. Ct. 1998).
814. 364 N.E.2d 56 (111. 1977).
815. Id. at 72.
816. Id. at59-60.
817. 535 N.E.2d 413 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
818. Id. at 422.
819. Id.
820. 315 N.E.2d 29 (111. 974).




825. Id. at 31.
99
Decker: The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVTEW
defendant remained seated in the vehicle.826 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld
convictions for not only one count of burglary but also two counts of attempted
murder.827 Notwithstanding the defendant's claim he had no specific intent to
commit attempted murder of either the tavern owner or the officer, the court




Although the Indiana accomplice statute appears to demand a "knowingly
or intentionally" basis for accomplice liability,829 the Indiana courts have
construed it to follow a Category 11 "natural and probable consequences"
830 831analysis for liability. In Johnson v. State, the defendant and the principal
formulated a plan to rob the victim, the defendant's father-in-law, which
resulted in the principal murdering the victim and the victim's wife while
defendant watched and did nothing. 8 The defendant argued that his conviction
as an accomplice for felony murder was inappropriate because the principal's
actions exceeded the scope of the plan to rob the victim.83 3 The Indiana
826. Id.
827. Id. at 33.
828. Id. at3l-33.
829. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (LexisNexis 2004) ("A person who knowingly or
intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense,
even if the other person: (1) Has not been prosecuted for the offense; (2) Has not been convicted of
the offense; or (3) Has been acquitted of the offense.").
830. In Richardson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 1998), the Indiana Supreme Court held
that "[a]n accomplice who acts in concert with another who actually committed the direct acts
constituting the elements of the crime is equally as liable as a principal for all natural and probable
consequences of the plan." Id. at 465. Here, the defendant and principal beat the victim for not
paying for cocaine supplied to him, during which beating the principal dropped a boulder on the
victim's head causing the victim's death. Id. at 464. Because this was a natural and probable
consequence of the attack on the victim, the defendant was liable for murder. Id. at 465.
In Porter v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), the Indiana Court of Appeals
employed the same language as the Richardson court. Id. at 1266 (quoting Tynes v. State, 650
N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995)). In this case, following an argument with the victim, defendant
handed a firearm to the principal, who shot the victim and wounded her, which ultimately was the
basis for upholding the defendant's criminal recklessness conviction. Id. at 1262, 1266.
Finally, in Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the Indiana Court of Appeals
held that "an accomplice is criminally responsible for all acts committed by a confederate which
are a probable and natural consequence of their concerted action." Id. at 450. Here, the defendant
drove the principal to and from the location where the principal shot the victim to death and, as
such, was an accomplice to murder. Id. at 447-48, 451.
831. 687 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1997).
832. Id. at 346.
833. Id. at 348.
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Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the principal's commission of a more
severe offense than planned does not negate an accomplice's liability if the
resulting offense is a probable and natural result of the planned offense. 834 The
court held that planning to rob a person in his "own home is bound to create a
risk that violence may ensue when the homeowner predictably attempts to
protect himself and his family.
' 835
7. Louisiana
Louisiana's criminal code provision addressing accomplice liability does
not contain any language concerning liability for natural and foreseeable
consequences.836 However, a review of the state's case law reveals the use of
837this doctrine. For example, in State v. Smith, the defendant and two
codefendants set out to burglarize the home of the victim, their former
employer.83 8 Upon the sudden, unexpected arrival of the victim and his wife, the
defendant and one codefendant fled the scene; the second codefendant,
however, remained to confront the victim. 839 The codefendant shot and killed
the victim and fled on foot. 84 At trial, the codefendant-shooter took full
responsibility for the death of the victim.84 1 Regardless, a jury convicted all
three defendants of murder. 84 2 The three defendants appealed the conviction,
with the defendant and codefendant seeking "to distance themselves from the
fatal shots fired by [the codefendant shooter]" by suggesting that they had not
"even been aware that their companion was armed.'H 4 3 In reviewing the trial
court's decision, the Supreme Court of Louisiana applied not only felony
murder but also accomplice law, stating that "under general principles of
accessorial liability, 'all parties [to a crime] are guilty for deviations from the
common plan which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the
plan. ''84 In addition to this theory, the court went on to cite an earlier opinion,
834. Id. at 349-50 (citing Tynes, 650 N.E.2d at 687).
835. Id. at 350.
836. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:24 (2007) ("All persons concerned in the commission
of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to
commit the crime, are principals.").
837. 748 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1999).
838. Id. at 1140.
839. Id. at 1141.
840. Id.
841. Id.
842. Id. at 1140.
843. Id. at 1143.
844. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AU STIN
W. SCOTT, JR., SU BSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 7.5, at 212 (1986)).
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where it held that, when "[a]cting in concert, each man... be[comes]
responsible not only for his own acts but for the acts of the other.' 845 Based on
its own precedent and accepted accomplice liability theory, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that "[t]he risk that an
unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling may escalate into violence and
death is aforeseeable consequence of burglary which every party to the offense
must accept no matter what he or she actually intended.,
846
On at least one occasion, the Louisiana Court of Appeals has shown it is
willing to consider its "foreseeable consequences" theory in a case that does not
847rely on the felony murder rule. In State v. B.J.D., two defendants and the
principal went to a neighbor's home to visit a classmate. 848 Although no one
was home, the defendants entered into the backyard without permission and
began swimming in an aboveground pool. 849 The principal "later admitted that
he cut the pool's liner with a box cutter. ' 85° The State subsequently charged the
defendants with and convicted them of felony criminal damage to property.
85 1
On appeal, the defendants argued, inter alia, that "the evidence was insufficient
to support the trial court's adjudication of delinquency as principals to the
[crime]. ' 852 The court reasoned that because "the State failed to prove that
[d]efendants directly committed the act in this case, the State then had the
burden of proving that [d]efendants either aided and abetted [the principal's
actions] or that [d]efendants counseled or procured [the principal's actions]."
853
The court determined that the principal's "cutting of the pool's liner was a
deviation from the trio's plan to trespass and swim in the pool.''854 Citing the
"foreseeable consequences" language from Smith, the Louisiana Court of
Appeals concluded that "the State did not prove that [d]efendants could have
reasonably foreseen [the principal's] cutting of the pool's liner."855 On this
reasoning, the court overturned the defendant's conviction.
6
845. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. Anderson, 707 So. 2d 1223, 1224
(La. 1998)).
846. Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Cotton, 341 So. 2d 362, 364 (La. 1976)).
847. 799 So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 2001).




852. Id. at 568.
853. Id. at 569.
854. Id.








The Maryland "accessory" statute offers only definitions of parties and the
abrogation of common law distinctions. 857 The Maryland case law, however,
858 859appears to follow a Category III analysis. In Johnson v. State, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals-using a Category Il approach-affirmed
the defendant's conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon and assault with
intent to murder. In this case, the defendant and his confederate robbed a
drugstore.8 1 As they were leaving, the pharmacist turned to head to the rear of
862the store and was shot in the back and injured. The pharmacist could not
identify his shooter, and neither the defendant nor his confederate admitted to
863the shooting. The trial court convicted the defendant of robbery with a deadly
weapon and assault with intent to murder.
864
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that, as a
participant in the robbery, the defendant was "responsible for all the natural or
probable consequences that flowed from the common purpose to rob the
pharmacist.' 865 The court then explained that the question regarding who may
have actually shot the victim did "not affect the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support [the defendant's] conviction of assault with intent to
murder."
866
In 1988, Maryland decided to distance itself from the natural and probable
consequences nomenclature while still employing an analysis that holds
defendant-accomplices responsible for incidental crimes that flow from the
intended crime.867 In Sheppard v. State, the defendant and two confederates
857. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-204(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2007) ("[T]he words
,accessory before the fact' and 'principal' have their judicially determined meanings.... Except
for a sentencing proceeding under § 2-303 or § 2-304 of the Criminal Law Article [death sentences
and life sentences without the possibility of parole, respectively]: (1) the distinction between an
accessory before the fact and a principal is abrogated; and (2) an accessory before the fact may be
charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced as a principal.").
858. See, e.g., Owens v. State, 867 A.2d 334, 342 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) ("[W]hen the
defendant participates in the main thrust of the criminal design, it is not necessary that he aid and
abet in the consequential crimes in order for him to be criminally responsible for them.")
(emphasis added).
859. 262 A.2d 325 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).





865. Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
866. Id.
867. Sheppard v. State, 538 A.2d 773, 775 & n.3 (Md. 1988) ("While we disagree that the
natural and probable consequence rule predicates liability on a negligence mens rea, we do agree
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robbed two women in a store. Though police captured the defendant during
the getaway, the police continued to pursue the three confederates, during which
one of them shot at the police officers in pursuit.8
69
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the defendant's conviction for
assault with intent to murder the police officer even though the defendant was in
police custody by the time the principal's crime of shooting at the police
occurred.870 The court stated:
[A]ccomplice liability[] takes two forms: (1) responsibility for the
planned, or principal offense (or offenses), and (2) responsibility for
other criminal acts incidental to the commission of the principal
offense.... In order to establish complicity for other crimes committed
during the course of the criminal episode .... the State must establish
that the charged offense was done in firtherance of the commission of
the principal offense or the escape therefrom....
... [T]he principal offense was the armed robbery of the two
women at the liquor store. The aggravated assaults against the police
officers, perpetrated during the escape from the commission of the
robbery, were secondary or incidental offenses.... [C]ontrary to [the
defendant's] contention that his responsibility for the aggravated
assaults is dependent upon proof that he aided and abetted the
commission of those offenses, [the defendant's] complicity rests on the
fact that he aided and abetted the armed robbery.8
71
Thus, although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has softened its language by
inquiring whether the unintended crimes committed by another were "done in
furtherance of the commission of the principal offense or escape therefrom," it
appears to remain a member of the Category Ill jurisdictions.
that tort standards of foreseeability have no place in criminal complicity law. Thus, consistent with
the rules of complicity in conspiracy law and under the felony murder doctrine, we prefer the
language 'in furtherance of the commission of the offense and the escape therefrom."'), abrogated




871. Id. at 775 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote call numbers omitted).
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Like Louisiana, Michigan's criminal code does not contain natural and
probable consequences language. 8 72 The Michigan Supreme Court, however,
has looked to legislative intent to support its application of the
common-law theory that a defendant can be held criminally liable as an
accomplice if: (1) the defendant intends or is aware that the principal is
going to commit a specific criminal act; or (2) the criminal act
committed by the principal is an "incidental consequence[] which
might reasonably be expected to result from the intended wrong.
873
In People v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Michigan reinstated a second
degree murder conviction that the Michigan Court of Appeals had previously
874reversed. In this case, the defendant and the principal went to the victim's
house under the principal's direction to "f* * * [the victim] up."' 87 5 The principal
knocked on the victim's door and the defendant struck the victim when he
876 877answered. The victim fell to the ground and the defendant hit him again.
When the principal began to kick the victim, the defendant told the principal
that "that was enough, and walked back to the car. ' ' 7v The principal then shot
and killed the victim.
8 79
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals had
held that "the trial court improperly convicted defendant of second-degree
murder because there was no evidence establishing that defendant was aware of
or shared [the principal's] intent to kill the victim.' '%° The Supreme Court of
Michigan then reversed the court of appeals' decision and held that "a defendant
who intends to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of [a] crime, is
liable for that crime as well as the natural and probable consequences of that
crime.' 'a 1 The supreme court cautioned that "[t]here can be no criminal
872. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.39 (West 2000) ("Every person concerned in the
commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures,
counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on
conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.").
873. People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Mich. 2006) (alteration in original) (footnote
call numbers omitted) (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 30, at 745).
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responsibility for any thing not fairly within the common enterprise, and which
might be expected to happen if the occasion should arise for any one to do it."
' 882
The court concluded,
The victim's death is clearly within the common enterprise the
defendant aided because a homicide "might be expected to happen if
the occasion should arise" within the common enterprise of committing
an aggravated assault .... [A] "natural and probable consequence" of
leaving the enraged [principal] alone with the victim is that [the
principal] would ultimately murder the victim.
8 83
10. Nebraska
Although there is no statutory law that speaks to the liability of accomplices
with regard to unintended secondary crimes committed by principals,
884
Nebraska case law supports the proposition that "one who intentionally aids and
abets the commission of a crime may be responsible not only for the intended
crime, if it is in fact committed, but also for other crimes which are committed
as a natural and probable consequence of the intended criminal act.' 885 In State
v. Trackwell, the defendant and the principal, both collection agents, drove to
886the victim's home for the purpose of repossessing the victim's pickup truck.
The defendant dropped the principal off to take the truck while the defendant
waited in his car at the end of the victim's driveway.8 87 As the principal drove
the truck away, the victim, believing that her truck was the target of theft,
888attached herself to the rear of the truck. The principal continued to drive away
and dragged the victim with him.889 At the end of the driveway, the victim fell
to the ground and suffered lacerations and injuries from being dragged by the
truck.89 0 A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of third degree assault
882. Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112,
114 (1872)).
883. Id. at 50-51 (footnote call numbers omitted).
884. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-206 (1995) ("A person who aids, abets, procures or causes
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender.").
885. State v. Trackwell, 458 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Neb. 1990) (citing State v. Ivy, 350 N.W.2d
622, 627 (Wis. 1984)).
886. Id. at 181-82.
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after a trial in the county court. 891 The district court affirmed the conviction, and
the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
892
On appeal, the defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of third degree assault.893 The Supreme Court of Nebraska noted that the
trial court found accomplice liability on a theory that the defendant and the
principal "were engaged in a 'criminal enterprise"' of theft of personal property
894they knew remained in the truck. Therefore, according to the trial court, the
defendant would "automatically be liable for any subsequent criminal act
committed by [the principal]. ' 895 Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
looked to accomplice liability common law from other states.896 Citing the
897Alabama opinion of Hollingsworth v. State, the court noted that "an
accomplice is criminally responsible for the proximate, natural, and logical
consequences of the common criminal undertaking."'898 Furthermore, the court,
referring to the "natural and probable consequence" language from the
Wisconsin opinion of State v. Ivy, 899 held that the defendant's conviction for
third degree assault was erroneous, reasoning that:
It was not a foreseeable consequence, nor was it a natural and probable
consequence, that [the victim], whose presence was unknown to [the
defendant], would attach herself to the rear of the pickup and allow
herself to be dragged the length of the driveway, where she would
eventually lose her grip and fall to the ground.900
In State v. Jackson,90 1 an opinion from the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the
defendant was waiting for a taxicab with his friend outside of a mini-mart when
two individuals walked out of the mini-mart. 902 After a hostile verbal exchange
between the two pairs of men, the two individuals crossed the street and
continued to direct hostile remarks toward the defendant and his cohort. 90 3 The
defendant's cohort followed the two men across the street and began fighting
891. Id.
892. Id.
893. Id. at 182.
894. Id. at 183.
895. Id.
896. Id. at 183-84.
897. 366 So. 2d 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); see supra notes 724-32 and accompanying
text.
898. Trackwell, 458 N.W.2d at 184 (quoting Hollingsworth, 366 So. 2d at 332).
899. 350 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Wis. 1984); see supra note 706 and accompanying text.
900. Trackwell, 458 N.W.2d at 184.
901. 601 N.W.2d 741 (1999).
902. Id. at 745-46.
903. Id.
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with one of them, at which point the defendant followed his friend across the
street.90 4 According to the defendant, he attempted to break up the fight but was
accosted by the second individual. 9 5 The defendant later asserted that he fought
back in self-defense. 90 6 During the confrontation, his cohort killed one of the
individuals. 90 7 As a result of his involvement in the fight, the defendant was
charged with manslaughter on the theory of accomplice liability of one
individual and first-degree assault of the other.
90 8
At trial, the defendant argued that he could not be held liable for aiding and
abetting the manslaughter committed by the principal because the defendant did
nothing more than follow his cohort across the street.9° 9 The Supreme Court of
Nebraska disagreed, stating that the defendant could be held liable for the
"natural and probable consequences of the intended criminal act."9 10 Although
"mere presence, acquiescence, or silence is not enough" to find one liable under
accomplice liability, the court found that, if the defendant, by "some word, act
or deed," evidenced his participation, he could be found liable. 9 11 The court
reasoned that a defendant who participates in the "common purpose of
assaulting" the victims shall be held liable for any "natural and probable
consequences of the intended criminal act."912 Accordingly, the court held that a
jury could reasonably find that the defendant's actions evidenced his
participation in the criminal conduct and, therefore, the charge of manslaughter
under an accomplice theory was proper.
9 13
11. North Carolina
North Carolina's accomplice liability statute makes no reference to a mental




907. Id. at 747.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 751.
910. Id. at 750. See also People v. Simmons, No. A-00-1201, 2002 WL 377085 (Neb. Ct.
App. Mar. 12, 2002) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not shoot the victim did not
preclude his conviction for attempted murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony where the
defendant and the principal, both armed with handguns, entered a bank with the intention of
robbing it and the principal shot the victim).
911. Id.
912. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d at 750.
913. Id. at751.
914. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (2007) ("All distinctions between accessories before the
fact and principals to the commission of a felony are abolished. Every person who heretofore
would have been guilty as an accessory before the fact to any felony shall be guilty and punishable
as a principal to that felony.").
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Category 11 model. In State v. Barnes,915 the defendant and codefendants had
discussed the possibility of robbing someone. 916 The defendant and
codefendants went to the home of the two victims. 9 17 The codefendants shot and
killed the victims, and the defendant and his codefendants then robbed the
victims' home of jewelry and other valuables. 918 The defendant and
codefendants then went to another home where they gave the occupants
information about the crime. 919 The occupants shortly thereafter informed the
police. 92° The police arrested all three perpetrators, and in their subsequent
statements to police, each denied having been involved in the murder of the
victims. 92 Physical evidence, including gunshot residue on the persons of all
three perpetrators, tied them to the crime. 922 The defendant and codefendants
were convicted of two counts of first degree murder and counts of armed
robbery and burglary.
923
On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the "acting in concert" rule with
regard to premeditated and deliberate first degree murder.924 The trial court's
jury instruction included the following language:
If two or more persons act together with a common purpose to commit
a crime, each of them is not only guilty as a principal if the other
commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime
committed by the others in pursuance of their common purpose or as a
natural or probable consequence of the common purpose.
The defendant argued that this instruction was contrary to the "acting in
concert" rule espoused in the North Carolina Supreme Court's earlier decision
of State v. Blankenship,926 which held that "the acting in concert doctrine did
not encompass a defendant who was at the scene of a murder acting in concert
with another with whom he shared a common plan to commit a crime, but who
did not have the specific intent to kill the victim."
' 927
915. 481 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1997).





921. Id. at 53.
922. Id.
923. Id. at 51.
924. Id. at 69.
925. Id. at 68.
926. 447 S.E.2d 727 (N.C. 1994), overruled by Barnes, 481 S.E.2d at 70.
927. Barnes, 481 S.E.2d at 70 (citing Blankenship, 447 S.E.2d at 738-39).
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However, the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly overruled
Blankenship and held that the jury instructions on the "acting in concert"
doctrine given in the case at hand were correct. 928 In overruling Blankenship,
the court also noted that they had previously applied the doctrine, quoting
language from their 1837 opinion of State v. Haney,92 9 which held "where a
privity and community of design has been established, the act of any one of
those who have combined together for the same illegal purpose, done in
furtherance of the unlawful design, is, in the consideration of law, the act of
all., 930 The court concluded that, the North Carolina "acting in concert" rule
should be understood as follows:
[I]f two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if
actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the
other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other
crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose...
or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.
931
In State v. Littlejohn,93 2 a North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion, the
victim met the defendant, the principal, and a third individual and drove to a
house in order to purchase false identification for use in the purchase of
alcohol.933 While standing near their vehicle outside the house, the principal
"cut [the victim's] throat ... and ran away ... with [the victim's] money. [The
victim] opened the ... door [of the vehicle] and screamed for help," but the
defendant told the victim to exit the vehicle. 934 The defendant and the third
individual then drove off.935 A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of
armed "robbery... and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill [while]
inflicting serious injury."
' 936
On appeal the defendant argued, inter alia, that the evidence adduced at
trial was insufficient for his conviction for "assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury." 937 The trial court gave an "acting in
concert" instruction as follows:
928. Id.
929. 19 N.C. 373 (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) (N.C. 1837).
930. Barnes, 481 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting Haney, 19 N.C. at 378).
931. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Erlewine, 403 S.E.2d 280, 286 (N.C. 1991)).
932. No. COA05-802, 2006 WL 539393 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2006).
933. Id. at *.
934. Id.
935. Id.
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If two or more persons join in a common purpose to commit a robbery
with a dangerous weapon, each of them, if actually or constructively
present, is not only guilty of that crime, if the other person committed a
crime, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in
pursuance of the common purpose to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon; or the natural or probable consequence thereof. 938
The court found that the trial court's jury instruction was consistent with the
North Carolina Supreme Court's prior decision in State v. Westbrook,939 which
had held,
[I]f two persons are acting together, in pursuance of a common plan
and common purpose to rob, and one of them actually does the robbery,
both would be equally guilty within the meaning of the law and if two
persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually
or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other
commits the crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed
by the other in pursuance of the common purpose; that is, the common
plan to rob, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.94°
The court also looked to its previous decision in State v. Joyner,941 where the
court stated that under "the concerted action" principle
[i]t is not.., necessary for a defendant to do any particular act
constituting at least part of a crime in order to be convicted of that
crime ... so long as [the defendant] is present at the scene of the crime
and the evidence is sufficient to show he is acting together with another
who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a
common plan or purpose to commit the crime.
942
The Littlejohn court concluded that there was no error.943 It noted that the
evidence at trial showed that the "defendant was both physically present ... and
acted together with [the codefendants] to accomplish the common plan of
938. Id. at *4.
939. 181 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1971), vacated on other grounds, Westbrook v. North Carolina,
408 U.S. 939, 939 (1972).
940. Littlejohn, 2006 WL 539393, at *4 (quoting Westbrook, 181 S.E.2d at 586).
941. 255 S.E.2d 390 (N.C. 1979).
942. Littlejohn, 2006 WL 539393, at *5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Joyner, 255 S.E.2d at
395).
943. Id. at *7.
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robbery." 94 The court concluded that defendant's conviction on the secondary
crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury
was proper because the assault grew out of the concerted action of committing
robbery.
12. South Carolina
The South Carolina accomplice liability statute makes no mention of a
mental state for its accomplice law. 946 However, South Carolina case law states
that where multiple actors commit an unlawful act and one of the actors
commits a homicide, all of the actors are guilty of the homicide so long as it
was a "probable or natural consequence of the acts done in pursuance of the
common design." 947 An illustration of this reasoning appears in State v.
Dickman, where a murder victim's body was found and linked to the defendant
and his confederate, but each claimed that the other had shot the victim.948 The
trial judge's instructions were that "the hand of one is the hand of all," which
the South Carolina Supreme Court felt was consistent with the principle that if a
homicide is committed as the natural and probable consequence of acts done in
pursuance of a common design, all involved are as guilty as the one who
committed the homicide. 949 Although the defendant himself apparently did not
have the "nerve" to shoot the victim, the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence showed that the defendant and
the principal were acting according to a plan to murder the victim.
950
State v. Curry 95 involved a drug deal gone awry, where one of the buyers
was shot and died, and there was doubt about which codefendant shot him.952 In
appealing his murder conviction to the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, the
defendant argued that the trial court's instruction based on the "hand of one is
the hand of all" theory was in error.953 Verbatim, the trial court's instructions
were:
944. Id. at *5.
945. Id. at *6.
946. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003) ("A person who aids in the commission of a
felony or is an accessory before the fact in the commission of a felony by counseling, hiring, or
otherwise procuring the felony to be committed is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be
punished in the manner prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon.").
947. State v. Dickman, 341 S.C. 293, 295, 534 S.E.2d 268, 269 (S.C. 2000) (citing State v.
Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 265, 188 S.E.2d 379, 382 (S.C. 1972)).
948. Id. at 294, 534 S.E.2d at 268.
949. Id. at 295, 534 S.E.2d at 269.
950. Id.
951. 370 S.C. 674, 636 S.E.2d 649 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006).
952. Id. at 678, 636 S.E.2d at 650-51.
953. Id. at 682, 636 S.E.2d at 653.
[VOL. 60:237
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It is my duty to charge you now that if a crime is committed by two or
more people who are acting together in committing a crime, the act of
one is the act of all. If a person joins with another to accomplish an
illegal purpose, he is criminally responsible for everything done by the
other person which occurs as a natural consequence of the acts done in
carrying out the common plan and purpose.954
The defendant claimed the instruction was deficient because it did not include
"natural and probable consequence" language.955 In finding the instructions
adequate, the court quoted two earlier South Carolina Supreme Court
decisions. 956 The first decision stated: "[O]ne who joins with another to
accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for everything done by his
confederate incidental to the execution of the common design and purpose."
957
The second opinion held "if a crime is committed by two or more persons who
are acting together in the commission of a crime, then the act of one is the act of
both. ' 95' Thus, in the case at hand, the thrust of the jury instruction correctly




While the Tennessee statute addressing "conduct of another" makes no
mention of the natural and probable consequences rule,960 it is reflected in the
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions-Crimina 6' and Tennessee case law. 962 In
954. Id. at 683, 636 S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis added).
955. Id.
956. Id. (citing State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 648, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999); State v.
Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 76-77, 502 S.E.2d 63, 76 (1998)).
957. Id. (quoting Langley, 343 S.C. at 648, 515 S.E.2d at 101).
958. Id. (quoting Kelsey, 331 S.C. at 76-77, 502 S.E.2d at 76).
959. Id.
960. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2)-(3) (2006) ("A person is criminally responsible
for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if: ... (2) Acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the
person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense; or (3) Having
a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent commission of the offense and acting
with intent to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, or to promote or assist its
commission, the person fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.").
961. TENN. PATTERN JURY INSTRU CTIONS-CRIMINAL § 3.01 ("A defendant who is
criminally responsible for an offense may be found guilty not only of that offense, but also for any
other offense or offenses committed by another, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
other offense or offenses committed were natural and probable consequences of the original
offense for which the defendant is found criminally responsible, and that the elements of the other
2008]
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State v. Howard,96 3 the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed and remanded the
case for the trial court's failure to instruct the jury of the natural and probable
consequences rule.964 In this case, the defendant and three individuals developed
a scheme to rob a restaurant.96 5 The men entered the restaurant through the back
door, instructed the restaurant employees to lie down on the ground, and entered
the manager's office and demanded money.966 Although the manager "complied
and gave the men the money they demanded, one man ordered, 'Shoot his ass.
Shoot the mother ---- r.'967 He was then shot and killed. Another employee
was also shot and wounded during the robbery.
969
The State charged the defendant with various offenses including murder,
especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.
970
At trial,
the court admitted into evidence a signed statement wherein [the
defendant] admitted that he had accompanied [the codefendants] to the
restaurant knowing that they intended to rob it. In his statement he
admitted that all three of the other men had guns, but he neither
admitted nor denied that he carried a gun himself. [The defendant]
claimed that when [the codefendants] went into the restaurant he stayed
"all the way in the back." Once he heard gunshots, he ran to the car.
[The codefendants] followed him to the car and one stated, "I shot him,
man, I shot him."
971
At trial, the prosecution did not present any evidence that the defendant shot
either victim. 972 The court instructed the jury that the defendant would be
"criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if,
acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense," he
offense or offenses that accompanied the original offense have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
962. See, e.g., State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) ("A
defendant is criminally responsible not only for the intended, or target crime, but also for those
collateral crimes committed by a co-participant in the criminal episode that are the natural and
probable consequence of the target crime.").
963. 30 S.W.3d 271 (Tenn. 2000).
964. Id. at 277-78.
965. Id. at 273.
966. Id. at 273-74.
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aided or attempted to aid another person to commit the offense; it made no
mention of the natural and probable consequences rule. 973 Moreover, it
explicitly instructed the jury it could not find the defendant guilty under the
felony murder rule if it convicted him of premeditated murder.974 The jury
"convicted [the defendant] of premeditated murder, especially aggravated
robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery."
975
On appeal, the defendant contended that there was not sufficient evidence
to establish deliberation or premeditation. 976 The Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals "recognized that because the State had offered no proof that [the
defendant] fired the shots that killed the victim, [the defendant's] conviction"
was therefore "based upon his criminal responsibility for the conduct of the
shooter., 97 7 The court concluded that the defendant was criminally responsible
based on the natural and probable consequences rule and affirmed his
convictions even though the trial court had not instructed the jury on the rule.
978
The defendant appealed the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
on three grounds:
(1) the rule should not apply to an offense requiring an intentional
mental state; (2) the rule as applied to homicides is already codified in
the felony-murder statute; and (3) there is no factual basis for a finding
that premeditated murder is the natural and probable consequence of
aggravated robbery.
979
The Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule. 980 In
reversing and remanding for a new trial, the supreme court explained:
[T]he natural and probable consequences rule survived the codification
of the common law into the criminal responsibility statutes even though
it is not explicitly included in the statutes. The rule underlies the
doctrine of criminal responsibility and is based on the recognition that
aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they
have naturally, probably and foreseeably put into motion. The doctrine
extends the scope of criminal liability to the target crime intended by a
973. Id. at 275.
974. Id. at 274.





980. Id. at 277.
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defendant as well as to other crimes committed by a confederate that
were the natural and probable consequences of the commission of the
original crime....
... [T]o impose criminal liability based on the natural and probable
consequences rule, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and
the jury must find the following: (1) the elements of the crime or crimes
that accompanied the target crime; (2) that the defendant was
criminally responsible pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-11-402; and (3) that the other crimes that were committed were
natural and probable consequences of the target crime.
981
The Supreme Court of Tennessee determined the instruction on natural and
probable consequences to be an "essential element that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 9 2 Though the court reversed for failure to provide
this instruction, it was quick to explain that, unlike reversal for insufficiency of
evidence, the reversal for procedural error permitted the State to retry the
defendant for the same charges.
983
14. Virginia
Virginia has no statute referring to a mental state for accomplices.9 4 Its
case law and the Virginia Model Jury Instructions-Criminal have a "concert of
action" instruction which provides that
[i]f there is concert of action with the resulting crime one of its
incidental probable consequences, then whether such crime was
originally contemplated or not, all who participate in any way in
bringing it about are equally answerable and bound by the acts of every
other person connected with the consummation of such resulting
crime.
981. Id. at 276 (citing State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (Tenn. 1997)).
982. Id. at 277.
983. Id.
984. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (2004) ("In the case of every felony, every principal in
the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and
punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree .... ).
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986In Spradlin v. Commonwealth, the defendant and codefendant both
appealed convictions of two counts of assault and battery, but the Virginia
Court of Appeals affirmed. 987 In this case, the victim testified that "while he and
[the second victim] were sitting in a booth at [a restaurant] ... the
defendant[] ... came to the booth and asked [the victim] why he had cursed
him.' 988 When the victim, who did not know and had never seen the defendant,
replied that he did not do so, the defendant struck him.9 89 A fight broke out in
which a group of men, including the defendant and codefendant, joined in
pushing and shoving the victims outside into a parking lot.9 90 One victim later
testified that the defendant and another continued to beat him in the parking lot,
while three other men beat the second victim.
99 1
The defendant contended that he could not be liable for the crimes
involving the second victim, and the codefendant contended he could not be
liable for the crimes involving either victim.9 92 Each defendant argued that
conviction of the crimes charged in the indictments must be supported by
evidence of actual violence inflicted by each defendant. 993 Holding both
defendants responsible, the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
Every person who is present lending countenance, aiding or
abetting another in the commission of an offense is liable to the same
punishment as if he had actually committed the offense....
If there is concert of action with the resulting crime one of its
incidental probable consequences, then whether such crime was
originally contemplated or not, all who participate in any way in
bringing it about are equally answerable and bound by the acts of every
other person connected with the consummation of such resulting crime.
The question of whether the offense is the natural and probable result
of the intended wrongful act is usually for the jury.
994
After addressing the fact that the defendant started the fight and that
defendant and codefendant were involved in its progression to the parking lot,
the court explained that the defendant and codefendant were "present and
986. 79 S.E.2d 443 (Va. 1954).
987. Id. at 446.





993. Id. at 444-45.
994. Id. at 445 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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associated in this concerted action and participated in bringing it about." 
99 5
Affirming the convictions, the court concluded that the defendant and
codefendant aided and abetted the commission of each of the crimes charged
and that "it [was] immaterial whether they actually inflicted the specific injuries
received by [the victims]."
9 6
In Rollston v. Commonwealth,997 the victim and a friend had provided
information to the police concerning the defendant and his associate's
involvement in a series of burglaries. 998 While detectives were building the
case, the victim and his friend's brother were shot and killed in the victim's
home. 999 Later, the defendant's former girlfriend implicated the defendant as
having information about these murders, namely, that when she went for a ride
with the defendant, he had told her that two associates
had done something he could not believe; that on the previous evening
he had taken them to [the victim's] house and dropped them off; and
that when he picked them up they told him they had "offed" two guys.
[The defendant] went on to tell her he had returned to the house earlier
that morning because he did not believe them; that he had seen that the
two guys were, in fact, murdered; ... that he was not part of any plan
to commit the murders; and that he had heard [the codefendants] saying
they would like to kill [the victims] prior to dropping them off, but he
thought they were just kidding.' 000
While riding in the car, according to the former girlfriend, the defendant
retrieved a knife and a gun from a ditch, claimed the gun was the murder
weapon, and then discarded the gun and knife by throwing them off a bridge. 10
The Virginia trial court found the defendant guilty of two counts of first
degree murder and two counts of use of a firearm in those murders, and the
defendant appealed. 100 2 On appeal, the defendant first challenged the trial
court's use of an instruction on the liability of the principal in the second
degree.l103 It read:
995. Id. at 446.
996. Id.
997. 399 S.E.2d 823 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
998. Id. at 824.
999. Id. at 825.
1000. Id. at 829.
1001. Id.
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A principal in the first degree is the person who actually commits
the crime. A principal in the second degree is a person who is present,
sharing the criminal intent of the perpetrator or aiding and abetting, by
helping in some way in the commission of the crime. Presence or
consent alone is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. It must
be shown that the defendant intended his words, gestures, signals or
actions to in some way encourage, advise, or urge, or in some way help
the person committing the crime to commit it. 1004
However, the defendant contended that to be convicted the law required the
State to prove that he shared the "specific intent to murder."'
00 5
The Virginia Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant, however, and
stated that "[s]pecific intent is not required to convict the defendant" of first
degree murder "as a principal in the second degree."''00 6 Instead, the court
explained, to "share the criminal intent" meant that "the accused must either
know or have reason to know of the principal's criminal intention and must
intend to encourage, incite, or aid the principal's commission of the crime."'°07
The defendant also challenged the trial court's use of the Virginia model
jury instruction on "concert of action," which was the basis of his liability on
the firearms charge.' °0 8 Again, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals
disagreed with the defendant:
While a concert of action instruction may be proper in a felony murder
case, it may also be proper to use when any unlawful enterprise is
intended. The intended wrongful act could be any crime and need not
be a felony. The only qualification is that the resulting crime be an
incidental, probable consequence of the original enterprise, plan or
purpose. Under the [State's] theory, [the defendant and codefendants]
planned the murders of [the victims]. This was the wrongful concerted
action and [the defendant] was vicariously responsible under this
principle for the firearm offenses. Even if he did not know that a
firearm would be the murder weapon, he would be vicariously culpable
1004. Id. at 825 (quoting 1 VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, Instruction No.
3.100 (1989)).
1005. Id. at 825.
1006. Id. at 826.
1007. Id. (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 270 S.E.2d 729, 732 (Va. 1980); Cirios v.
Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 164, 167 (Va. 1988)).
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for the firearm offenses because they were "incidental probable
consequences" of the murders.' 
009
Finally, the defendant contended in his appeal that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the murder and firearm convictions. 010 The Virginia
Court of Appeals disagreed again, concluding that while there was "no direct
evidence that the defendant was present at the scene" or actively participating in
the murder, the circumstantial evidence pointed to his guilt as an aider and
abettor of the offense.' 01' The court further stated that the evidence allowed for
a reasonable inference that, while the murder was in progress, the defendant was
serving as a "lookout" and consequently acted as the driver of the "getaway"
car. 10 12 The court then held that the defendant was properly convicted as a
principal in the second degree. 013
VI. STATES WITH AMBIGUOUS, NOVEL, OR UNIQUE APPROACHES TO
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
Courts in several states reveal unclear, uneven, or unusual approaches to
accomplice liability. In some of these states a discrepancy or ambiguity in
reasoning surfaces that is not present in more easily categorized jurisdictions. In
turn, it becomes difficult to reconcile these states with the three approaches
outlined in this article.
However, within these states that appear to follow a novel, inconsistent, or
even an unidentifiable approach to accomplice liability, some patterns emerge.
These jurisdictions can be broken down into several subcategories: (1) states
with unresolved issues due to (a) insufficient case law or (b) divergent case law;
and (2) states with nonuniform rules.
A. Unresolved Issues
1. Insufficient Case Law
States with very limited numbers of cases relating to accomplice liability
often display some ambiguity; yet one or more of the three approaches appears
to influence many of these states, which include Alaska, Montana, North
Dakota, and South Dakota.
1009. Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
1010. Id.









Alaska has insufficient case law to determine which approach prevails. In a
case that predates the current Alaska accomplice liability statute, Tarnef v.
State,10 14 the Alaska Supreme Court stated, "It is well established at common
law and in Alaska that a person cannot be convicted of 'aiding and abetting' a
crime unless it is shown that he had the specific criminal intent to bring about
the illegal end."' 1 15 Later, the Alaska legislature revised its complicity statute
consistent with Model Penal Code section 2.06(3), which follows the Category I
model. 10 16 Moreover, the legislature did not include subsection (4) of section
2.06, which follows the Category II model. 1
017
In Echols v. State, 1° 18 the Alaska Court of Appeals considered a case where
a wife was charged with being an accomplice to a first degree assault committed
by her husband. 10 19 The state's evidence revealed that the defendant-wife asked
her husband to discipline their child and then stood by and watched her husband
inflict serious injury on their child by whipping the child with an electric
cord.1°2° Looking to the revised Alaska legislation, the Echols court ruled that
the wife's accomplice liability could not be premised on recklessness because
intent to commit the crime was an element of the substantive offense.'
0 2 1
Rather, the court held that the wife could only be accountable for first degree
assault if the State could establish that she intended the child suffer physical
injury through the use of a weapon.' ° 22 In other words, because the Alaska
statute contained only the "purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense" language found in section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code, the
court felt compelled to follow the Category I approach. 1023
1014. 512 P.2d923 (Alaska 1973).
1015. Id. at 928.
1016. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110 (2006) ("A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another constituting an offense if (1) the person is made legally accountable by a
provision of law defining the offense; (2) with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the
offense, the person (A) solicits the other to commit the offense; or (B) aids or abets the other in
planning or committing the offense; or (3) acting with the culpable mental state that is sufficient
for the commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent person or a person who lacks
criminal responsibility to engage in the proscribed conduct.").
1017. See id.
1018. 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), overruled by Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204
(Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
1019. Id. at691.
1020. Id. at 692.
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In Riley v. State1°20 the Alaska Court of Appeals rejected its previous
approach requiring the accomplice to have a mental state of criminal purpose to
achieve a particular criminal result.' °25 In Riley, the defendant and another
individual opened fire on an unsuspecting crowd but there was no evidence to
show who fired the shots that ultimately wounded the victims.' °26 A jury
convicted the defendant of, among other crimes, first degree assault, which
required proof that he recklessly caused serious physical injury with a
dangerous instrument.' °27 The defendant claimed on appeal that the State
needed to prove he intended to inflict injuries on the victims.' ° 28 The appellate
court disagreed and held that the law requires the same culpable mental state of
all participants whether they act as principals or accomplices.' ° 29 The Riley
court held, contrary to the holding in Echols, that the law did not require intent
to inflict injury.' In a less than convincing argument, the court concluded that
the Alaska legislature omitted language following section 2.06(4) of the Model
Penal Code "because they considered it superfluous."' 0 31 Even though the
Alaska law contains no provision like section 2.06(4), the Riley court cited
subsection (4) and its commentary to support the accomplice's conviction for
crimes requiring recklessness on the part of the actual perpetrator.' ° 32 In other
words, even though the plain reading of the Alaska statute follows the Category
I approach, the Riley court applied the Category II model to justify its result.
If one considers this apparent flip-flop on the part of the Alaska Court of
Appeals and the absence of any statement about the mental state requirement for
accomplice liability from the Alaska Supreme Court since the Alaska
legislature's revisions to the statute, Alaska's approach cannot be neatly
categorized. Thus, like Montana, Alaska's mental state requirement for
accomplice liability is not entirely apparent.
b. Montana
Montana is perhaps the best example of this subcategory. The Montana
courts have only looked at accomplice liability in a handful of narrow settings.
1024. 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
1025. Id. at 206-07.
1026. Id. at 205-06.
1027. Id. at 205.
1028. Id. at 206-07.
1029. See id. at 221.
1030. Id.
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Although Montana's statute reflects both Category I and Category II
language, 10 33 its case law is less clear.
In State v. Powers,'0 34 the trial court had convicted four defendants of
deliberate homicide in the death of a five-year-old child. 10 35 The defendants
were members of a church that believed in severe physical discipline of
children. 036 The State relied upon accountability principles in finding criminal
responsibility on the part of each of the defendants, including the mother of the
victim who stood by while her defendant-husband repeatedly beat their child
with a belt.1°37 Specifically, the State claimed "they need not prove a specific
intent to kill .... reasoning that the defendants engaged in a common design or
course of conduct to accomplish an unlawful purpose"-child abuse or
assault. 1° 38 The State further contended that the Montana accountability law was
patterned after the Illinois accountability statute and its interpretations, which
"indicate that where codefendants undertake a course of conduct or common
design which results in a person's death, all can be held criminally
responsible."' 1039 The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the State and
followed the Illinois common design theory of accomplice liability.' Illinois's
theory follows the Category I model. 1041 Here, the court found that the
respective defendants' adherence to a church's policy of imposing severe
discipline, which led to the child's death, was sufficient to show a common
design between the church members. 1°42 As to the victim's mother, she "aided
and abetted the other defendants in causing the victim's death by her failure or
refusal to perform her duties as a parent, terminate the beatings and discipline,
and provide the victim with needed medical care and attention. ' 1 43 Obviously,
the Powers court relied on a Category I analysis in their resolution of this
case.
1033. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302 (2007) ("A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another when: (1) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he
causes another to perform the conduct, regardless of the legal capacity or mental state of the other
person; (2) the statute defining the offense makes him so accountable; or (3) either before or during
the commission of an offense with the purpose to promote or facilitate such commission, he
solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid such other person in the planning or commission of
the offense.").
1034. 645 P.2d 1357 (Mont. 1982).
1035. Id. at 1359.
1036. Id. at 1362.
1037. Id.
1038. Id. at 1362.
1039. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 221 N.E.2d 662, 663 (II1. 1966); People v. Richardson,
207 N.E.2d 478, 481 (II1. 1965); People v. Spagnola, 260 N.E.2d 20, 27 (111. App. Ct. 1970)).
1040. Id.
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However, in State ex rel. Keyes v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District
Court,1 4 4 the Montana Supreme Court avoided the common design theory
while stating that it was faced with a case of first impression. 1° 45 In this case,
the defendant and the first victim exchanged gunfire from their respective
vehicles in a parking lot.'0 46 The second victim killed in the shootout was a
passenger in the vehicle driven by the first victim.'0 47 The State did not have
conclusive evidence that the bullet from the defendant's gun killed the second
victim. l 48 The court charged the defendant with, among other things,
"deliberate homicide by accountability."' 104 9 In concluding that this charge was
not an offense under Montana law, the court did not state clearly what mental
state the law requires for accomplice liability.'0 50 The court did, however, state
that "Montana's accountability statute does not extend criminal liability to
unintended, yet reasonably foreseeable deaths, such as the death of [the victim],
that result as a consequence of committing the agreed upon offense. In other
words, Montana's accountability statute does not provide for transferred
intent."' 0 5 1 Thus, it appears Keyes rejects the Category III approach. After
reviewing the few Montana decisions on the subject, the actual mental state
requirement in Montana is unclear due to a lack of definitive case law.
c. North Dakota
The North Dakota statute contains both Category I and Category II
language. 10 52 As to case law, one North Dakota case involving a novel
evidentiary issue clearly reflects North Dakota's adherence to the specific intent
requirement for accomplice liability. In State v. Deery,1° 53 a jury convicted the
principal of driving with a suspended license primarily on the testimony of the
1044. 955 P.2d 639 (Mont. 1998).
1045. See id. at 640.
1046. Id. at 639.
1047. Id.
1048. Id.
1049. Id. at 642.
1050. See id. at 642-43.
1051. Id. at 640.
1052. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1) (1997) ("A person may be convicted of an offense
based upon the conduct of another person when: ... [a]cting with the kind of culpability required
for the offense, he causes the other to engage in such conduct; ... [w]ith intent that an offense be
committed, he commands, induces, procures, or aids the other to commit it, or, having a statutory
duty to prevent its commission, he fails to make proper effort to do so; or ... [h]e is a
coconspirator and his association with the offense meets the requirements of either of the other
subdivisions of this subsection.").
1053. 489 N.W.2d 887 (N.D. Ct. App. 1992).
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witness who had loaned him the vehicle he was driving when arrested. 10 54 On
appeal, the issue was whether the witness was an accomplice whose testimony
the State needed to corroborate.'0 55 The Court of Appeals of North Dakota
concluded that the record did not establish that the witness allowed the principal
to drive the vehicle with the "intent" that the principal commit the offense of
driving while his license was under suspension.'0 56 Accordingly, the court held
that the witness was not an accomplice and, as such, the witness's testimony did
not have to be corroborated. 10 57 Consequently, the court upheld the principal's
conviction. 058
By contrast, in an earlier North Dakota Supreme Court opinion, State v.
Pronovost,1°5 9 a jury convicted the defendant of aiding the principal in
delivering cocaine to an undercover agent in a vehicle driven by the defendant
to and from the location where the delivery was to occur. 0 60 In upholding the
defendant's conviction as an accomplice to delivering a controlled substance,
the court held that a court could predicate a finding of accomplice liability on
the fact that a defendant was "acting with the kind of culpability required for the
offense and sharing the criminal intent of the principal.
In examining North Dakota case law, it is evident that decisions on the
issue this Article examines are rare. Further, while Deery follows a Category I
approach, Pronovost appears to rely on Category II thinking. Like an uncertain
election projection, this state is "too close to call" and, as such, is not
categorized.
d. South Dakota
South Dakota has an accountability statute that follows a Category I
model. 106 2 However, case law construing the statute is sparse and somewhat
conflicting. In State v. Tofani,1° 63 the defendant, the victim (the defendant's
fianc6e), and a male companion traveled from Florida to South Dakota and
rented a motel room. 106 4 Defendant and his companion left the victim at the
1054. Id. at 887-88.
1055. Id.
1056. Id. at 889.
1057. Id.
1058. Id.
1059. 345 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1984).
1060. Id. at 852.
1061. Id. at 853 (citing Zander v. S.J.K., 256 N.W.2d 713,715 (N.D. 1977)).
1062. See S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006) ("Any person who, with the intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, aids, abets, or advises another person in planning
or committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime.").
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motel and encountered the principal, whom they did not know, at a local
casino. 1065 The defendant's companion observed the principal winning a large
sum of money at a casino game; the companion approached the principal and
engaged him in conversation.' 0 66 During this conversation, the defendant
described his dissatisfaction with the victim and that he wanted to get away
from the victim.'0 67 During the course of the conversation, the terms "beaten"
and "raped" were used to describe the appropriate way of treating the victim. 068
The defendant's companion subsequently urged the defendant to go to Sioux
Falls, and the principal agreed to drive them.'0 69 The three men traveled to
Sioux Falls, whereupon the principal left the defendant and his companion at a
truck stop. The principal then returned to the motel and picked up the
victim. 1° 71 Later, on a country road, the principal pulled the victim from the car,
forced her to perform oral sex, and "struck her without provocation. ', 1072 The
principal then choked the victim until she feigned unconsciousness. 1073 After an
argument and a brief struggle, the principal eventually agreed to drive the
victim to a location closer to her motel. When the principal stopped the
vehicle to "relieve himself," the victim escaped to a nearby farmhouse and
called the police. 1075 Meanwhile, the defendant and his companion had
hitchhiked back to the motel. 1076 The victim subsequently called the defendant
from the hospital and claimed that she had been raped. 1077
The State charged the defendant with kidnapping, rape, attempted
aggravated assault, and aggravated assault, all as an accessory before the
fact. 1078 At a bench trial, the defendant "was found guilty.., of aiding and
abetting [the principal] in the rape and aggravated assault of [the victim]."',
0 79
The defendant appealed the verdict claiming, among other things, that the trial
court had relied upon insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the
principal in the crimes against the victim.' The defendant asserted that (1) the
1065. Id. at 393-94.
1066. Id. at 394.
1067. Id.






1074. Id. at 395-96.





1080. See id. at 397-98.
126
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss2/1
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
evidence was insufficient to show a common design or purpose, and (2) the
principal's testimony indicated that he had acted alone and failed to show any
shared intent on the part of the defendant and his companion. 081
The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the trial court's conviction of
the defendant. 10 82 The court pointed out that while the accomplice law requires
"'the intent to promote or facilitate' the crime, the evidence must show that [theS • ,,1083
defendant] 'knowingly did something to assist' in its commission. Here,
because the evidence established that the defendant (1) informed the principal
that the victim was "alone and vulnerable"; (2) advised the principal of his
desire to be rid of the victim and stated the victim was a "'crack whore,"' who
was "available for easy sex, someone to be 'roughed up and sent out of town"';
and (3) showed the principal where the victim was staying and gave the
principal the victim's room key, the court concluded that the direct and
circumstantial evidence supported the trial court's verdict finding that the
defendant "knowingly assisted" the principal in the commission of the
crimes. 1084
Other opinions in South Dakota, like Tofani, follow the reasoning that
though the state accountability law on its face requires "intent to promote or
facilitate," 1085 in actuality the State need not establish "specific intent" to
promote or facilitate; rather, the State must show the defendant "knowingly
acted."' 10 8 On the other hand, at least one other decision by the Supreme Court




held that where a defendant-accomplice who knew the principal wanted to
purchase marijuana introduced the principal to a drug source, and where the
principal "unexpectedly purchased methamphetamine in addition to marijuana,"
the defendant was "not absolved[d] of responsibility as an accomplice to the
crime of possession of methamphetamine" even though he did not expect the
purchase. 108 8 Be that as it may, because South Dakota's stance on the mens rea
requirement for accomplice liability is unusual, if not uncertain, this state is not
categorized in this Article either.
1081. Id. at 400.
1082. Id. at 405.
1083. Id. at 400 (quoting State v. Brings Plenty, 490 N.W.2d 261,268 (S.D. 1992)).
1084. Id. at 405.
1085. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-3 (2006) (emphasis added).
1086. See, e.g., Brings Plenty, 490 N.W.2d at 268 ("[Knowingly does not encompass a
specific intent or special mental state over and above a doing of the actual act." (citing State v.
Barrientos, 444 N.W.2d 374, 376 (S.D. 1989))); State v. Schafer, 297 N.W.2d 473, 476 (S.D.
1980) (stating that when defendant "knowingly did something to assist in the commission of a
crime, then his status changes" to an accomplice).
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2. Divergent Case Law
In regards to accomplice liability mental state requirements, a few states
show inconsistencies of reasoning between districts. These states, Missouri,
Ohio, and West Virginia, form another subcategory.
a. Missouri
Although Missouri's statute reflects a Category I approach, 1089 the case law
does not necessarily follow suit. In Missouri, there is an apparent split in
reasoning between the two appellate districts that the Missouri Supreme Court
has yet to resolve. In State v. Logan,'0 90 a case from the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District, four people decided to rob a service
station. 1091 Because the service station employees might have recognized the
defendant's van, the defendant's role was to locate another vehicle to use in the
robbery. 1092 After an unsuccessful attempt at finding a new vehicle, the group
decided to approach the service station on foot, rob the store, and then escape in
the service station attendant's car. 1° 93 Two members of the group then robbed
the store, escaped in a customer's vehicle, and met up with the defendant and
another member of the group.1°94 The court stated that Missouri's law limited
the "defendant's liability for ... other conduct, however, with its ubiquitous
requirement of a 'culpable mental state."' 10 95 The court found that the defendant
was liable because he had the "'knowledge' that the second robbery could result
from the conduct he purposefully promoted." 109 The court specifically rejected
the defendant's claims that the law required a specific "'purpose to promote"'
for the secondary offense but also rejected the State's argument for liability
under a "natural and probable consequences" rule.'
0 97
However, in State v. Workes, 1°98 a rape case from the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District, the court used a broader approach than that of
1089. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041.1(2) (West 1999) ("A person is criminally responsible
for the conduct of another when ... [e]ither before or during the commission of an offense with the
purpose of promoting the commission of an offense, he aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such
other person in planning, committing or attempting to commit the offense.").





1095. Id. at 65 (citing MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.016.1, 562.036 (West 1999)).
1096. Id.
1097. Id. at 65.
1098. 689 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
[VOL. 60:237
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the Logan court.'0 99 Here, the defendant and the principal forcibly took the
victim into a vehicle and forced her to perform fellatio on the defendant and
principal.' 100 Later, they drove her to a park where the principal raped her while
the defendant was not present.101 The defendant argued that he and the
principal intended to commit sodomy in the park, not rape; therefore, the
defendant claimed he did not have the requisite intent to aid and abet a rape.102
While this Missouri appellate court did not use the "natural and probable
consequences" language explicitly rejected in Logan, it did comment that the
defendant would be responsible for those crimes he could "reasonably
anticipate" from the underlying criminal conduct." 03 The court ruled that the
defendant had the intent to assist the principal in the sexual assault despite the
fact that he believed the assault would be of a "different orifice.'""0 4 In any
event, the "reasonably anticipate" nomenclature in Workes sounds remarkably
similar in scope to the "natural and probable consequences" test Logan
explicitly rejected.' 105
b. Ohio
Ohio courts that have analyzed the requisite mental state for accomplice
liability found in Ohio's "complicity" statute' 0 6 also seem to have differing
approaches. In State v. Johnson,1107 a group from the Crips street gang stole two
vehicles to commit a drive-by shooting on a member of the Bloods street gang
in retaliation for previous drive-by shootings the Bloods had committed.
While looking for a Bloods gang member, the defendant accompanied the group
to an apartment building where one of the Crips shot into an apartment, killing a
small girl and injuring three others, despite the fact an individual had told one of
the group that the Bloods member did not live there." 09 A jury convicted the
defendant as an accomplice to one count of aggravated murder and three counts




1103. Id. (citing State v. Logan, 645 S.W.2d 60, 65-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
1104. Id.
1105. See Logan, 645 S.W.2d at 65.
1106. OmO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A) (LexisNexis 2006) ("No person, acting with the
kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1)
Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense .....
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of attempted aggravated murder. 1110 In this 2001 case, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that
to support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting.., the
evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged,
cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of
the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the
principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the crime. 
1111
Here, the court concluded that the defendant was part of a "calculated plan to
kill" the Bloods gang member but killed and injured others instead; as such, he
was criminally "responsible as a complicitor" for the offenses."1 2
In State v. Jackson,"1 '3 the Ohio Court of Appeals in 2003 attempted to
clarify the mental state requirement for complicity for secondary crimes.
1 4
Here, the victim agreed to sell marijuana to the defendant in a parking lot.
11 15
The defendant approached the victim's car, examined the marijuana, and asked
the victim if he could show a portion of it to the principal; the victim agreed,
and the defendant then returned with the principal to complete the sale.111 6 The
principal entered the victim's vehicle, pulled out a gun, and when the victim
went to reach for his own gun, the principal shot him.111 7 The defendant later
claimed that the victim was a business associate with whom he shared drug
profits, and as such, he had no intention to be involved in a robbery.
Nevertheless, a jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery and
felonious assault. r119 The appellate court stated:
[T]he culpability necessary to sustain the conviction of an aider and
abettor "will be presumed where the crime committed by a principal in
furtherance of a common design to commit a criminal offense
reasonably could have been contemplated by the aider and abettor as a
1110. Id. at 798-99.
1111. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
1112. Id. at 801-02.
1113. No. 03AP-273, 2003 WL 22511528 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003).
1114. See id. at *7.
1115. Id. at *1.
1116. Id.
1117. Id.
1118. Id. at "3.
1119. Id. at "4.
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natural and probable consequence of the commission of that criminal
offense." 1120
Here, the appellate court concluded there was evidence to support that (1)
defendant had intended to participate in a robbery of the victim, and (2) "the
serious physical harm caused to the victim[, the felonious assault,] was a natural
and probable consequence of the plan."' 12 ' Thus, while Johnson follows the
Category II approach as codified in the Ohio accomplice statute, 122 the Jackson
opinion obviously reflects a Category 11 analysis. Consequently, it is difficult
to categorize Ohio.
c. West Virginia
West Virginia's statute does not address an accomplice's mental state.1121
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has relied on its "concerted action
principle," which does not use standard Category 11 language in describing the
scope of its accomplice law but seems to follow a somewhat comparableS • 1124 12
analysis. For example, in State v. Fortner,1125 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia affirmed the defendant's conviction for multiple sexual crimes
on a theory of accomplice liability.1126 In this case, the defendant and four other
men were driving around when they spotted a twenty-three-year-old woman
using a pay phone. 1127 One participant "grabbed the woman, told her he had a
gun, and forced her into the car."" 2 8 A second participant drove "the group
three or four miles to a wooded area at the end of a dirt road.' ,1129 For around
two hours, "the five men forced the woman to engage in multiple acts of sexual
1120. Id. at *7 (quoting State v. Hendrick, No. 53422, 1988 WL 18767, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 18, 1988)).
1121. Id.
1122. See OffOREV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (2007).
1123. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-6 (LexisNexis 2005) ("In the case of every felony,
every principal in the second degree, and every accessory before the fact, shall be punishable as if
he were the principal in the first degree .... ). However, the statute does require that the defendant
"knowingly aid and abet" a few crimes. Id. § 61-2-14e (listing kidnapping, holding hostage,
demanding ransom, concealment of a minor child, and several other crimes).
1124. See State v. Foster, 656 S.E.2d 74, 80-81 (W. Va. 2007) (stating that under the
"concerted action" principle the defendant must have "shared the criminal intent of the principal"
but is "not required to have intended the particular crime ... but only to have knowingly intended
to assist.., the design" of the principal (quoting State v. Fortner, 387 S.E.2d 812, 823 (W. Va.
1989))).
1125. State v. Fortner, 387 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1989)
1126. Id. at 822-26, 832.
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intercourse."113 0 The woman begged for release but was "forced back into the
car and driven around [the town] while her assailants discussed what to do with
her."" 31 Eventually, the group drove to a tavern in another town, where a
participant led the woman "to a [nearby] creek bank, sexually assaulted her, and
attempted to choke her."" 32 After about an hour the woman succeeded in
convincing the participant to take her home.11 33 When they arrived at the
woman's apartment, they found her husband waiting and the participants
fled. 1134 The police caught the men shortly thereafter.' 135
At trial, the defendant admitted participating in two separate sexual acts
with the victim but insisted "that he had participated only because he feared
what his companions might do or say if he intervened on her behalf or refused
to go along."11 36 The defendant denied that he "encouraged or assisted the
others in committing [the] offenses against the victim."" 1 37 In addition, the
defendant was able to establish that he was not present during several of the
later sexual assaults committed by the other participants." 38 Nevertheless, a jury
convicted the defendant of ten counts of sexual assault and ten counts of sexual
abuse, with sixteen of these counts as an aider and abettor.
1139
In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia noted:
To be convicted as an aider and abettor, the law requires that the
accused "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his action to make it succeed." The State must demonstrate that
the defendant "shared the criminal intent of the principal in the first
degree." In this regard, the accused is not required to have intended the
particular crime committed by the perpetrator, but only to have
knowingly intended to assist, encourage, or facilitate the design of the
criminal actor. The intent requirement is relaxed somewhat where the
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Thus, under the concerted action principle, a defendant who is
present at the scene of a crime and, by acting with another, contributes
to the criminal act, is criminally liable for such offense as if he were the
sole perpetrator.' 140
Here, the defendant actively participated in the criminal venture including
removing the victim's clothes and otherwise "shared the festive and boisterous
attitude of his companions towards the entire episode."' 1141 Further, the court
ultimately concluded that there was "no evidence that the defendant ever
disassociated himself from the criminal enterprise, much less expressed any
disapproval of or opposition to the acts of his companions." 1142 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held the defendant liable for all of
the sex crimes committed by the actual perpetrators.' 143
In a later Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decision, the court
relied on a standard Category 1I "shared intent" analysis. In State v. Deem,
1144
the defendant was with a group of people when they allegedly heard a person on
the street shout a derogatory term.1145 The term provoked the defendant's group
to pull over, get out of their cars, and grab clubs from their trunks.
Subsequently, one member of the defendant's group assaulted the victim. 1147 A
jury convicted the defendant of aiding and abetting the assault based on the
State's theory that the defendant provided "moral support" to the
codefendant.1148 While the defendant testified that he had a club with him, there
was undisputed testimony that he never spoke to the victim or the principal
before the assault." 1
49
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia indicated in Deem that the
"State must demonstrate that the defendant 'shared the criminal intent of the
principal in the first degree.""' 50 Here, the defendant "associated himself with
the criminal venture perpetrated" by the principal and "shared in [the
principal's] criminal intent by supporting, encouraging and facilitating [the
principal's] assault on the victim."' .51 The court concluded that although the
1140. Id. at 823-25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1141. Id. at 824.
1142. Id. at 826.
1143. Id. at 817,832.
1144. 456 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1995) (per curiam).
1145. Id. at 24.
1146. Id.
1147. Id. at 25.
1148. Id.
1149. Id.
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defendant did not expect or intend that the victim be assaulted, he "admittedly
knew that trouble was likely to occur," and "[r]ather than disassociating himself
from the group .... the [defendant] chose to participate with the group in the
ensuing confrontation which resulted in the assault.
At first blush, West Virginia seems to be a Category II state. However,
when West Virginia courts invoke the "knowingly assist a design of the
S1153 1154perpetrator" approach, as they did in State v. Fortner 1and other opinions,
it is unclear whether they are following a Category I purposive approach or
Category 11 common design thinking, like that found in Illinois." 55 West
Virginia courts have not adopted the classic natural and probable consequences
thinking of the Category 11 model, consistently followed a pure shared intent
analysis like the other Category II jurisdictions, or demanded specific intent to
aid and abet as in the Category I model. Because of the lack of clarity reflected
in the West Virginia decisions, it is impossible to categorize this state.
B. Nonuniform Rules
The final group of cases in this Part of the Article reflects states with novel
or unusual approaches in determining their mental state requirement for aiding
and abetting-Colorado, Nevada, and Washington.
1. Colorado
Colorado, similar to Nevada (discussed below)," 56 casts a wide net
regarding unintended crimes requiring recklessness or negligence, but it follows
a narrow approach akin to Category I when the principal offense requires either
intent or knowledge.11 57 If one examines the face of the Colorado complicity
statute, it requires no less than "intent to promote or facilitate the commission of
1152. Id. at27-28.
1153. 387 S.E.2d 812, 823 (W. Va. 1989) (citing Harper, 365 S.E.2d at 73; State v. West,
168 S.E.2d 716, 721-22 (W. Va. 1969)).
1154. See State v. Foster, 656 S.E.2d 74, 84 (W. Va. 2007) (quoting Fortner, 387 S.E.2d at
823); State v. Wade, 490 S.E.2d 724, 737 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting State v. Kirkland, 447 S.E.2d
278, 284 (W. Va. 1994)).
1155. See People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 33 (111. 1974) (quoting People v. Armstrong,
243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ill. 1968)).
1156. See infra Part IV.B.2.
1157. Compare Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191 (Nev. 2005) (rejecting the natural and
probable consequences doctrine for specific intent crimes, but declining to reject it with respect to
general intent crimes), with Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Colo. 2005) (holding that
knowledge is the required mental state for reckless manslaughter), and People v. Bass, 155 P.3d
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the offense."" 58 When one studies the Colorado case law, the matter becomes
more complicated.
In People v. Wheeler,1159 the Colorado Supreme Court stated the "'intent'
referred to in the complicity statute is not defined according to [the statutory
provision], which defines 'intentionally' and 'with intent' as those terms are
used in the 'offenses' set forth in the criminal code."' 160 Instead, in the context
of a negligent homicide prosecution, the court concluded the following:
This language does not require that the complicitor intend for the
principal to cause death. The complicitor also need not intend for the
principal to act in a criminally negligent manner. This language only
requires knowledge by the complicitor that the principal is engaging in,
or about to engage in, criminal conduct. Thus, the jury could find [the
defendant] guilty of criminally negligent homicide on a theory of
complicity if it believed that she knew ... the principal[] was about to
engage in conduct that was a gross deviation from the standard of care11 • 1161
that a reasonable person would exercise.
One should note that a dissenting justice in Wheeler criticized "[t]he majority's
statement that the defendant is guilty if she knew the principal was going to
engage in any criminal conduct whatsoever."11
62
Later, in Bogdanov v. People,"63 the court clarified that "the rule of
Wheeler should only be applied to crimes defined in terms of recklessness or
negligence, and should not be applied to dispense with the requirement that the
complicitor have the requisite culpable mental state of the underlying crime
with which he is charged."' 164 For example, the Bogdanov court said, "[T]he
rule of Wheeler does not apply when aggravated robbery is the underlying crimeS ,,1 165
because it is not a crime of recklessness or negligence. Here, the court was
careful to point out that it was not inclined to accept wholesale the Category III
approach when it noted, "The Colorado General Assembly chose not to extend
accomplice liability to reasonably foreseeable crimes, but rather limited such
1158. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (2008) ("A person is legally accountable as principal
for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in
planning or committing the offense.").
1159. 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989).
1160. Id. at 103 (citing People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892, 894 (Colo. 1981)).
1161. Id. at 103-04 (citations omitted).
1162. Id. at 107 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1163. 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Griego v. People, 19 P.3d
1, 7-8 (Colo. 2001).
1164. Id. at251.
1165. Id. at 251 n.9.
2008]
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liability to those particular crimes which the accomplice intended to promote or
facilitate."' 166
In Grissom v. People,1167 a Colorado trial court, "after deliberation under a
theory of complicity," convicted the defendant of vehicular eluding and first
degree murder. 168 In this case, the principal won a dice game against the victim
and then "became angry when [the victim] refused to pay him."'1169 The
defendant observed the game, "later agreed to help [the principal] find [the
victim] to collect the alleged debt," and, in fact, "drove [the principal] to several
locations in the next few days in search of [the victim].'" About "one week
after the dice game, [the victim] was fatally shot near the motel where he had
been staying .... The police responded to the crime scene, saw a [suspect car]
and pursued it." Following a car chase, the suspects wrecked their car, the
defendant and the principal fled from the vehicle, and the police arrested them
during a chase on foot. The police found two handguns and jewelry, all
stained with blood, in the general area."172 After testing the clothing of the
defendant and the principal, the police determined that the principal had been
the shooter.'
173
At trial, the defendant argued that he "did not know what [the principal]
intended and that [he] merely intended to help [the principal] recover his
gambling debt."' 74 The defendant also argued that he was "very close" to the
victim and consequently would not have helped the principal kill the victim. 1175
The defendant requested an instruction on reckless manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of first degree murder, but the trial court refused; instead, it
provided instructions on complicity, first degree murder, robbery, and vehicular
eluding." 
76
The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing again for the inclusion of
the lesser included offense instruction, but the Colorado Court of Appeals
rejected his argument, holding that there "must be evidence that the principal
committed the lesser crime" for the defendant to receive the lesser included
offense instruction. 1177 Defendant then brought his same argument before the
1166. Id. at 251 n.8.
1167. 115 P.3d 1280 (Colo. 2005).








1176. Id. at 1282-83.
1177. Id. at 1283 (citing People v. Grissom, No. 00CA1407, 2003 WL 22113721, at *1
(Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003), rev'd, 115 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Colo. 2005)).
[VOL. 60:237
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Supreme Court of Colorado, which held that the trial court should have included
the instruction." 178 In reaching this conclusion, the court examined liability for
unintentional crimes, citing People v. Wheeler,1179 in which the Supreme Court
of Colorado held that Colorado's complicity statute "only requires knowledge
by the complicitor that the principal is engaging in, or about to engage in,
criminal conduct."' 180 The court then provided the following explanation:
Wheeler is consistent with cases from other states holding that
accomplice liability extends to unintentional crimes committed by the
principal when the complicitor and the principal are acting in a
"common enterprise."...
In these "common enterprise" cases, where both parties [act] in
concert to commit a threshold crime, but the principal ultimately
commits a more serious crime than the complicitor initially intended,
the complicitor can be held liable for the crime committed by the
principal.' 181
The court went on to examine the intent requirement expressly written into the
Colorado complicity statute:
We observed in Wheeler that the General Assembly defined
complicity liability to extend to those acts done with the "intent to
promote or facilitate" criminal conduct, but that in the complicity
context as articulated in [the complicity statute], "intent" retains its
"common meaning" and is not synonymous with the statutory
definition of "intent" which applies to other crimes.
... [W]e do not require that the complicitor himself intend to
commit the crime that the principal commits for crimes defined in
terms of recklessness and negligence. In those cases, the complicitor
must only intend to aid or assist the principal to engage in conduct that
"grossly deviates from the standard of reasonable care and poses a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another."
Some commentators have argued that accomplice liability should
extend only to those specific and intentional crimes that the complicitor
intended to facilitate and that the principal committed. Under this
1178. Id. at 1288.
1179. 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989).
1180. Grissom, 115 P.3d at 1283 (quoting Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 104) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1181. Id. at 1284 (emphasis added).
2008]
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alternative interpretation, one cannot be a complicitor to the principal's
commission of a crime requiring the mental states of recklessness or
negligence. One commentator lamented that this court's "extension of
accomplice liability for unintended crimes is too broad."
The Model Penal Code does not extend accomplice liability to the
principal's unintentional acts based on a concern that imposing
accomplice liability in this context is only appropriate when the
accomplice shares the principal's mental state and facilitates the
principal's conduct....
Under the Model Penal Code's formulation, accomplice liability is
not imposed even when.., the party to be charged as an accomplice
has actual knowledge that criminal activity will occur. Although the
Colorado General Assembly has incorporated many of the Model Penal
Code provisions into [the] criminal code, the legislature has adopted a
complicity statute that is substantially different from the Model Penal
Code formulation....
We decline to adopt the theory of complicity liability discussed in
the Model Penal Code.
1182
Thus, the Supreme Court of Colorado established that in Colorado,
"accomplice liability tracks that degree of knowledge which the complicitor's
actions of aiding and abetting evince and where the complicitor is engaged in a
common enterprise with the principal, he or she may be held liable as a
complicitor for reckless crimes.""183 Reiterating Wheeler, the Grissom court
held that in cases of reckless and negligent crimes, the mental state necessary
for conviction as an accomplice or complicitor "only requires knowledge by the
complicitor that the principal is engaging in, or about to engage in, criminal
conduct" of some sort." 184 Here, the court limited the Wheeler holding to
common enterprise cases, stating that "[u]nder such circumstances, a defendant
can be held liable for reckless manslaughter as a complicitor."" 85 The court
made the following determination:
Based on the evidence in this case, the jury could reasonably have
accepted the evidence [offered by the defense] that [the defendant]
merely intended to help [the principal] find [the victim] to collect the
1182. Id. at 1284-86 (citations omitted).
1183. Id. at 1286.
1184. Id. at 1283 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 104 (Colo. 1989)) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1185. Id. at 1288.
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alleged debt, and that [the defendant] believed he was helping [the
principal] collect his debt by a means short of murder. At the same
time, the jury could have reasonably believed that both [the defendant]
and [the principal] engaged in reckless conduct.
... From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that [the
defendant] and [the principal] were engaged in a common enterprise to
at least assault [the victim] in the course of collecting the debt, thereby
exposing [the defendant] to liability for reckless manslaughter .... 1186
Thus, while the Colorado accomplice law accepts a broad approach when it
examines unintended crimes requiring recklessness or negligence, post-Grissom
appellate cases involving crimes requiring specific intent, such as attempted
robbery, state that the defendant "must intend for his or her own conduct to
further the principal's crime," with no mention made of the Wheeler-Grissom
doctrine.1187
2. Nevada
The Nevada accomplice statute contains no explicit mental state.11
8 8
However, the Nevada case law interprets the state's accomplice law as requiring
proof of a mental state that is different for specific intent crimes than it is for
general intent crimes."189 For example, in Sharma v. State," 9° the State charged
the defendant with attempted murder.'191 At trial, the defendant claimed that
although he knew a companion had a gun during a dispute among a group of
several men, he never intended that one of the group shoot the victim." 92 The
trial court "failed to inform the jury that to convict [the defendant] of aiding and
abetting an attempted murder, [the defendant] must have aided and abetted...
1186. Id. at 1287.
1187. See, e.g., People v. Bass, 155 P.3d 547, 551 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming an
attempted robbery conviction).
1188. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.020 (LexisNexis 2006) ("Every person concerned
in the commission of a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, whether he directly commits
the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission, and whether present or absent;
and every person who, directly or indirectly, counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or
otherwise procures another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor is a principal,
and shall be proceeded against and punished as such. The fact that the person aided, abetted,
counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded, induced or procured, could not or did not entertain a
criminal intent shall not be a defense to any person aiding, abetting, counseling, encouraging,
hiring, commanding, inducing or procuring him.").
1189. See Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 201 (Nev. 2005).
1190. 56 P.3d 868 (Nev. 2002).
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with the specific intent to kill."''11 3 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed,"
94
assuming the jury relied on a natural and probable consequence analysis in
arriving at its verdict.' 95 The court provided the following reasoning:
[The natural and probable consequences] doctrine has been harshly
criticized by "[m]ost commentators ... as both 'incongruous and
unjust' because it imposes accomplice liability solely upon proof of
foreseeability or negligence when typically a higher degree of mens rea
is required of the principal." It permits criminal "liability to be
predicated upon negligence even when the crime involved requires a
different state of mind." Having reevaluated the wisdom of the
doctrine, we have concluded that its general application in Nevada to
specific intent crimes is unsound precisely for that reason: it permits
conviction without proof that the accused possessed the state of mind
required by the statutory definition of the crime....
... [T]he doctrine thus "allows a defendant to be convicted for
crimes the defendant may have been able to foresee but never
intended."
... Because the natural and probable consequences doctrine
permits a defendant to be convicted of a specific intent crime where he
or she did not possess the statutory intent required for the offense, we
hereby disavow and abandon the doctrine.
Accordingly, we... hold that in order for a person to be held
accountable for the specific intent crime of another under an aiding or
abetting theory of principal liability, the aider or abettor must have
knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the other person
commit the charged crime.
Thus, the Sharma court was clearly insisting on a Category I analysis for
specific intent crimes.
In Bolden v. State,1197 the defendant and four other masked men "broke into
[a family's] apartment looking for drugs and money.""198 Some or all of the men
robbed the family while brandishing weapons; however, the police apprehended
1193. /d.at873.
1194. /d.at875.
1195. See id. at 873.
1196. Id. at 871-72 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(footnote call numbers omitted).
1197. 124 P.3d 191 (Nev. 2005).
1198. Id. at 193.
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all of the men at the scene." 199 The State charged the defendant with burglary,
home invasion, kidnapping, robbery, and conspiracy.' The State alleged three
alternative theories to support the defendant's liability: (1) direct involvement in
the crimes, (2) aiding and abetting his cohorts, and (3) vicarious co-conspirator
liability. 12° 1 A jury convicted the defendant of all counts, 1202 but it was unclear
upon which theory the jury relied. 1
203
The Nevada Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out the
following:
When alternate theories of criminal liability are presented to a jury and
all of the theories are legally valid, a general verdict can be affirmed
even if sufficient evidence supports only one of the theories. When any
one of the alleged theories is legally erroneous, however, reversal of a
1204general verdict is [generally] required....
The supreme court concluded that "the State presented sufficient evidence for
the jury to convict [the defendant] under all of its theories of culpability."',
20 5
First, the court felt that there was evidence that would allow the jury to find
liability under a direct involvement analysis. 126 Second, the court felt there was
a basis for finding the defendant had "knowingly and with criminal intent
aid[ed] and abet[ted] in [the offense's] commission."'1 20 7 Here, the court noted
the trial court's instruction had insisted on proof of specific intent for any aiding
and abetting. 128 However, the court "call[ed] into question the legal viability of
the State's remaining theory of vicarious coconspirator liability" because the
trial court had instructed the jury on that theory using a "probable and natural
consequences of the object of the conspiracy" instruction for the specific intent
crimes of burglary and kidnapping. 1209 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded
that a court may not hold a defendant criminally liable for a specific intent
crime a coconspirator commits because that crime was a natural and probable




1201. Id. at 194.
1202. Id. at 192-93.
1203. See id. at 201.
1204. Id. at 194-95 (citing Phillips v. State, 119 P.3d 711, 716 (Nev. 2005)).
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Although we refuse to adopt the natural and probable consequences
doctrine in general, our decision is limited to vicarious coconspirator
liability based on that doctrine for specific intent crimes only. The
mental state required to commit a general intent crime does not raise
the same concern as that necessary to commit a specific intent
crime.... To hold a defendant criminally liable for a specific intent
crime, Nevada requires proof that he possessed the state of mind
required by the statutory definition of the crime. Although we affirm
[the defendant's] conviction for the general intent crimes of home
invasion and robbery, we conclude that in future prosecutions,
vicarious coconspirator liability may be properly imposed for general
intent crimes only when the crime in question was a "reasonably
foreseeable consequence" of the object of the conspiracy. 1211
Thus, the court felt compelled to reverse the specific intent crimes of burglary
and kidnapping but not the general intent crimes of home invasion and
robbery. 121
In conclusion, in Sharma, the Nevada Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
Category III approach for aiding and abetting specific intent crimes without
comment about its feelings toward general intent offenses. In Bolden, the
court rejected the natural and probable consequences approach in connection
with vicarious co-conspirator liability in prosecutions of specific intent crimes
but accepted it for general intent crimes, which suggests the court would follow
the same dichotomy in aiding and abetting cases.
3. Washington
Washington's accomplice liability law reflects yet another unique approach.
Washington's courts appear to follow a traditional Category I approach to
accomplice liability with the exception of requiring knowledge on the part of
the accomplice rather than intent, which is consistent with Washington's
complicity statute. 12 15 In State v. Stein, 121 the defendant, a delusional paranoiac,
1211. Id. at 201 (footnote call numbers omitted).
1212. Id.
1213. See Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (Nev. 2002).
1214. See Bolden, 124 P.3d at 201.
1215. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(3)(a) (West 2000) ("A person is an
accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: ... With knowledge that it will
promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he (i) solicits, commands, encourages, or
requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning
or committing it .... ); see also State v. Roberts 14 P.3d 713, 735 (Wash. 2001) ("The language
of the accomplice liability statute establishes a mens rea requirement of 'knowledge' of 'the
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asked the principal to "arrange 'accidents' for people [he] believed were
depriving him of his inheritance" in exchange for $10,000 for each person
eliminated. 12 17 One victim was killed, and though another targeted person
resigned as caretaker of the defendant's father's estate, the defendant stated he
wished to see that person dead anyway. 12 18 The court instructed the jury that it
could convict the defendant either as (1) an accomplice if he had "knowledge"
his actions would facilitate a crime, or (2) as a coconspirator if it was
"reasonably foreseeable" his agreement would lead to such a crime. The jury
convicted the defendant of murder and attempted murder but acquitted theS 1220
defendant of conspiracy. The trial court's jury instructions allowed the jury
to convict him vicariously of his co-conspirators' crimes without proof of
knowledge. 122 1 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed an appellate court
reversal of the conviction, holding that despite the fact that the crime was
reasonably "foreseeable," a court cannot hold a defendant liable under
Washington complicity law without a finding of the requisite knowledge. In
this case, the court categorically rejected a Category T1i analysis for both
conspiracy and accomplice liability. 
1223
The Supreme Court of Washington applied this same analysis two years
later. In State v Berube, 122 a jury convicted two parents of homicide by abuse
when their child died from injuries they allegedly inflicted. 12 25 The mother of
the child challenged her conviction based on accomplice liability, claiming that
evidence of her complicity in the child's death was insufficient to warrant
instructions for accomplice liability. 12 26 The Supreme Court of Washington
crime.' The statute's history, derived from the Model Penal Code, establishes that 'the crime'
means the charged offense. The Legislature, therefore, intended the culpability of an accomplice
not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has 'knowledge'...." (citations
omitted)). Although a footnote in Roberts suggests that Washington law is consistent with Model
Penal Code § 2.06(4) as well as § 2.06(3), Roberts, 14 P.3d at 735 n.13, the Roberts court
interpreted the Washington accomplice statute as requiring the State to prove the accused knew his
conduct would aid and abet the charged offense rather than requiring it to prove he acted with the
culpability required for the commission of the offense, id. at 736, which offense could conceivably
require a lesser mental state such as recklessness. Therefore, the author chose not to categorize
Washington as a Category II jurisdiction.
1216. 27 P.3d 184 (Wash. 2001).
1217. Id. at 185.
1218. Id. at 185-86.
1219. Id. at 188.
1220. Id. at 186.
1221. Id. at 188-89.
1222. Id.
1223. Id.
1224. 79 P.3d 1144 (Wash. 2003).
1225. Id. at 1146-47.
1226. Id. at 1151.
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disagreed, stating that although an accomplice must know one's assistance
might promote a crime, the defendant "need not participate in or have specific
knowledge of every element of the crime nor share the same mental state as theS • ,,1227
principal. The court sustained the defendant's conviction, stating that the
evidence clearly showed she "knew her actions would promote the abuse and
that she encouraged the abusive behavior."' 1228 Therefore, it appears Washington
essentially follows an approach analogous to Category I in that it requires a
mental state carrying a higher degree of culpability than that required under
either the Category I or the Category II model, yet this mental state is
knowledge rather than specific intent.
VII. CONCLUSION
A study of the criminal accomplice liability statutes and case law
interpretations of this legislation in the fifty American states reveals a variety of
approaches regarding the mental state required for conviction of the person
traditionally described as the aider and abettor. This Article shows that ten
states have case law reflecting either (1) a very novel approach not followed
elsewhere, (2) conflicting views between appellate districts, or (3) very few
opinions, perhaps quite dated, which made generalizations about these states
impossible. However, while all fifty states were examined both in terms of their
accomplice liability legislation and case law, forty states have a sufficient
number of judicial decisions which allow for some conclusions regarding their
particular stance on the accomplice's mental state requirement. After a
collective study of these forty states, some patterns emerged, reflecting
essentially three different approaches to the subject.
The perspective that a person should not be saddled with criminal liability
as an accomplice unless that person specifically intended to promote or
facilitate the actual perpetrator's commission of the offense charged is not the
prevailing view in the majority of states. If one focuses on the accomplice
legislation of the respective states, a significant minority of states follow this
view, described in this Article as a Category I approach; 12 29 however, if one
then examines the case law of these as well as the other jurisdictions, one finds
that little more than a handful of states follow this view.230
The Model Penal Code defines an accomplice as one who either (1) acts
with "the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the [particular]
1227. Id. (citing State v. Sweet, 980 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Wash. 1999); State v. Hoffman, 804
P.2d 577, 605 (Wash. 1991)).
1228. Id.
1229. See supra Part H.A.
1230. See supra Part III.
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offense" charged, or (2) "[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an
offense," acts with the kind of mental culpability required for conviction of the
substantive offense. 123 1 However, most states do not follow this dual scheme of
accomplice law in their "accomplice," "complicity," or "aiding or abetting"
legislation 123 2 or in their case law.1233 On the other hand, a significant minority
of states do, in fact, predicate accomplice liability on some variation of the
Model Penal Code's second prong-sharing with the principal the mental state
required for actual commission of the substantive crime-but on the whole, do
not limit this approach to result-based crimes as does the Model Penal Code.
Thus, these states, which comprise what this Article describes as the Category II
approach, follow a statutorily prescribed mental state model that simply looks to
the mens rea required of the substantive crime charged.
Finally, there exists a third grouping of states that have the most far
reaching mental state requirement for accomplice liability: it neither requires the
accomplice to have intended the criminal result carried out by the actual
perpetrator nor have shared with the perpetrator the mental state required for
commission of the substantive crime charged. Instead, the accomplice laws of
these states reach offenses that accomplices did not intend or contemplate but
that were "natural and probable," "natural and foreseeable," or "reasonably
anticipated" consequences, or the like, of lesser criminal wrongdoing that the
alleged accomplice actually had in mind. These twenty states, which make up
the Category 1II jurisdictions for purposes of this Article, have the largest
following with regards to this thorny, but critical, component of American
criminal law.1234 While scholars may criticize this approach, 1235 as was the case
when the American Law Institute prepared the Model Penal Code, 1236 those who
are disciples of the Category 1II thinking believe substantive criminal law must
send a strong message of deterrence. History has shown that those inclined to
urge or assist others, perhaps in only some peripheral way, to hop the train
traveling in the direction of some form of criminality may eventually find that
they have facilitated a runaway train. Consider the now convicted youngster in
Illinois who joined another bent on merely "kicking the ass" of someone, only
to see the perpetrator lose total control of his emotions and kill another human
being. 1237 Thus, the message seems clear: don't hop that train.
1231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)-(4) (1962)
1232. See supra Part lV.A.
1233. See supra Part lV.B.
1234. See supra Part V.
1235. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 13.3, at 688; Rogers, supra note 23, at 1360-61.
1236. See id. cmt. b n.42.
1237. See People v. Duncan, 698 N.E.2d 1078, 1080-81 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
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